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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The objective of this project was to examine the cost and operational feasibility of 
developing a tactically controlled, operationally responsive satellite system.  The 
approach made use of systems engineering practices based on the Space Mission and 
Analysis and Design (SMAD) process. [Larson W, Wertz J 1999] A specific mission 
scenario, the Philippine Sea Scenario, was chosen to guide and bound the analysis.  The 
scenario led to military requirements that drove the requirements for the space mission.  
These high level mission requirements were devolved into space system requirements by 
conducting a gap analysis to see which of the military requirements were not well served 
by existing tactical system such as Global Hawk.  Appropriate payloads, orbits, and 
constellation sizes were then selected to meet these requirements.  These in turn drove the 
development of a common bus concept.  The concept of operations (CONOPS) and 
ground infrastructure to support such a mission were also examined.  This high level 
space systems engineering exercise provided insights into operations and military utility 
as well as estimated costs for such a system. 
The orbits that have the most utility are in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) between 400 
and 500 kilometers.  Constellation sizes between two and four satellites provided 
acceptable coverage and revisit times. 
The Virtual Mission Operations Center (VMOC) concept gives tactical control of 
the TacSat payload while spacecraft operations and mission control require a globally 
distributed ground infrastructure.  Additional TacSat infrastructure is also required for the 
launch facilities including pre-staged launch vehicles, payloads, and buses.  The cost of 
this infrastructure can be minimized by using existing Air Force ground stations and 
operations facilities. 
The natural shelf life of spacecraft and launch vehicles as well as the need to train 
as we fight requires that there be regular launches of TacSats.  This will lead to regular 
yearly costs associated with the TacSat program but will drive down per unit costs as 
 xx
more satellites are produced.  This should also encourage more rapid development of and 
space qualification of new satellite technologies. 
The procurement and operational costs of a TacSat system are estimated to be 
about $65 million for a constellation of two satellites.  Operations costs of a tactical 
satellite system can be significantly less than the Global Hawk system when operated 
continuously over a one- to two-year period.  
The study shows that there are tactical scenarios in which space capabilities 
provide military utility and cost effectiveness above what is provided by traditional 
tactical assets such as UAVs.  This is particularly true when large operational areas are 





11.0  INTRODUCTION 
This study is a product of students enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) Master of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) program (Space Systems 
Emphasis).  This group project is sponsored by Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 
(SSC) San Diego, the National Space Security Office (NSSO), and the Navy Space Field 
Activity. 
1.1  THESIS STATEMENT 
Tactical Satellite (TacSat) is an operationally responsive and cost effective 
satellite system concept that can provide effective intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and communications support to tactical commanders and warfighters. 
1.2  BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is building a series of tactical satellite 
demonstrations that will be launched and tested over the next several years.  If successful, 
some of the key concepts, such as rapid launch timelines, standards-based bus designs, 
payloads composed of commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) and government-of-the-shelf 
(GOTS) sub-systems, and direct Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) 
connectivity, will fold into a new DoD acquisition effort called Operationally Responsive 
Space (ORS).  Some background on the TacSat and ORS efforts is useful to understand 
the relationships of the various programs and understand the importance of this thesis 
project. 
Small satellites, typically defined as those with a launch weight of less than 1,000 
lbs, have historically been limited to the domain of university efforts and modest 
Research and Development (R&D) projects.  Technological advances in satellite 
materials and micro-electronics over the last 15 years, however, have led to increasingly 
capable university designs that have captured the interest of military payload planners.  
Parallel advances in rocket fabrication and propulsion technologies led to renewed 
interest in the idea of a new family of less-costly, modular launch vehicles.  In 2003, the 
2Air Force Space Command (AFSC) funded an Operationally Responsive Spacelift 
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to find an optimal design for such a family of launch 
vehicles.  The Air Force’s goal is to significantly reduce the per-pound cost to orbit while 
at the same time dramatically reducing the time from launch call-up to on-orbit 
availability.  The results of this study have led to several new launch vehicle programs, 
including the DARPA/U.S. Air Force FALCON demonstration program and the Air 
Force’s Affordable Responsive Spacelift (ARES) development program. 
Nearly in parallel with the ORS AoA, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 
(OSD’s) Office of Force Transformation (OFT) seeded a collaborative initiative to 
investigate and demonstrate the military utility of small satellites that could be launched 
rapidly, with direct SIPRNET connectivity, in response to emerging tactical 
requirements.  This first OFT initiative, TacSat-1, has been led by the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL). 
Shortly following the ORS AoA and the kick-off of TacSat-1, then Under-
Secretary of the Air Force (USECAF) Peter B. Teets endorsed an aggressive plan to 
initiate an overlapping series of TacSat demonstration projects, one each year, to test the 
technical feasibility, affordability, and battlefield utility of small satellites that could be 
stockpiled and managed as tactical military reserve material.  About this same time, the 
AFSC led the development of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) 
proposal, dubbed TacSat-2, to convert a small satellite S&T effort, named Roadrunner, at 
the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) into military utility demonstration.  The 
Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the Army Space Program Office (ASPO) joined the 
ACTD effort, which was approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). 
Shortly after the Teets-endorsed TacSat schedule was announced, OFT, AFRL, 
and the Air Force Space and Missile Command (SMC) established a 4-phase ORS 
Standard-bus program that would produce the bus designs for TacSat-3 and TacSat-4.  
Meanwhile, AFSC organized a joint, ad-hoc TacSat Requirements IPT to establish a 
TacSat mission and payload selection process for TacSats-3, -4, -5, and -6 that included 
input and critique by the various U.S. Component Commands (COCOMS). 
3This early flurry of ORS organization in the 2004 timeframe has led to a number 
of ORS accomplishments in the last two years.  TacSat-1 is complete at NRL and 
awaiting launch on a FALCON launch vehicle in 2007.  TacSat-2 is in final system tests 
at AFRL and awaiting launch on an Minotaur in late 2006 or early 2007.  The TacSat-3 
standard-bus design, payload selection, and contracts awards have been accomplished, 
and TacSat-3 is under construction at AFRL.  The ORS Standard Bus effort is now 
focused on TacSat-4.  The TacSat-4 payload selection was accomplished, and the design 
is now at Critical Design Review (CDR).  The ORS Requirements IPT has initiated a 
TacSat-5 mission selection process.  AF SMC continues both the ARES studies and an 
on-going ORS Common Bus effort, looking at a family of modular bus designs for 
several classes of ORS payloads.  On the programmatic front, both the House and Senate 
Armed-Services Committees have approved funding for a DoD ORS Program of Record 
start in 2008. 
A summary of the four TacSat demonstrations currently underway is useful to 
understanding the context for this thesis project.  For an excellent overview of the TacSat 
missions and ORS program development, see “A TacSat and ORS Update Including 
TacSat-4” [Doyne, 2006]. 
TacSat-1 is sponsored by OFT and managed by NRL.  NRL is also the lead 
developer.  It is scheduled to be launched on the second flight of the SpaceX Falcon-1 
launch vehicle, likely in early 2007.  The overall objective of TacSat-1 has been to 
catalyze DoD and industry toward consideration of small, low-cost satellites and launch 
vehicles as a viable military capability.  The key elements of the TacSat-1 mission 
include a militarily-useful microsatellite, a low-cost launch vehicle, and direct SIPRNET 
access via a web-based Virtual Mission Operations Center (VMOC) for tasking, data 
dissemination, and collaboration.  The payload consists of a Radio Frequency (RF) 
sensor, a visible and infrared imager, and a direct tactical UHF link for EP-3 and, later 
Rivet Joint (RJ), aircraft for cross-platform mission use.  Tasking modes, VMOC 
operation, and TacSat-1 simulation approaches can be found in the Experimentation Plan 
(EXPLAN) For Terminal Fury 06 CPX Initiative: TacSat-1 Operations, December 2005 
[EXPLAN, 2005].  
4The TacSat-2 ACTD is managed by AFRL, who is also the lead developer.  It is 
co-sponsored by AFRL, AFSC, the Air Force Space Test Program (STP), ONR, ASPO, 
and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Advanced Systems and Concepts 
(AS&C).  The ACTD is sponsored by the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).  
TacSat-2 is scheduled for a Minotaur launch in late 2006 or early 2007.  Having grown 
out of the Roadrunner space technology program, it retains many of the original 
Roadrunner experiments, including an On-board Autonomy experiment and experimental 
Hall Effect thrusters.  The ACTD payload suite includes the Target Indicator Experiment 
(TIE, an RF sensor payload similar to the RF payload on TacSat-1), a multi-spectral 
optical imager, and a Common Data link (CDL) communications system.  Like TacSat-1, 
TacSat-2 tasking and data dissemination includes the SIPRNET VMOC.  TacSat-2 offers 
additional communications, however, with the first space-borne CDL, which will transit 
multi-color tactical imagery to an Army Mobile Interoperable Service Terminal (MIST) 
at 274 Mbps.  Pan-imagery and TIE data will be able to be transmitted either via CDL or 
via the S-Band Space Ground Link Subsystem (SGLS).  The TacSat-2 ACTD will focus 
on operational demonstration and military utility assessment (MUA) of the tactical 
satellite concepts. 
TacSat-3 was the first TacSat with a mission focus selected through the joint 
TacSat Requirements IPT process.  A hyperspectral imaging concept was selected, and is 
sponsored by the Army and by AFRL.  TacSat-3 is managed by AFRL.  OFT is funding 
the satellite bus as part of the ORS Standard Bus effort.  TacSat-3 will also carry a small 
tactical data exfiltration (Data-X) payload, funded by ONR.  Like TacSat-2, TacSat-3 
will carry a CDL communications payload for transmitting hyperspectral imagery data to 
tactical image analysts.  TacSat-3 is expected to be complete by mid-2007 and launched 
in late 2007 or early 2008.  The Army and USSTRATCOM are leading the CONOPS 
development and tactical demonstration plans.  For additional info on TacSat-3, see 
“Development of the Tactical Satellite 3 for Responsive Space missions” [Davis, 2006]. 
TacSat-4, also selected through the TacSat Requirements IPT process, is being 
developed as separate bus and payload development efforts, using a standards-based 
interface control document (ICD) as the medium between the two teams.  The bus is 
funded by OFT as part of the ORS Standard Bus effort, and co-managed by NRL and the 
5Johns Hopkins University (JHU) Applied Physics Lab (APL).  The payload is funded by 
ONR under the TacSat Innovative Naval Prototype (INP) Program and managed by NRL.  
TacSat-4 will carry a tactical communications payload in a 4-hr, highly elliptical orbit, 
allowing substantial dwell time over a theater.  The UHF communications payload will 
support Comms-on-the-Move (COTM), Blue Force Tracking (BFT), and Data-X, with a 
focus on providing augmented UHF Satellite Communication (SATCOM) capacity to 
unattended sensor systems, emergent tactical requirements and underserved regions.  The 
TacSat-4 launch is being planned for late 2008 as part of the new Air Force Rocket 
System Launch Program (RLSP). 
1.3  PURPOSE 
There are many technical challenges unique to the development of tactical space 
systems and there are many concept of operations (CONOPS) issues that remain 
unresolved.  The word “tactical” itself has many different meanings among defense 
community representatives.  Decision makers in all the services are grappling with these 
issues as they decide whether or not to move forward with the tactical space concept. 
It is the intention of this study to 1) capture in one place key operationally 
responsive space relevant information and 2) conduct a feasibility analysis using sound 
systems engineering techniques and principles.   
1.4  SCOPE 
This thesis will bound its analysis and provide it greater relevancy by conducting 
it within a specific mission scenario.  The high level mission objectives, requirements, 
and constraints for a tactical space system are all derived from the Philippine Sea 
Scenario. (Appendix C)  All aspects of military and associated civilian operations such as 
humanitarian relief will be considered in scope for this scenario. 
1.5  PROCESS 
The System Engineering process for this study includes requirements analysis, 
functional requirements decomposition, and system concept design analysis.  The 
6requirements analysis section of the study serves to initially bound the analysis and 
provide greater relevancy by conducting operational requirements analysis within a 
specific mission scenario. Bounded by this scenario, subsequent sections of this study 
develop the high level objectives and mission requirements.   
Based on the requirements analysis, functional requirements decomposition is 
performed to determine system level design requirements.  After functional requirements 
are identified, alternatives are examined to determine which of these are best satisfied by 
a tactical space mission rather than traditional national missions or tactical capabilities 
such as those provided by UAVs.  The gaps identified in this analysis identify a handful 
of missions that are best satisfied by a tactical space mission.   
The systems analysis section references the space mission requirements resulting 
from the gap analysis and further breaks them down into system level requirements for a 
possible tactical space system.  This system engineering process then identifies candidate 
payloads and orbits.  This is followed by a determination of certain key system 
parameters such as payload volume, mass, power requirements and pointing and 
stabilization requirements for the proposed payloads.  Orbital parameters further 
determine key parameters for the power system such as length and frequency of eclipse 
periods.  With these data points in hand high level models are developed that describe 
key aspects of the space system.  These are the mass, volume, and power budgets.  This 
level of systems analysis provides the input data for cost estimating relationships to 
predict cost of the TacSat system.  The cost estimating relationships used for this study 
are part of the small satellite cost model provided by Aerospace Corporation.   
Special emphasis is placed on the assessment of TacSat payloads and 
constellations.  Payloads considered include communications, unattended sensor data 
relay, panchromatic imagery, hyper-spectral imagery, and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).  
The analysis of the TacSat bus, launch vehicle, and ground station will be limited to those 
attributes necessary for total system analysis.   
Figures 1-1 and 1-2 illustrate the systems engineering processes used for this 
study.  Figure 1-1 illustrates the overarching system engineering process including 
mission objectives, CONOPS, alternatives, gap analysis, and system concept analysis.  
7Figure 1-2 illustrates the details of the systems concept analysis process.   This was the 



























































Figure 1-2.  Detailed System Concept Analysis Process 
 
92.0  MISSION DEFINITION 
2.1  MISSION NEED 
National space assets, downscaled at the end of the cold war, will continue to be 
oversubscribed by a combination of bandwidth consuming systems, increasing numbers 
of users, and increasing worldwide demand.  Increasing demands for high resolution 
imagery and streaming video combined with the growing numbers of users exceed the 
capacity of current and planned systems.  Furthermore, data from sensor to end-user can 
be time consuming, as can the process for sensor tasking. Prioritization of the Request for 
Information (RFI) at the national level often leaves the tactical commander at the end of 
the line. As the sensor to shooter timeline decreases, the need for the tactical user to have 
direct control and fast response from remote sensors increases.   
Along with increasing demands, denial of service issues will also grow with time.  
The capability of foreign powers to target, damage, or destroy national assets will 
continue to increase.  All space-based systems are subject to damage from natural, 
unpredictable cosmic events that could also preclude timely access to services. U.S. 
Forces’ survival depends upon primary and backup Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), weather and communications from space.   
As a result the DoD Joint and Coalition Forces have a growing mission need for 
highly-responsive overhead sensor and communication systems.  These systems will 
augment current assets and serve as temporary replacements for national assets. 
2.2  SCENARIOS 
The scenario for this study is the Coalition FORCEnet Study – Operation 
Philippine Comfort Scenario.   It was developed by The Technical Cooperation Program 
Maritime (TTCP MAR) Group/Action Group 6 to study the coalition impact of 
participating in the USN FORCEnet program.   The intention of the scenario is to provide 
guidance to each Nation (US/AUS/CAN/NZ/UK) in terms of identifying opportunities to 
participate in FORCEnet, and the operational benefits that might result.  The aim is to 
assist each Nation’s decision making process, by supporting their criteria for evidence to 
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approve such an investment.  The intention of using this scenario for this study is to show 
the possible impact of TacSat on coalition operations and to show the integration points 
between TacSat and FORCEnet.  The movement of data to and from TacSat will be based 
on the principles outlined in FORCEnet. 
The scenario in its entirety in contained in Appendix C. It contains elements that 
allow for the exercising of various Coalition mission sets, including Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Recovery, Force Projection, Force Protection, Anti-Insurgency 
Operations and Geopolitical Stabilization. All of these missions benefit from space-based 
assets and provide a model background for examining the feasibility of a TacSat 
program. 
2.3  THREATS 
Threats derived from this scenario include natural threats, political threats, 
symmetric military threats, and asymmetric threats.  This combination of symmetric and 
asymmetric threats is not unique and this study shows that Tactical Satellites can 
minimize these threats.   
Natural threats include ever present threats posed by the environment such as 
weather phenomena and the unique threats from the volcanic eruptions which include the 
localized immediate danger of pyroclastic flow as well as wide-spread long term danger 
of dust/debris fallout. This study will examine whether TacSat will minimize the impact 
of environmental disasters by providing rapid updates of volcanic activity and the 
associated destruction to decision makers in the region.  TacSat could assist rescuers by 
providing frequent imagery updates as they search for disaster survivors and trek into 
regions where all terrain has been destroyed and altered to the point where available maps 
are no longer useful.    
Political threats include the destabilization and change of governments within the 
region as well as the threats posed by competing countries involvement (e.g. China, 
Russia) in the region and political affairs.  TacSat could address these threats by 
providing movement reports of all activity in the region of interest.   
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Military threats include the military forces of Indonesia, the “insurgents”, and the 
possible indirect interference from other countries.  Military threats include diesel-
electric submarines, small surface combatants, combat aircraft, and land warfare threats 
such as truck loaded rockets.  The military order of battle is detailed in the scenario 
(Appendix C).  TacSat may support managing these threats by providing imagery for 
widely dispersed targets and with revisit rates unattainable by current systems.  TacSat 
can also provide persistent data relay capability for large scale undersea sensors and 
ground sensors.   
Asymmetric threats include terrorist activities from the rebels in the Southern 
Philippines.  This study assumes the hypothesis that “the four principles of Internal 
Defense and Development (IDaD) as currently defined in U.S. Joint Doctrine (1) 
maximum intelligence, (2) minimum violence, (3) unity of effort, and (4) responsive 
government are the applicable variables in defeating the modern asymmetric threat”. 
[Connor, Robert J. Captain, United States Army (2002)]  This study demonstrates TacSat 
provides a vital and unique intelligence capability to support “maximum intelligence”.  
By employing TacSat within the FORCEnet construct, TacSat helps provide “unity of 
effort” through near real-time intelligence sharing across the battlefield. 
2.4  ENVIRONMENT 
The environment needs to be characterized with respect to both indo-atmospheric 
and exo-atmospheric factors.  As a low cost system TacSat needs to carefully consider 
environmental factors in order to maximize performance and minimize design, 
development, and operational costs.   Environmental factors affect satellite design, 
development, construction, launch, sensor performance, orbital characteristics, and 
disposal.  This paper will address only those issues unique to TacSat, Global Hawk, 
commercial satellite systems, or the mission as defined in the Philippine scenario.   The 
entering argument is that the Philippine Islands are a very challenging area for overhead 
surveillance.   Recent operations in the Middle East may have made the task of gathering 
overhead imagery seem relatively easy.  Nathan Hodge of Defense Week noted that:  
12
At the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the agency that collects satellite 
intelligence for the military raced to update its geospatial images of the region. But it had 
one key advantage: Afghanistan is a relatively sparse, open country that makes the task of 
capturing overhead pictures much easier.  
The United States may not have that luxury in the next phase of its war on terror.  
The head of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), [now renamed as the 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency], acknowledged that U.S. satellites and 
reconnaissance aircraft have a more difficult time operating over places like the 
Philippines, where clouds and dense jungle foliage obscure the ground. "The challenge 
posed in the Philippines is very different" from places like Afghanistan or Iraq, said 
retired Air Force Lt. Gen. James Clapper, the director of NIMA (NGA). "That's why you 
need other forms of sensors to compensate for that." [Hodge N, 2002] 
2.4.1  Indo-Atmospheric Environment 
The overall physical region is characterized by unpredictable environmental 
conditions due to multiple volcanic eruptions.  The combination of volcanic activity, 
fires, and heavy rain can dramatically change the lands geography.  The eruptions and 
associated fires may adversely impact visual surveillance and flight operations.  The 
climate is tropical marine and heavy rain can be expected in all regions.  The terrain is 
mostly mountainous with narrow to extensive low lying coastlands with 36,289 km 
(Philippines) of coastline.  Approximately 15 cyclones are expected per year.   
The sea surveillance environment is challenging and includes the extremes of 
both blue water and the littoral.   Water depth ranges from shallow littoral areas to 10,540 
meters in the Mindanao Trench.   
The electromagnetic environment is characterized by interference from weather 
disturbances and high jamming from adversaries, particularly in the UHF spectrum.  
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2.4.2  Environmental Factors for Launch and Flight Operations 
TacSat presents unique challenges in that the launch time must react to the needs 
of the tactical commander.  It is assumed that TacSat must be available year round and 
that the environment around the launch site will be able to support year round operations.  
The environmental conditions for launch include temperate climate and a position along 
the equator (to reduce lift requirements).  The ideal launch area also will have light winds 
and controllable acoustic, vibration, and shock levels.  Since TacSat is not being launched 
from this region the evaluation of weather with respect to launch must be done from the 
planned launch site. 
2.4.3  Environmental Factors for Sensor Performance 
TacSats remote sensing objectives are quite different then those of typical 
commercial satellites.  Commercial systems use full spectrum imagers to record variances 
in vegetation in one spectrum and perhaps measure cloud cover in another.  Within the 
Philippine Sea scenario, TacSats imagery requirements are more limited and need to 
detect objects such as ships in ports, trucks in dense environments and/or detect 
movement of volcanic lava. 
Atmospheric factors that affect sensor performance include absorption (atomic 
and molecular processes), scattering (aerosols-dust, fog, clouds, smoke) and turbulence 
(from temperature variations).    Of these factors scattering due to aerosols is most unique 
to this scenario.   Cloud cover and volcanic ash both act as aerosols and, as a result, may 
have an impact on sensor selection and performance.  Although harder to quantify, the 
humidity resulting from the ocean (and moist ground) may also have an impact on sensor 
performance.  In general, the environment limits the advantages of multi-spectral imagery 
and the primary imagery bands of interest are visible and far infrared.   
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2.4.4  Cloud Cover 
The scenario itself presents several critical environmental problems.  The Area of 
Operations has a high percentage of cloud cover and the mean cloud cover per day may 
exceed 60% in humid tropics.  “It is practically impossible to get well-distributed cloud 
free images in tropical countries like the Philippines”. [Bussieres, Goita 1997]  Data 
provided by Landsat shows that at least 50 percent cloud cover can be expected about 16 
percent of the time, 30 percent cloud cover can be expected about 34 percent of the time, 
and at least some cloud cover (> 10 percent) can be expected about 73 percent of the 
time.  [Pete M, Gardie J 1999] 
The impact of significant cloud cover will affect the choice of imagery sensors for 
TacSat.  As with aerosols, heavy cloud cover limits the advantages of multi-spectral 
imagers, as shown in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1.  Cloud Cover [Pete M, Gardie J 1999] 
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2.4.5  Volcanic Dust (aerosol) 
There are two volcanic plumes defined in the scenario which will impact sensor 
selection and performance.  Volcanic ash can throw aerosols of small particulates up as 
far as the stratosphere, where they can persist for months or years.  However, only if the 
concentration is very strong is there likely to be an effect on vertical or near-vertical 
viewing.   The effect, when it occurs, is fairly broadband, though it appears to be greatest 
in the visible region. [Pease CB, 1991] Therefore, the impact of volcanic plumes in the 
region will drive sensor selection to the middle/far Infrared spectrum.   
2.4.6  Jungle 
The thick vegetation (jungle) environment provides serious challenges for remote 
sensing.  Heavy vegetation has the capacity to block visual and most infrared imagery as 
well as communications downlink to the CDLS/MIST station.   
2.4.7  Indo-Atmospheric Environmental Issues-Conclusion 
The environmental challenges in this scenario are extreme and will limit the 
effectiveness of all imaging sensors.  Although multi-spectral and hyper-spectral imagers 
can produce useful information these environmental conditions do restrict their 
performance and make it difficult to justify the associated complexity and cost.  The most 
cost effective “tactical” sensors in this environment may be panchromatic (visual) and far 
infrared.   
Heavy rain and cloud cover bolster the advantages of lower frequency 
communications such as UHF or S band over higher frequencies such as X, Ku, or Ka for 
general communications requirements.   
Weather can diminish the performance and operation of the payloads of all host 




Hawk, and TacSat); weather most adversely affects Global Hawk.   Rain and clouds have 
no impact of satellite flight operations while they can severely restrict or eliminate Global 
Hawk flight operations. 
2.4.8  Space Environment 
The “space environment” is characterized by near vacuum, low gravitational 
acceleration, ionizing radiation, extreme thermal gradients, micrometeoroids, orbital 
debris and extreme variation in temperatures.  One objective of TacSat design is to 
minimize the need for space hardening to reduce weight and ultimately cost.  To this end 
understanding the space environment is critical in making design trades for both design 
and operation of the TacSat system.  This section outlines a few of the most important 
space environmental factors directly related to the design principles of TacSat. 
2.4.8.1  General Space Environmental Factors 
LEO orbits experience near, but not total, vacuum which results in drag and orbit 
decay.  The consequences of near (but not total) vacuum include the need for propulsion 
and the need to account for chemical reactions between the space atmosphere and 
spacecraft materials.  As a minimum some type of non-oxidizing material will be 
required to account for the oxidizing effects of atomic oxygen.  Electronic circuitry must 
be designed to account for unintended conductive paths (Paschen breakdown).   
Micrometeoroid impacts to spacecraft are rare but they are more common in 
lower orbits due to the gravitational attraction of the earth.  Though space debris is a 
continuing and increasing problem especially at low orbits, TacSat lifespan and low cost 
requirements may dictate that no special protection be engineered to protect against this 
threat.  Some mitigation is inherent in choosing altitudes less than 550 km since the 
debris density seems to be worst at altitudes of 600-1000 km. [Griffin M.D, 2004]  
(Space debris below 550 km is subject to faster orbit decay and reentry into earth 
atmosphere) 
In some cases LEO satellites require protection against space plasma which can 
cause “absolute charging”.  Absolute charging may in turn cause “sputtering” in which 
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large negative charges attract ions to impact and damage the surface of the spacecraft.  
Naturally occurring radiation impacts spacecraft at all altitudes but the impact is 
generally less for LEO then geostationary (GEO) type orbits.  Shielding is less critical for 
spacecraft designed for short life (1-2 years).  Shielding is also less effective for LEO 
satellite as heavier protons (not electrons) dominate LEO altitudes.   
2.4.8.2  Radiation Factors 
TacSat designers must consider the effects of the Van Allen Belts in both design 
and operation.  The Van Allen radiation belts were first detected by the first U.S. satellite 
Explorer I, which was launched during the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. 
They are composed of energetic charged particles trapped inside the Earth's magnetic 
field, which surrounds the Earth like a ring doughnut and vary according to solar activity.   
The location and composition of the belts are not universally agreed upon but they are 
generally thought to be composed of two belts (inner and outer) though some scientists 
have reported belts diverging and converging from 2 to 4 belts.  They have also changed 
in composition over time. 
Scientists have been trying to explain why the number of charged particles inside 
the belts varies so much. A major breakthrough came when two rare space storms were 
observed that occurred in October and November of 2003. During the storms part of the 
Van Allen radiation belt was drained of electrons and then formed much closer to the 
Earth in a region usually thought to be relatively safe for satellites.   "When the radiation 
belts reformed they did not increase according to a long-held theory of particle 
acceleration. Instead, very low frequency radio waves caused the particle acceleration 
and intensified the belts”. [Dyer C, 2003] 
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Figure 2-2.  Van Allen Belts [from Wikipedia] 
 
The outer belt extends between altitudes of about 10,000–65,000 km and has its 
greatest intensity between 14,500 and 19,000 km.  Given these distances, the outer Van 
Allen Belt will not be a factor in TacSat design or operation.   
The “inner” Van Allen Belt generally extends from about 900 km (~600 miles) to 
4800 km (~3,000 miles) altitude.  Importantly, the Inner Van Allen Belt dips down until 
it is only around 321 km (~200 miles) off the surface of the planet over the south Atlantic 
between about 35 and 60 degrees latitude.  “This “anomaly” is a result of the 
displacement of the dipole term in the geomagnetic field away from the Earth's centre, 
there is a region in the South Atlantic where the trapped radiation mirrors lower altitudes.  
This is called the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) or Brazilian Anomaly and dominates 
the radiation received in LEO. In addition, highly inclined LEOs intersect the outer belt 
electrons at high latitudes in the so-called horn regions”. (Figure 2-2) [Dyer C, 2003]  
This inner belt contains high concentrations of energetic protons with energies 
exceeding 100 MeV, trapped by the strong (relative to the outer belts) magnetic fields in 
the region.  “It is believed that protons of energies exceeding 50 MeV in the lower belts 
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at lower altitudes are the result of the beta decay of cosmic ray neutrons. The source of 
lower energy protons is believed to be proton diffusion due to changes in the magnetic 
field during geomagnetic storms.” This belt also contains electrons, low-energy protons, 
and oxygen atoms with energies of 1–100 keV. When these electrons strike the 
atmosphere they cause the polar aurora. [Tascione T.F., 1994] 
Since the Van Allen belts themselves contain concentrations of charged particles, 
going through them presents its own hazard and that radiation can and has caused damage 
to spacecraft in LEO.  Hubble orbits the Earth about every 97 minutes at an altitude of 
about 353 miles (569 kilometers) and inclined at about 51.60 degrees.  It sometimes shuts 
down its electronics when riding through a high radiation zone (such as the Van Allen 
belts over the South Atlantic).  Other space craft such as the Shuttle and the Space Station 
try to avoid radiation damage by staying out of the affected areas.  The space station is 
located in orbit around the Earth at an altitude of approximately 360 km (220 miles).  
Shuttle orbits range from 290 km (for the heavy Columbia) to 360-390 km (space station 
altitude). 
Radiation belts can become more intense as a result of naturally occurring solar 
storms or manmade nuclear explosions.  When the sun acts up, the area outside the Van 
Allen belts becomes thick (i.e., high flux) with dangerous, high-energy charged particles.   
Lead author, Dr Richard Horne of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) says "Solar storms 
can increase radiation in the Van Allen belts to levels that pose a threat to spacecraft.”  In 
1962 a high altitude nuclear burst caused the Van Allen belt radiation to be amplified and 
several satellites ceased operation.   
Spacecraft riding through the Van Allen belts during these events run a high risk 
of both short and long term damage.  Solar cells, integrated circuits, and sensors can all 
be damaged by radiation. Electronics on satellites must be hardened against radiation to 
operate reliably.  Miniaturization and digitization of electronics and logic circuits have 
made satellites more vulnerable to radiation, as incoming ions may be as large as the 
circuit's charge.  “An object satellite shielded by 3 mm of aluminum will receive about 
2500 rem (25 Sv) per year”. [Ptak A, 1997]  The effects of the Van Allen Belts were 
studied for their impact on the SDI Weapons Platforms.  The conclusions were:  “The 
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calculated results show that the SDI platform will survive long term (10 years) exposure 
to natural VAB protons and electrons. However, when the electron belts are enhanced by 
the detonation of a nuclear weapon, high levels of radiation can be expected in 
components mounted on or near the surface of the spacecraft. These dose levels are 
sufficient enough to produce damage in the most sensitive components.” [Barnes JM, 
Santoro RT 1988]  
2.4.9  Exo-atmospheric Environmental Conclusions 
There are advantages in placing remote sensing devices in high altitude orbits 
(>600 km) and there is a trend to raise orbit altitudes for surveillance missions.  The 
consequences are that natural radiation effects are more significant, particularly those 
resulting from trapped protons.  
LtCol (ret) Edward B. Tomme writes in his paper “The Strategic Nature of the 
Tactical Satellite” that “The requirement for satellites in magic orbits (HEO) to regularly 
traverse the inner Van Allen belt will call for some mitigating engineering design to 
ensure that the one-year goal lifetime can be met. This mitigation can come in one of two 
ways: by using radiation-hardened, space-qualified components or by adding additional 
shielding to protect the cheaper commercial off-the-shelf electronics. The first method 
will almost certainly cause the budgetary goals of the program to be exceeded. The 
second method will add significant weight to the system. Neither solution seems 
palatable.”  [Tomme, E.  2006] 
LtCol Tomme is probably correct regarding the requirement to add expensive 
space hardening to TacSat but the “magic HEO” orbit he alludes to may not be the best 
solution for TacSat.  Avoiding challenging space environments can be accomplished by 
careful consideration of altitude and inclination.    It is important to keep spacecraft out of 
challenging radiation environments such as Van Allen Belts.  This is even truer for 
scenarios where nuclear weapons may be used.  Equatorial orbits inclined below 300 and 
below ~600km will minimize the affect of radiation and collisions with micrometeoroids 
and other “space debris”.  An equatorial orbit (supporting this Philippine scenario) 
inclined at <200 will avoid the SAA though TacSat missions in general may have to  
21
account for it if higher inclinations are required.    In general, higher inclinations (about 
300) may require orbits at lower altitudes to avoid radiation and the cost of engineering 
the system to compensate for it.   
It appears that TacSat will incur significant benefit by remaining in orbits with 
altitudes and inclinations that avoid both Van Allen radiation belts and impact with space 
debris and micrometeoroids.  These lower orbits will also help TacSat remain less 
susceptible to the harmful affects of nuclear air bursts.  Optimal altitudes for satellites 
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3.0  REQUIREMENTS 
3.1  MISSION OBJECTIVES 
This chapter establishes the mission objectives based on the Philippine Sea 
scenario described previously.  It begins by establishing desired outcomes for the military 
and humanitarian operations and then describes some of the military operations required 
to achieve these. Space mission objectives are then derived from the military operations 
requirements. Specific performance parameters are then generated based on the space 
mission objectives required to meet the military operations.  
3.1.1  Conduct humanitarian Operations 
The volcanic eruption has caused widespread suffering and there is an urgent need 
to transport necessary supplies into the region.  There is also a need to maintain local 
order and protect both the local population and the non-government organizations (NGO) 
trying to lend assistance. 
3.1.2  Stabilize Local Government 
In order to prevent the radical Islamists from seizing and maintaining control, the 
local government needs to be supported and stabilized.  This involves providing security 
and establishing local order as well as insuring the local government has the 
communication and transportation resources to respond to the needs of its citizens. 
3.1.3  Protect the Oil  
It is important to insure the security of the oil facilities on the Spratly Islands.  
These are attractive targets for Indonesia as well as Islamic radicals seeking to destabilize 
the region.  Loss or damage to these facilities could result in economic hardship both 
locally and globally. 
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3.2  MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
The requirements below describe the military functions and the C4ISR support 
required to occur in order to support the Mission Objectives outlined above.  
3.2.1  Establish a Recognized Situational Awareness Picture 
The situation in the scenario is complex and changing rapidly.  In order to meet 
the objectives outlined in the scenario with minimal risk and minimal application of 
force, it is critical that the situational awareness picture is established and maintained.  
Persistent imagery of activity on both land and sea is required to maintain situational 
awareness.  Communication services are required to support persistent monitoring of 
distributed sensor fields. 
3.2.2  Land and Support Forces Ashore  
In order to meet the operational goals described above, forces will need to be 
landed and supported.  These forces will facilitate transport of supplies, establish security 
and conduct operations against the rebels in the southern islands.  Imagery and 
communications support is required to enable the tactical commander to monitor 
transportation corridors and maintain lines of communication throughout the AOR.  
3.2.3  Coverage 
For this scenario, imagery coverage and communications capability is required 
over widely dispersed Areas of Interest (AoIs) bounded roughly by 7°S and 20°N latitude 
and 105°E and 132°E longitude. 
3.2.4  Suppress Rebels in the Southern Islands  
The rebels in the southern islands pose a clear threat to local security and regional 
stability.  Legitimate control must be established with minimal application of force.   
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Positions and movements of rebels in the Southern Islands must be frequently reported to 
the commander.  Imagery support is required to enable the tactical commander to monitor 
rebel forces in the southern islands. 
3.2.5  Suppress Indonesian Navy (ASUW)  
The government of Indonesia may see it as in their interests to encourage the local 
rebellion.  They have sortied their naval forces and it is important to keep these forces 
from exerting influence while avoiding direct conflict if possible.  Imagery and ELINT 
support is required to track surface forces. 
3.2.6  Suppress Kilo (ASW) 
Perhaps the most serious naval threat from Indonesia is their Kilo class diesel 
electric submarines.  Imagery and ELINT support is required to locate and track these 
and insure they do not get into a position where they may pose a threat to friendly forces. 
3.3  PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
The performance requirements can be developed by decomposing the mission 
functional requirements. Using the functional requirements and the Philippine Sea 
scenario performance requirements were derived to meet the mission needs. A detailed 
breakout of the performance requirements are shown in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2.  
The modeling team used these performance requirements to develop the system 
requirements. Those requirements that could not be meet were discussed with the group 
and trade-offs were made to produce a feasible design.  Although not specifically 
addressed as a requirement, system cost is a critical issue and is addressed in the gap 
analysis and section seven. 
3.3.1  Coverage  
This requirement supports the coverage of both ISR data and communications 
data over the entire AOR. The AOR can be defined as an irregular polygon within 7°S 
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and 20°N latitude and 105°E and 132°E longitude as depicted in Figure 5-1. In addition 
to the geographical coverage requirements, there is an additional requirement to sense in 
restricted airspace undetected by the enemy. 
3.3.2  Capacity 
Data transmission requirements exist for voice, tactical and ISR data. The TacSat 
must have the ability to transmit and route this data within the time allotted to provide the 
Combatant Commander reliable data in near real time. As the data capacity for voice is 
quite small the limiting factor for capacity is the telemetry link for imagery.  To support 
the tactical commander in this scenario TacSat must be able to transmit all imagery data 
in the same pass overhead as it was recorded.  While 1 to 2 Mbps is adequate for 
communications, imagery demands up to 274 Mbps. 
3.3.3  Resolution 
Resolution is a key driver in the development of the TacSat system. To provide 
tactical value to the warfighter imagery must have the ability to obtain the identity of 
many items both large and small such as vehicles, boats, and troop movements. 
3.3.4  Interoperability 
Interoperability can be defined as the systems ability to exchange data with other 
services, systems, units, or forces, and to use those services to operate effectively 
together. [Joint Pub 2001] Specific interoperability requirements for communications and 
imagery are highlighted in the performance requirements section. 
3.3.5  Availability 
The system payload must be available for tasking from the tactical or local joint 
task force commander at all times.   
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3.3.6  Launch Time 
In order to be of use militarily, tight timelines must be maintained for the 
requesting and launching of the tactical space mission.  The JTF commander should 
establish his requirements and communicate them to the tactical space mission operations 
node.  The time from service request to the time the constellation is fully operational 
must be no less then 10 days.   
3.3.7  Duration 
The scenario requirement includes 60 days of high intensity operations, 60 to 360 
days of medium intensity operations, and 60 to 360 days of international contingency 
operations.  Therefore, the minimum duration required is 160 days while the maximum 
duration required is 780 days or just over two years. Two years was selected as the 
duration for the purposes of this study.  
3.3.8  Requirements Summary 




Coverage 24 hrs per day 
200N to 70S / 1050E to 1320E 
24hrs per day  
200N to 70S / 1050E to 1320E 
Capacity 1- 1.0 Mbps secure data/voice channel 2- 1.0 Mbps secure data/voice 
channels 
Interoperability Combatant commander, JTF  Combattant commander, JTF, 
Allies, Coalition. 
Availability 97% Constellation Availability 
95% Link Availability  
99% Constellation Availability 
99% Link Availability 
Launch Time  Within 10 days of launch order Within 3 days of launch order 
Duration 1 year 3 years 
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3.3.9  Surveillance Performance Requirements  
Table 3-2.  ISR Requirements Summary 
Performance Parameter Threshold Objective 
Coverage- (Temporal Resolution) for each 
AoI 
Every 2 hours Every 1 hour 
Coverage- regions (LAT) 200 Deg N to 70 S 200 Deg N to 70 S 
Coverage- regions (LONG) 1050E to 1320E 1050E to 1320E 
Coverage- # of Areas 5 AoIs imaged every 1-2 
hours; >1600 NM separation 
8 AoIs imaged every 1-2 hours; > 
1900 NM separation 
Coverage-Restricted Airspace No restrictions No restrictions 
Capacity (downlink) 108 Mbps secure channel 274 Mbps secure channel 
Resolution-Spatial 2 m (panchromatic) 1 m (panchromatic) 4 m (IR) 
Resolution- Spectral  Panchromatic Panchromatic;  Middle far IR 
Interoperability CDL/MIST/VMOC CDL/MIST/VMOC 
Availability- Constellation (system)  97% 99% 
Availability- Link  95% 99% 
Availability- Time to "on station" (days from 
request) 
10 3 
Availability -Duration (years) 1 3 
Data Delivery time (from request to delivery 
to tactical user) 
3 hours 1 hour 
 
 
3.4  CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS)  
System performance and operations planning must be consistent with needs and 
objectives of the war fighter.  TacSat CONOPs must be in alignment with FORCEnet 
Functional Concepts for the 21st Century as approved by the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC).  Any data or service for the 
war fighter should be developed and provided with consideration of the war fighter’s 
perspective or view.  When designing systems for employment, one must get inside the 
war fighter’s head, perspective or frame of reference.  --- OODA Loop = Observe, Orient, 




Command and Control Process.  The  ISR mission or service provides realization for the 
“Observe”  and “Orient” phase of the OODA/Command and Control process and 
battlespace awareness.   
Much of the Intelligence information will be “double posted” under the 
FORCEnet CONOPs.  Collections nodes may post or provide time-sensitive data for 
immediate exploitation of users as appropriate.   The same information may be picked up 
by an analysis activity and reposted as intelligence that has been processed, analyzed, 
evaluated and interpreted.  [CNO-CMCMCDP 6/NDP6] 
The objective is to optimize the flow of useful information while restricting the 
flow of unnecessary information.  In support of this, all network nodes become providers 
and users of service on the network.  Services are any work performed by one node for 
another.  Decision makers can “pull” information as required while other information 
may be “pushed” as deemed important or a requirement by higher authority.  This 
FORCEnet characteristic may support the Capstone TacSat “store and forward” concept 
with regard to some information sharing and dissemination.   
3.4.1  TacSat Operation Considerations 
Per Unified Command Plan 2002 (UCP 02), Space Forces assigned to the Air 
Force component to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) provide day-to-day 
global space support to unified commanders per SECDEF directed command and support 
relationships.  TacSat force planning will be consistent with current AEF processes and 
functional area manager (FAM) guidance.  Additionally, the necessary space supporting 
capabilities and personnel will be apportioned to UTCs and AEF cycles, and designated 
for use in coordinated OPLAN annexes.  Finally, the air and space operations center 
(AOC) weapon system will provide the basis for operational C2, but will require 
capabilities upgrades in order to successfully accomplish assigned responsibilities. [Volz] 
Figure 3-1 provides an Operational View (OV-1) of proposed TacSat CONOPS 
by the USAF.  CONUS-based space operations are integrated (virtual and on station) in 
theater level planning and, when alerted, begin generation activities to provide on-
demand support to theater.  JWS forces, space systems (space, link and ground) and 
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space support (i.e., spacelift) are elevated to “alert” status to quickly respond to JFC 
tasking and demand (i.e., communications, ISR, etc.).  Forces must be operational within 
72 hours of call-up.  When requested by the JFC, USSTRATCOM, as a supporting 
command, will direct the launch of TacSat assets through his Air Force Space 
component, which has global and expeditionary space forces assigned.  When operational 
(in near-space or on orbit), the payload(s) will CHOP to theater and be dedicated to the 
needs of the JFC.   AF mission operations may continue in a supporting relationship for 
satellite vehicle health & safety monitoring, anomaly resolution, collision avoidance, 
beyond line-of-site commanding, and end-of-life disposal operations. [Volz]  
3
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO  
Figure 3-1.  TacSat CONOPS [from ORS CONOPS] 
3.4.2  Operations 
Thirteen key functions are performed by Mission Operations: 
Mission Planning; Activity Planning & Development; Mission Control; Data 
Transport/Delivery; Navigation & Orbit Control; Spacecraft Operations; Payload 
Operations; Data Processing; Mission Database Maintenance & Archiving; Systems 
Engineering, Integration & Testing; Computers & Communications Support; Software 
Development/Maintenance; Mission Operations Management. [Larson W, Wertz J 1999]  
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Hardware, software, people and procedures must operate together for completion 
of these key functions.  Trade-offs between automation and ground crew operations must 
be considered with regard to operating and life cycle cost. [Larson W, Wertz J 1999]  
Spacecraft operations include launch and ground control operations This 
CONOPS discusses the general operations of each of these as well as specific CONOPS 
for “tactical” operations such as collecting and down-linking high resolution imagery. 
3.4.2.1  Launch Segment Operations 
The launch segment for a space system is typically one of the most expensive and 
time-intensive parts of the overall system.  Space programs plan and schedule launches 
well in advance.  There is considerable infrastructure involved in integrating payloads to 
buses and moving the resulting spacecraft to the selected launch facility.  Once at the 
launch facility there is considerable more effort and time involved in mating the 
spacecraft to the launch vehicle and transporting the resulting rocket to the launch pad.  
Countdowns then follow during which subsystems are monitored, checked and rechecked 
before the final go ahead is given for launch. 
In order to have military utility TacSat must be launched in timelines that are not 
supported by this type of process.  It will be necessary that ground infrastructure and 
inventories be placed at the launch location(s) that will support TacSat launches.  
Candidate locations are Kennedy Space Center, Vandenberg Air Force Base, and of 
particular importance to the scenario, Kwajelein atoll.  This infrastructure would need to 
include warehousing for payloads and buses.  In addition the launch vehicles themselves 
would need to be pre-positioned and stored at the launch site.  This poses challenges 
regarding the shelf life of these items.  Launch vehicles typically have a shelf life of three 
years. [Brown C, 2002] This challenge coupled with the U.S. military philosophy that 
“we train as we fight” leads to the conclusion that TacSat launches will need to take place 
regularly.  This will have the added benefit of increasing the numbers of payloads, buses, 
and launch vehicles produced and thus driving down unit costs. 
Another logistical challenge associated with the pre-staging of launch vehicles 
involves the sizing of the thrust required.  Typically a launch vehicle is chosen based on 
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the desired orbit and expected general size the spacecraft.  The launch vehicle is then 
selected.  When finished there is typically still some variation between the velocity the 
spacecraft needs to attain the desired orbit and the velocity the launch vehicle will 
provide for the spacecraft based on its final mass.  Liquid fueled rockets shut down by 
inhibiting the flow of fuel when the desired velocity is attained.  Liquid fueled rockets 
however, introduce logistical requirements in terms of handling and storage of their 
volatile fuels.  Solid rocket motors can tailor their delivered velocity to some degree by 
what is known as their “off load” capability.  Essentially the solid rocket motor case is 
poured so the maximum impulse, (and the resultant velocity), delivered is tailored to the 
spacecraft being carried into orbit. [Brown C, 2002]  In the TacSat pre-stage scenario, 
there will be variations in total mass from one mission to the next.  There will also be 
variation in the exact orbits selected from one mission to the next.  The timelines required 
for an operationally responsive tactical capability does not allow for custom pouring of 
launch vehicles.  There are two possible concepts that may provide solutions.  First, a 
family of launch vehicles tailored to the various bus and payload combinations could be 
pre- staged at the launch facilities.  Second, the variation in mass could be handled by 
using launch vehicles that are sized for the worst case combination of bus, payload, and 
orbit.  For combinations that require less total impulse the difference could be made up 
by adding ballast to the system.   
3.4.2.2  Ground Control Operations 
Ground operations consist of three functions.  The first is payload operations, the 
second is spacecraft operations, and the third is mission operations.   
The Consolidated Space Operations Center (CSOC) is the probable central 
locations for TacSat control.  They will provide tracking, control altitude, monitor health 
via telemetry, and provide orbit maintenance functions.  No special ground control 
infrastructure is planned for TacSat. The existing ground station services, Air Force 
Satellite Control Network, will be used in order to save on costs.  This network has nodes 
in New Hampshire, California, Hawaii, Guam, Diego Garcia, Greenland, and England 
and is interconnected by robust satellite and terrestrial communications networks.  They 
communicate to the spacecraft using the S-Band Space Ground Link Subsystem SGLS.  
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[Larson W, Wertz J 1999]  The MCC and SOCC at one of these existing nodes or another 
Air Force location will provide robust links to the AFSC such as Vandenberg or Falcon 
Air Force Base in Colorado. 
3.4.2.2.1  Payload Operations 
In order for TacSat to achieve its full military utility for a tactical user the payload 
operations need to be carried out in a distributed fashion.  This is the concept that 
underlies the Virtual Mission Operations Center (VMOC) concept.  Using a simple, 
intuitive graphical user interface and standard TCP/IP communications; the VMOC 
provides a tool that allows distributed users to task the payload.  This requires 
considerable capability within the VMOC software and supporting communications.  The 
software must have accurate telemetry and tracking data from each satellite in the 
constellation and the ability to project orbits forward so that specific targets can be 
scheduled by the users.  In addition there needs to be mechanisms to deal with 
contentions between different tactical users.  Much like the current national systems 
TacSat will rapidly become a system with more tasking then it can completely 
accommodate.  Careful and efficient scheduling of tasks will be critical.  This can be 
particularly challenging in a distributed environment.  Experiments have already been 
conducted with this approach in an experiment where a CISCO router aboard a spacecraft 
was remotely controlled using VMOCs.  
3.4.2.2.2  Spacecraft Operations 
Although the proposed bus simplifies spacecraft operations as much as possible 
by maximizing automation, especially for guidance and navigation, there will still be a 
requirement to monitor telemetry and up-link commands to the satellite.  The TacSat 
spacecraft operations mission will be assigned to the existing Air Force Satellite Control 
Network (AFSCN) for satellite control and maintenance in order to keep the costs 
associated with spacecraft operations minimal.  While there will be additional cost both 
in terms of personnel and physical infrastructure such as consoles; this approach should 
still yield significant savings over building dedicated spacecraft operations centers. 
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3.4.2.2.3  Mission Control Center Operations 
The task of the Mission Control Center (MCC) is to coordinate the needs of the 
payload operations and spacecraft operations.  Tasking and commands are arbitrated 
between the two to insure the health and status of the spacecraft are maintained with 
minimum impact to the payload operations and vice versa.  The mission control console 
and staffing should be co-located with the spacecraft operations control center (SOCC). 
3.4.2.2.4  Tactical Operations 
For TacSat, Tactical Mission Operations include control of the imagery, ELINT, 
and communication payloads.  The Virtual Mission Operations Center (VMOC) is 
currently under development by the U.S. Air Force.  This system, if it performs as 
advertised, will enable the tactical user to effectively manage TacSat payloads.  This 
system, in the ACTD stages, provides space-based network-centric operations via 
Internet protocol (IP).  The tactical commander will have direct control over satellite 
payload operations.   
Tactical commanders will use computers terminals to pull down data from 
satellites or, if the desired data isn't readily available, the VMOC will schedule the 
satellite to collect the image.  The VMOC provides a graphical user interface that enables 
the tactical users to view and control satellite and payload control status and history 
information.  The software-based technology treats space and air assets like Internet 
addresses, permitting remote users to request information from them or to monitor the 
status of platforms. 
A fallback alternative is for the tactical user to send requests for payload 
management directly to the AFSCN where staff can manage the spacecraft payload. 
3.4.2.2.5  Tactical Imagery Operations 
TacSat imagery downlink demands high data rates and will be managed by a 
Modularized Interoperable Surface Terminal/Common Data Link (MIST/CDL) in 
theater. This system, co-located with a tactical command center, will receive X-band data 
at up to 274 Mbps.  Imagery analysts stationed at the command center will process, 
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evaluate, and disseminate imagery in accordance with the tactical commander’s 
instructions.  Once CDL has the images they are processed and salient data sent to 
tactical commanders via FORCEnet. (Figure 3-2) 
TacSat Mission CONOPS
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Figure 3-2.  Imagery CONOPS 
 
Alternatives to direct downlink include networks of connected ground stations for 
tracking and telemetry and to uplink commands to the satellite.   NASA’s “Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite” (TDRS) is an alternative path that could be used to remove the 
constraint that payload data could only be downloaded while the satellite was overhead in 
the theater.  The data could be transmitted to one of the geosynchronous TDRS satellites 
and then down linked to the earth.  Once received at the TDRS ground station the data 
would be forwarded over standard DoD communications channels.   
3.4.3  Sequence of Events (example): 
1) Mission Request - The need service shall originate from the Joint Taskforce 
Commander or Joint Force Commander (JFC).   This request may be 
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communicated per Numbered Fleet Commanders Operation Order (OPORD) 
directions, promulgation via Operational Tasking (OPTASK), Air Tasking 
Orders (ATO) or via Commander’s Daily Intent; Task Force Commanders or 
JFC shall notify the respective Unified Combatant Commander of their intent.   
The JFC shall determine/synthesize  the Mission requirement in 6 hours and 
submit to USSTRATCOM 
2) Asset Assignment – The asset identification and assignment shall occur at 
USSTRATCOM. 
3) Asset Prep & Launch – Asset assignment will assist or determine in 
identification of the launch location.  Options consist of: Vandenberg AFB; 
Kwajalein Atoll; Wallops Island; NASA.  Assets will be located in adjacent to 
launch sites.  
4) Launch schedule- Launch schedule will enable full constellation to be on 
station in 3-10 days of JFC requirements determination.  
5) JFC/Combatant Commander Control – Once the asset has achieved orbit and 
completed systems checkout, The Combatant Commander shall take 
Operational Control of the payload via SIPRNET. 
6) Service/Product Retrieval – Data retrieval or communications reception shall 
occur at designated ground stations, Command ship or C2 node.  
7) Analysis – Initial analysis shall occur in theater.  Naval afloat platforms may 
use Fleet Intelligence Support Teams (FIST) if embarked; Follow-up detailed 
analysis may occur at designated service Intelligence agencies.  The 
Intelligence agency shall actionable Intelligence to the JFC.  This shall 
consider the exploitation of SIGINT and furnishing of Black & white 
photos/imagery. 
8) Action – The JFC shall task combat assets for subsequent action in support of 
the mission execution/completion.  The JFC shall review his/her prioritized 
task list for consideration of future tasking or re-tasking. 
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9) JFC reports mission complete to Unified Combatant Commander, Service 
Space operations and STRATCOM.   
10) STRATCOM notifies the Operations centers when asset is to be placed back 
in inventory for re-tasking or end of life termination & re-entry. 
3.5  CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Constraints include physical limits of systems and limitations on procurement 
options.  Constraints can become mission drivers, that is, they drive the system 
complexity and cost and ultimately bound its effectiveness.  Assumptions address 
operational issues such as availability of supporting systems.   
3.5.1  Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and Government–off-the-shelf (GOTS) 
Selection of options for TacSat payloads, such as imagers and telemetry, will be 
constrained to COTS/GOTS whenever possible. 
3.5.2  Launch Vehicles 
Launch vehicles under consideration are constrained to existing low cost launch 
vehicles which include Falcon 1 ands Pegasus. 
3.5.3  Space Resource Competition 
Operations in other regions compete for overhead commercial resources and 
national resources for both communications and ISR.  Support from national systems is 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
39
4.0  ALTERNATIVES AND GAP ANALYSIS 
4.1  DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES 
This section identifies current systems that may meet mission requirements.  It 
includes a brief discussion of capabilities and limitations of both military and commercial 
systems.  It examines existing systems such as commercial satellites and UAVs but does 
not include examination of alternative future concepts such as high altitude airships. 
4.1.1  National Systems 
National systems information is primarily classified and cannot be addressed in 
this study.  One of the assumptions for this study is that these national systems are 
not available full-time due to tasking in other regions or due to intentional damage by 
hostile forces.   
4.1.2  Commercial Sensors 
Commercial sensors include various types of imaging and communications 
platforms.  This section provides a representative list of available alternatives.  It includes 
salient points of spectral, temporal, and spatial resolution as well as general information 
on orbits.  Spectral resolution, the measure of its power to resolve features in the 
electromagnetic spectrum, is discussed in reference to the requirement to provide 
surveillance of various types of targets.  Temporal resolution, or the revisit time, is 
discussed in reference to the requirements to revisit specific areas every one to two hours.  
Spatial resolution, or the level of detail in an image that is discernable, is discussed in 
reference to the requirement to provide one meter spectral resolution. (Table 4-1) 
 
• EROS A is an Israeli imaging satellite that orbits at 480 km and provides 1.8 
meter imagery resolution with a temporal resolution of 2-4 days. 
• IKONOS orbits at 680 km and can obtain an 11 km swath of data at 1-meter 
resolution.  Imagery is collected at 11 bits per pixel and compressed to 2.6 bits per 
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pixel before transmission.  Orbit time is 98 minutes and the revisit time for 1 
meter resolution is 2.9 days.  [Leachtenauer J, Driggers R 2001 p. 47] 
• IRS-P3 is an India remote sensing satellite in an 817 km orbit with a temporal 
resolution of about 5 days. It images a swath width of about 200 km [Sarabhai V, 
2006] 
• IRS-P5/6/7 These advanced Indian imagers have a 2.5 meter resolution and a 
temporal resolution of 5 days. [Roy PS, Agarwal V 2006]  They carry up to three 
cameras that operate in multi-spectral modes.   
• LANDSAT orbits at 705 km with a temporal resolution of about 8 days.  It can 
produce 100 images per day with a 24 hours turn around time. [Leachtenauer J, 
Driggers R 2001 p. 46] 
• Orbview-3 provides 1 meter resolution panchromatic imagery and 4 meter multi-
spectral with an 8 km swath width.  It orbits at 470 km, inclined at 97 degrees and 
has a temporal resolution of about 3 days. 
• Orbview-5 orbits at 660 km while collecting 0.41 meter resolution panchromatic 
mode and 1.67 meter multi-spectral mode imagery.   When combined with 
Orbview -3 it will be able to collect 1.2 million square miles of imagery per day 
with a combined revisit rate of 1.5 days.  [Andrews L, 2005] 
• Quickbird orbits at 450 km, has a 93.5 minute orbit, and a temporal resolution of 
3-7 days at nadir (depending on latitude).  It boasts a panchromatic resolution of 
about 60 cm at nadir and multi-spectral 2-4 meter at nadir. 
• SPOT (1-5) are a French constellation of 3 types of satellites orbiting at about 830 
km and inclined at 98 degrees.   They can provide 2.5 (Spot 5) - 20 (Spot 1-3) 
meters spatial resolutions.  At the equator a single satellite (with oblique viewing) 
provides a temporal resolution of about 3 days.  While the combined constellation 
has a temporal resolution of about 24 hours. 
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Table 4-1.  High Resolution Satellites 




















EROS 1.5 na 13 4 480 99  
IKONOS 0.82 3.2 11.3 3 680 99 150 
IRS P-3  188 n a 770 5 817 99   
IRS P-5 2.5 na 27-30 5 618 98 105 
IRS P-6 2.5 24 1400 5 821 99  
LANDSAT (1-3) 40 75 185 8 705 98 15 
LANDSAT 7 15 30-60 185 16 705 98 150 
QuickBird 0.4 3.3 22 3 to 7 450 98 320 
Orbview-3 1 4 8 3 470 97 2 
Orbview 5 0.41 1.67 8 3 660 98 50 
SPOT (1-5) 2.5-20 10 to 20 
120-
600 1 to 3 830 98 150 
TOPSAT 2.8 5.7 25 4 600 98  
 
The commercial satellite systems currently incorporated into the military 
SATCOM architecture have several limitations of importance to military planners.  These 
include 
• General lack of protective features (communications satellites) 
- anti-jam (AJ) 
- anti-scintillation (AS) 
- low probability of intercept (LPI)/low probability of detection (LPD)  
• Regulatory impediments to their use in foreign countries (Imaging satellites) 
• Time to access, downlink, and process imagery (Imaging satellites) 
Commercial imaging satellites generally do not employ the stringent techniques 
required for protection against deliberate disruption and exploitation.    
The use of commercial systems is regulated in every country and as a minimum 
access to these sensors will take time to work out special operating agreements and site 
licenses. The commercial service providers generally pre-negotiate these agreements with 
the regulatory agencies of each country. However, the specific agreements and the 
restrictions placed on their use may vary widely from country to country.  In many cases 
the satellite will already be under contract and not available.   “While operating over 
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international waters and airspace, the Navy will not be restricted in their use, but shore-
based units and units operating in the littoral may be affected by regulatory restraints 
imposed by the host nation”. [Exec Sum] 
Many commercial systems have adequate resolution to support these mission 
requirements but they have serious shortcomings.  Their low rate temporal resolution, 
long lead time in down linking data, and uncertainty of availability due to political 
sensitivity and commercial competition make them non-viable alternatives for the tactical 
user.  In addition, the feasibility of rapidly integrating them in the “FORCEnet” grid is 
uncertain.    
4.1.2.1  Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle flies at ~340 knots and up to 65,000 feet 
with a range of about 13,500 miles or about 32 to 40 hours endurance.  Its payload 
includes EO, IR, and SAR.  The EO payload is a sensor with a 0.4 µm- 0.8 µm response.  
The IR payload is a MWIR sensor with a 3.6 – 5.0 µm bandwidth.   The wide area search 
can cover 40,000 square miles in one day while the spot mode can collect about 1900 2x2 
km frames per day. [Leachtenauer J, Driggers R 2001] 
4.1.2.2  Surveillance Requirements 
Table 4-2 details the distances between (example) areas that require surveillance 
for this scenario.  (For this study it is assumed there is one launch recovery site near 
Subic Bay).  Table 4-2 shows the distance required if one aircraft were required to survey 
all areas several times per day as per mission requirements (about 7697 km or 4782 
miles).  Table 4-3 shows it would take one Global Hawk ~13 hours (plus any loiter time) 
to complete one cycle it seems clear that one Global Hawk could not meet the 
requirement to surveil each area once every 1-2 hours.  There are many surveillance plan 
options but in order to provide imagery every 1 (objective requirement) to 2 (threshold 
requirement) hours the Global Hawk would need to be within approximately 600 to 1200 
kilometers on each AoI at all times.(based on cruise sped of ~600 km/h plus 15 minutes 
loiter)  Four Global Hawks could meet the threshold requirement (every 2 hours) if one 
each were assigned as follows:  1) Volcano 1 and Volcano 2 sites, 2) Mindanao and East 
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Approach, 3) Surbaya and Jakarta, and 4) West Approach and Spratly Islands.   Even this 
assumes that the Global Hawk is continuously on station and does not include and 
downtime of aircraft or ground station.  It seems clear that providing imagery for areas 
geographically dispersed can seriously stress the capabilities of Global Hawk and that 
meeting the objective requirement of this scenario would demand numbers of Global 
Hawks that might be impractical. 
Table 4-2.  Distance between surveillance areas (KM) 











Approach Surbaya Jakarta  
Subic Bay 0 297 112 919 450 1700 1400 2450 2600 
Volcano 1  297 0 200 1100 770 1850 1700 2700 2830 
Volcano 2  112 200 0 850 670 1800 1490 2550 2750 
Mindanao  919 1100 850 0 800 800 1600 2000 2400 
Spratly  450 770 670 800 0 1100 1150 2000 2100 
W. Approach 1700 1850 1800 800 1100 0 1000 1050 1050 
E. Approach 1400 1700 1490 1600 1150 1000 0 1600 1100 
Surbaya 2450 2700 2550 2000 2000 1050 1600 0 550 
Jakarta  2600 2830 2750 2400 2100 1050 1100 550 0 
 

















0 297 200 850 1600 1600 550 1050 1100 450 7697 4782 
 
4.1.2.3  Cost/Availability 
The Global Hawk and its associated sensors have been upgraded several times 
increasing capability and cost.  Reliability has been a serious issue with respect to both 
sensor operation and aircraft survivability.  During Operation Enduring Freedom 2 of the 
7 Global Hawks used were lost and there were numerous equipment failures.  
The cost of Global Hawk includes the aircraft, mission control elements, launch 
recovery elements, segment support elements, and initial spares.  Some contractor sites 
unrealistically report the cost of Global Hawk as low as 10 to 26 million per copy. [RQ-4 
Global Hawk]   In 2004 the GAO reported unit cost at about 123.2 million, while in 2006 
the Air Force reported cost is about 145 million per copy. [GAO-05-6], [Justifying Sharp, 
2006]  Accurate operating “costs per hour” for Global Hawk are not available but would 
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include both aircraft and ground system operation. Ground crews would be needed for the 
duration of the deployment and not just during actual flight operations time.  Rough costs 
for comparison would include three Global Hawks at $125M each ($375M total), plus 
operating costs, plus one assumed loss.    Global Hawk requires either 3 C-141s or 2 C-
17s to get equipment in theater.  Detailed cost analysis is contained in section 6 of this 
document. 
4.1.2.4  Summary 
The Global Hawk can provide superior tactical reconnaissance under controlled 
conditions.  It can provide long dwell time over any one target area and can host a variety 
of sophisticated sensors.  It will meet or exceed both spatial resolution and spectral 
resolution requirements as well as provide other sensors capabilities (SAR/ELINT etc).  
However, it has serious limitations in this environment where targets are thousands of 
miles apart but still need surveillance updates several times per day.  Maintaining 
temporal resolution requirements over the widely dispersed area would require several 
very expensive Global Hawks and their associated ground crews, landing areas etc.   
Additionally, it is likely that Global Hawk will not get permission to fly through 
Indonesian airspace and will not be able to survey ports in Indonesia.  Its low altitude 
(compared to satellites) will result in additional communication relay requirements (i.e. 
getting data from Global Hawk flying over Indonesia requires a relay to get to a ground 
station in the Philippines). 
4.2  GAP ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this “Gap analysis” is to map the gap which exits between implied 
& specified mission requirements and the capability of existing systems.  It includes, in 
addition, significant operational issues to consider as a result of choosing an alternative. 
The issue of national sensors is a “gray” area in that the availability is assumed to be 
reduced but it is not realistic to assume they are not available at all.  National sensor 
capabilities are not included to avoid discussion of classified systems.  Gaps are the 
inability of current systems to meet mission, functionality, and usability requirements.  
Specifically, this analysis will evaluate mission requirements against the capability of 
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existing systems such as commercial satellites and Global Hawk (GH).  Performance of 
existing systems will be evaluated with respect to mission requirements at both the 
threshold and objective levels.  Lastly, the potential for the TacSat system to mitigate 
these capability gaps will be addressed. 
Applicable throughout this gap analysis is the constraint that national systems are 
not fully available due to other tasking such as support Middle East conflicts or due to 
damage from space environment or deliberate attacks from hostile forces.  Similarly, the 
capabilities of commercial systems (CS) must be balanced against their constraints.  
Table 4-4 summarizes ISR requirements, current capabilities, and potential gaps.
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Table 4-4.  Gap Analysis 
ISR and Communications Gap Analysis 
Performance 
Parameter 
Threshold Objective Capabilities                    
Commercial System (CS)  
Global Hawk (GH) 
Gaps-Mitigation 
Coverage- (Temporal 
Resolution) for each AoI 
Every 2 hours Every  hour GH can meet requirement if a dedicated 
unit is provided for each AoI. CS cannot 
meet requirement 
3-4 GHs or 2 TacSats can meet requirements 
Coverage- regions (LAT) 200 N to 70 S 200 N to 70 S All No capability gap 
Coverage- regions (LONG) 1050 E to 1320 E 1050 E to 1320 E All No capability gap 
Coverage- # of Areas 5 AoIs 1-2 hours; up 
to 1600 NM 
separation 
8 AoIs 1-2 hours; up to 1900 
NM separation 
CS can meet requirement.  GH can only 
meet requirement if a dedicated unit is 
provided for each AoI. 




No restrictions No restrictions CS are restricted by treaty.  GH requires 
long range oblique scanning. 
TacSat can meet requirement 
ISR Downlink Capacity (In 
theater) 
108 Mbps over 
secure channel 
274 Mbps over secure channel Only GH can meet requirement (via 
CDL/MIST) 
Potential gap. TacSat or GH, can meet 
requirement vis CDL 
Command Control Tactical Command 
Center 
Tactical Field CDRs GH can link to tactical command centers. 
Current systems do not support control 
by field CDRs 
TacSat payload controlled by VMOC can 
meet requirement 
Resolution- Spatial 2 m panchromatic 1  m panchromatic All systems have this capability. No capability gap 
Resolution- Spectral  panchromatic panchromatic;  middle far IR All systems have this capability. No capability gap 
Interoperability CDL/MIST/ VMOC CDL/MIST/ VMOC GH are interoperable.  CS do not meet 
requirement 
No capability gap 
Availability- System  97% 99% All No capability gap 
Availability- Link 95% 99% All No capability gap 
Access and Control (from 
theater) 
< 15 minutes < 5 minutes Only GH can meet requirement   No capability gap 
Data Delivery time (from 
request to delivery) 
4.5 hours 1 hour GH can meet requirement No capability gap 
Capacity 1- 1.0 Mbps secure 
Data/Voice channel 
2- 1.0 Mbps secure 
Data/Voice channels 
If available, CS have this capability. Potential gap TacSat can meet requirement 
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ISR and Communications Gap Analysis 
Performance 
Parameter 
Threshold Objective Capabilities                    
Commercial System (CS)  
Global Hawk (GH) 
Gaps-Mitigation 
Planning & Logistics 
Duration (years) 1 3 CS can provide this capability No capability gap 
Availability (Launch or 
service request time) 
Within 10 days of 
service request 
Within 3 days of service 
request 
CS require long lead time for contracts.  
GH requires ground station transport, 
runway arrangements etc 
No capability gap 
Cost-Theater Lift Impact 1 C-17 None CS may provide this capability. Multiple 
GH demand excessive lift 
TacSat can mitigate as it has no in theater lift 
requirements 
Cost-In Theater staff 
support for ground ops (not 
payload) 
<12 <6 CS meet this requirement. GH demands 
excessive support for ground operations. 
TacSat can mitigate as it has no in theater 
staff requirements for ground ops 
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4.2.1  Coverage (Temporal Resolution)  
Temporal resolution is defined as the frequency at which images are recorded or 
captured in a specific place on the earth. The more frequently it is captured, the better or 
finer the temporal resolution is said to be.  Mission requirements specify a threshold 
requirement of 4 hours and an objective requirement of 1 hour for each of the areas of 
interest.  The ability of various sensors to meet a temporal resolution standard depends on 
both on the physical capability of the system and the willingness (or ability) of the system 
owner to deploy the asset.  National sensors capability is classified but any spaced based 
system has the physical capability to meet both threshold and objective requirements.  
However, as previously stated, this study assumes that national sensors availability is 
limited and cannot meet the temporal resolution requirements.  Commercial remote 
sensing satellites are all in orbits designed for full earth coverage and as a result they 
have particularly poor temporal resolution near the equator.  There are no commercial 
satellites that can physically meet threshold temporal requirements for this scenario.  
Global Hawk boasts long dwell time over any one area of interest but a single Global 
Hawk cannot meet temporal resolution requirements at the widely dispersed areas of 
interest.  It might take 4 Global Hawks to meet requirements over the stipulated areas of 
interest.  This does not include attrition and assumes continuous availability.  This 
assumes 3 are flying near continuously and 1 spare is available (provided to account for 
historical attrition).   
In conclusion, only Global Hawk can provide the temporal resolution required but 
it would take at least 4 to accomplish the task.  TacSat can meet this temporal resolution 
given an unlimited constellation.  The TacSat System Analysis section will address the 
ability of the TacSat system to meet these requirements.   
4.2.2  Coverage Regions (LAT/LONG) 
All potential systems can meet and exceed the requirements to provide 
surveillance for the equatorial region specified for this scenario. 
49
4.2.3  Coverage (Number of Areas) 
This scenario demands simultaneous coverage of several widely dispersed areas.  
Both national and commercial sensors have the capacity to provide reconnaissance over 
any targets within their field of view.  Given the distance between targets (900-1900 
miles) Global Hawk requires deployment of unique units to each AOR.  TacSat has the 
same capability and same restriction as commercial sensors with respect to this 
requirement.   
4.2.4  Coverage- Restricted Airspace  
This scenario requires coverage of Indonesian Navy Ports and other restricted 
regions.  Airspace will be controlled by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.  
Indonesia usually denies airspace privileges to the U.S and even denied airspace over 
flight during tsunami operations. [Loy H, 2005]  Given this history the fact that Indonesia 
is a hostile force in this scenario it is assumed that no over-flight will be allowed.    
Commercial satellites cannot as they are usually restricted by treaty for this type of 
surveillance.  Global Hawk would be denied over-flight permissions and even oblique 
viewing would not allow surveillance of subject Navy ports.  At 65,000 feet it would 
need to stay about 125 miles from restricted areas.  TacSat has this capability and is a 
feasible alternative to mitigate this gap. 
4.2.5  ISR Downlink Capacity 
In order to be “tactical” images need to be quickly down-linked and forwarded to 
the tactical user.   The capability of national sensors is classified.  Commercial satellites 
generally downlink at ranges up to about 150 Mbps while Quickbird (as the name 
implies) downlinks up to 320 Mbps.  Global Hawk can downlink via CDL and has other 
downlink modes as well.  The TacSat system would have to meet threshold values to be 
“tactical”. 
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4.2.6  Command Control 
The requirement to get data to the tactical user is critical so this requirement 
specifies the ability of the system to downlink and or forward data to the tactical 
commander.  Clearly national sensors have the ability though the willingness (or 
unwillingness) to do this was the genesis of the TacSat program.  Typical tactical ground 
stations do not have tracking or terminals for commercial remote sensing satellites.  
Routing (indirectly) data from commercial satellites to tactical command centers is 
feasible but would normally be routed at high speed to a ground station and then to the 
command center via WEB or other communications satellites (with lower data rates).  It 
also means that potentially sensitive data exists and is controlled by the owner of the 
commercial terminal.  In any case once the data is received at the ground station it is 
subject to the constraints of other communication systems. 
Global Hawk can link directly with tactical ground stations via numerous means 
(Figure 4-1) but those systems themselves add constraints.  First, they must be available, 
not tasked by other users and second, they must operate at data rates that support Global 
Hawk.  Links other than direct CDL imply low data rates and non-tactical employment. 
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Figure 4-1.  Global Hawk [USAF Graphic] 
 
TacSat would need to directly interface with CDL/MIST ground stations and 
support associated high data rates.  Other relay type links (TDRSS) may be available to 
process data at lower data rates. 
4.2.7  Resolution- Spatial  
Spatial resolution is the ability to sharply and clearly define the extent or shape of 
features within an image. It describes how close two features can be within an image and 
still be resolved as unique.  All candidate systems, except older commercial systems, can 
meet spatial resolution requirements defined for this scenario.  The TacSat system would 
need to be designed to meet these requirements. 
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4.2.8  Resolution- Spectral  
Spectral resolution requirements were defined by the tactical user.  The threshold 
requirement is for panchromatic only while the objective requirement includes middle/far 
infrared.  All current systems can carry payloads that meet these spectral resolution 
requirements.   
4.2.9  Interoperability 
All systems must be interoperable within the FORCEnet Grid.  All save some 
commercial systems, are interoperable. 
4.2.10  Availability- System  
Commercial systems usually have very high availability rates.  The exception is 
the potential for intentional damage by hostile forces.  Commercial satellites availability 
is subject to the owner’s discretion and usually requires a long contracting process unless 
they are untasked at the time.  Global Hawk failure rate is about 27%, that is, about 1 of 
every 4 Global Hawks sent to theater will fail.  Whether gaps exist is subject to 
unplanned events.    
4.2.11  Availability- Link  
All current systems meet link availability requirements. 
4.2.12  Access and Control 
Currently, a gap exists in that the tactical user cannot access or control imagery 
assets within the required time.  The use of VMOC would allow the tactical user to have 
virtual control, as specified by the chain of command, in near real time. 
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4.2.13  Data Delivery Time  
Currently, data through national sensors as a result of priorities for imagery in 
other theaters may take hours to get to the tactical user.  Data delivery time from 
commercial sensors is a best unreliable and at worst unavailable.  Global Hawk delivers 
imagery data quickly when within LOS (~ 500 Miles) but is constrained by the 
availability of overhead resources when beyond LOS.  TacSat is a feasible alternative to 
mitigate this gap and provide reliable data delivery time to the tactical user. 
4.2.14  Capacity 
One to two Mbps for secure voice and data are required to support tactical 
communications.  All systems considered can support this requirement so the question 
remains availability.  If commercial systems are not available then TacSat must be 
designed to meet this capacity requirement.   
4.2.15  Duration (years) 
All systems meet duration requirements though Global Hawks cost rises over time 
due to cost of staff.  Overhead sensors can be turned on and off easily while Global Hawk 
requires expensive staff changes. 
4.2.16  Availability-Launch or Service Request Time (Days from Request) 
Commercial sensors are always available if operational commanders decide to 
make them available.  Global Hawk requires transport of ground station and personnel 
and set up time in theater.  The time depends on distance of Global Hawk home base to 
operational base and availability of air transport for ground station and personnel. 
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4.2.17  Cost-Theater Lift Impact 
Overhead systems do not require any lift to the theater.  Global Hawk operates in 
several modes but all require some level of lift to the theater (ground support equipment, 
operating staff).  For long periods of operations (1-3 years) significant lift would be 
required.  For long periods of operations Global Hawk requires 2 C-141’s or 2 C-17s with 
6 or 11 meter antenna.  This exceeds the required maximum lift requirement (1 C-17) so 
a gap exists.  TacSat is a feasible alternative to mitigate this gap. 
4.2.18  Cost-In Theater Staff Support 
All systems require staff to analyze imagery so it is assumed that staff numbers 
will be common for all systems.  Global Hawk requires an additional 3 staff in the launch 
and recovery element, about 5 in mission control, plus about 5 others to maintain 
equipment.  Given a watch rotation every 8 hours a total staff of about 39 is required.  
This exceeds the staff maximum requirement and therefore a gap exists.  TacSat is a 
feasible alternative to mitigate this gap. (Table 4-5) 
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Table 4-5.  ISR Performance/Gap Summary 
 
Performance Parameter Commercial 
Global 
Hawk TacSat 
Coverage- (Temporal Resolution) for each AoI   4 GH required    
Coverage- regions (LAT)       
Coverage- regions (LONG)       
Coverage-# of Areas    4 GH required   
Coverage -Restricted Airspace        
ISR Downlink Capacity (In theater)       
Command Control       
(Spatial) Resolution       
Spectral Resolution       
Interoperability       
Availability- System        
Availability- Link        
Access and Control (from theater)       
Data Delivery time (from request to delivery)       
Capacity       
Duration (years)       
Availability (Launch or service request time)       
Cost-Theater Lift Impact       
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5.0  TACSAT SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
This section outlines a high level model that will give insight into the key 
technical parameters describing an operational TacSat system.  These values will provide 
insight into the feasibility and performance of TacSat and provide inputs to the cost 
analysis that follows. 
The approach followed was to first develop estimates for key system parameters 
based on rules of thumb.  These were used as entering arguments for more detailed 
analysis.  The results of this analysis were then rolled into a second tier, more detailed set 
of models.  These models should provide reasonable fidelity for the initial determination 
of the cost estimating relationships for the cost model. 
 
Overall System Parameters 
To begin the analysis estimates of the key system parameters for mass, volume, 
body area, linear dimension and moment of inertia were developed.  These initial values 
served as entering arguments for high level payload analysis which in turn provide data 
for a more detailed analysis of the key BUS subsystem budgets for power, mass, and 
volume.  These models once established can be refined and enhanced to support more 
detailed analysis or to investigate different alternatives. 
Initial design parameters for a satellite are given by well known rules of thumb or 
relationships that have been demonstrated to hold on previous satellites.  These 
relationships use the dry mass of the spacecraft as an initial input and derive values for 
volume, linear dimension, body area, and moment of inertia.  Although TacSat is a new 
breed of satellite the rules of physics and properties of materials that underlie these 
relationships still hold. 
The key is determining a reasonable value for dry mass.  A great deal of historical 
data on spacecraft dry mass is available for previous space systems.  Ideally one would 
start with a value for dry mass given by this historical data.  Fidelity is gained by 
organizing this historical data by satellite type as is done in Appendix A of Space 
Mission Analysis and Design (SMAD).  TacSat, however, is intended to be an entirely 
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new breed of satellite that will be simpler, lighter and cheaper than past satellites.  There 
is no historical data available for this type of satellite. 
This problem was solved by taking values for types of spacecraft that are closely 
related to TacSat and adjusting them to arrive at reasonable first estimates.  The validity 
of these estimates will be tested and their fidelity improved as subsystems are examined 
in greater detail and the systems analysis is iterated.  TacSat will be called upon to 
perform two key types of tasking.  The first is communications and the second is remote 
sensing.  In addition, because TacSat is supposed to be simpler and lighter than typical 
satellites it has much in common with a class of satellites known as light SATS.  Data for 
dry mass was taken from SMAD Appendix A for each of these three types of satellite.  
The data was then adjusted by increasing values for the light SAT by one standard 
deviation and decreasing the values for the communications and remote sensing satellites 
by one standard deviation.  Average values were taken from these to produce a dry mass 
for the notional TacSat system. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1.  TacSat system parameters 







    
Light SAT 109 + 31.3 140.3
Communications 816 - 389 427





The given value of dry mass of 458 kg seems like a reasonable first 
approximation.   
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Table 5-2 shows the key parameters for an initial spacecraft design, the 
relationships used to estimate them and the values derived based on a loaded mass of 558 
kg for the notional system.  This includes the addition of 130 kg of propellant. 
Table 5-2.  Key parameters for an initial spacecraft design 
Loaded Mass = M (kg) Propellant Mass (kg) Dry Mass (kg)
588.5 130.4 458.10
Characteristic Estimate Value
Volume (cu.m) V = 0.01(M) 5.89
Linear Dimension (m) s = 0.25(M)^0.333 2.05
Body Area (sq. m) A = (s)^2 4.21
Moment of Inertia (kg-sq.m) I = 0.01(M)^1.6666 19.19
Loaded Mass (kg) M 588.50  
 
Mass Budget: 
Using the same methodology outlined above for deriving the initial estimate of 
dry mass; percentages of dry weight were calculated for each subsystem.  These are 
summarized in Table 5-3. 
Table 5-3.  Percentage of each subsystem dry weight 










Total 100  
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Using these percentages the spacecrafts first mass budget was generated as shown 
in Table 5-4. 
Table 5-4.  Spacecraft first mass budget 
Element Estimating relationship Value (kg)
 
Payload 0.23x(Dry Mass) 105.36
Bus subsystems  
Propulsion 0.04xDry Mass) 18.32
Attitude Control 0.07x(Dry Mass) 32.07
TT&C 0.06x(Dry Mass) 27.49
Thermal 0.02x(Dry Mass) 9.16
Power 0.21x(Dry Mass) 96.20
Structure 0.17x(Dry Mass) 77.88
Margin 0.24x (Dry Mass) 109.94
Dry mass Total From previous calc 458.10
Propellant From previous calc 130.40
Loaded Mass Same as dry with no prop 588.50
Kick stage Assume not used 0.00
Injected mass Same as dry with no kick 588.50
Adapter 20.00
Boost weight 608.50  
 
 
It is worth noting here that the nominal boost weight for FALCON I is exceeded by 
approximately 38 kg. 
 
Power Budget: 
Using rules of thumb as outlined in SMAD (page 316) an initial power budget 
was constructed.  The payload power is used as the entering argument which, as a rule of 
thumb, typically consumes about 40% of the total satellite power.  From this a total 
power was calculated.  Based on that total power and the rules of thumb governing power 
usage in a satellite the initial power budget in Table 5-5 was created. 
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Table 5-5.  Initial power budget 
Subsystem Fraction of Total Power (W)
Payload 0.4 80
Propulsion 0.05 10
Attitude Control 0.15 30
Communications 0.05 10









5.1  ORBIT AND CONSTELLATION 
Selections of optimal orbit types and constellation sizes are critical parts of the 
system engineering process.  In the context of the Philippine Sea scenario imagery 
requirements and communications requirements that could potentially be met using 
TacSat were derived. (Section 4.2 Gap Analysis).  The orbit and constellation selection 
process was an iterative process (as outlined below) aided by the use of a modeling and 
simulation tool, standard reference Satellite Tool Kit (STK), which has led to the final 
recommendations for orbits and constellations.  The entire modeling and simulation 
approach in contained in Appendix B.  The established process for selecting orbits is: 
[Larson W, Wertz J 1999] 
1) Select orbit types (parking, transfer, space-referenced, earth-referenced) 
2) Determine orbit related mission requirements for both imagery and 
communications 
3) Assess applicability of specialized orbits 
4) Conduct constellation size/orbit design trades 
5) Assess launch and disposal options 
6) Evaluate growth and replenishment options 
7) Create Delta V budget 
8) Document orbit parameters, selection criteria, and reiterate as required. 
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5.1.1  Selecting Orbit Types 
Step one, selecting orbit types, is clear in that this mission will require only an 
earth-referenced orbit selection.  It is conceivable that a parking orbit will be used prior to 
disposal but for the purposes of this study, it is assumed that the satellite will be de-
orbited shortly after mission life and will not address the issue of parking orbits.  GEO 
will not be considered as an option for tactical satellites due to excessive cost of launch, 
unsuitability for ISR missions, and high link budget requirements. HEO will be discussed 
briefly for the communications mission, but again, the costs associated with high energy 
orbits and radiation hardening is of great concern for a viable TacSat concept. 
5.1.2  Orbit Mission Requirements 
Orbit characteristics are closely tied to payload capability but altitude and 
inclination are critical factors in any case.  This paper will focus on imagery requirements 
and communications relay requirements for remote sensors.  Orbit affects ISR payload 
coverage, imagery resolution, communications package sensitivity, environmental 
survivability, launch capability, ground communications, orbit lifetime, and even legal or 
political constraints.  Orbit also impacts link budget and availability for communication 
relay systems. 
The analysis to this point and the resulting requirements provide several key 
parameters relevant to the constellation and orbit analysis.  These key parameters for 
imagery include temporal resolution, area coverage, and spatial resolution. In the simplest 
of terms the orbits need to support the acquisition of clear images over the Philippines 
operational areas at least 6 times per day and provide adequate dwell time for imagery 
data downlink.   
The key parameters for communications and /or communications relay includes 
dwell (persistence), area coverage, and link/power budget.  While TacSat is kept is kept 
in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to reduce launch costs and to reduce the communications 
power requirements, all aspects of performance and cost were considered.  The objective 
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of the modeling effort is to determine the optimal orbits and constellations with respect to 
total cost and payload performance.   
Mission requirements also include the ability to pass control of the satellite 
payload to the tactical commander.  This involves the added complexity for timing and 
managing uplink commands to the satellites and receiving downlink data as the LEO 
satellites pass over head. 
5.1.2.1  Coverage 
Coverage is defined to include earth location of interest, continuity, frequency, 
duration, field of view, and ground track.  These requirements are impacted by orbit type, 
altitude and inclination.  As discussed earlier, for the imagery requirement, the orbit type 
is limited to LEO. Altitude selection is discussed in a later section. 
Mission requirements (for imagery) derived from the scenario dictate coverage in 
the Philippine operational area between 200 north and 7° south of the equator.  
Specifically, coverage in several areas is required at least once every four hours to meet 
threshold and once per hour to meet objective.  Establishing inclination for a LEO is 
based on maximizing coverage in this region and the optimal inclination is no greater 
then 200.    This insures the most frequent coverage of a targeted area of interest. 
Figure 5-1 is a snapshot from an STK model simulation run. It shows a sample 
ground track for a single satellite traveling in a circular orbit at 400 km altitude and 200 of 
inclination. There are several example targets spread over the AOR that are separated by 
thousands of kilometers. Each parallel track could be separated by as much as 1000 km. 
With a potential sensor FOV of as little as one tenth of the track separation, a method for 
pointing the sensor is required. This is covered in the payloads section below. Due to 
angular constraints of the payload, pointing alone may not provide adequate coverage. 




Figure 5-1.  Sample ground track of scenario AOR 
 
Mission requirements for communications and communication relay may require 
coverage 24 hours a day/seven days a week over the entire land and sea entire operational 
area. Here too, a balance must be struck between antenna beam width, altitude, and 
power requirements. 
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5.1.2.2  Temporal Resolution (Revisit Rate) 
Altitude and inclination can affect the frequency that a single satellite passes over 
a target but they are not usually considered drivers for the overall revisit rate. Defined as 
the number of times a specific target is accessible by the total constellation in a period of 
time, the revisit rate is an orbit mission requirement that is most greatly affected by the 
number of satellites in a constellation. To meet greater operational mission requirements, 
more satellites must be added to the constellation, thereby directly driving cost, and 
leaving room for substantial trade space. 
Revisit rate is considered for both imagery and communications relay. With 
imagery, it reflects the frequency that a tactical commander needs to update situational 
awareness of a given target. For static or slow moving targets, the rate can be low, but for 
more dynamic situations, a higher revisit rate may be required. Observing the number of 
times a single satellite passes through the AOR at various altitudes within the predefined 
constraints, STK shows the number of passes stays relatively steady at between 14-15 per 
day for altitudes from 400 km to 550 km. Varying the inclination from baseline by +/-5 
deg does little to affect the number of passes per day either. This provides a good 
multiplicative factor for determining the number of satellites required in the constellation 
to meet a given revisit rate. In order to meet the requirement of one pass per hour, two 
satellites would be required in the imagery constellation. They would be in the same orbit 
but the ascending node would be 180 deg out of phase. 
5.1.2.3  Link Establishment 
Regardless of the specific mission, all TacSat’s must establish a communications 
link with ground stations for satellite and payload control and for imagery data downlink. 
Aside from environmental and atmospheric conditions, the two most important variables 
affecting link establishment are distance between transmitter and receiver and “time in 
view”. The impact of free space path loss on uplink and downlink signals is most greatly 
affected by altitude and angle of incidence.  (Figure 5-2) 
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Figure 5-2.  Free Space Path Loss 
 
Yet another issue challenging the ability to establish a persistent link is the length 
of time that the transmitter can access the ground station. At such low altitudes, there 
may not be sufficient time in a given pass to transmit all of the data currently in storage. 
Furthermore, a single tactical ground station local to the AOR may not be in position to 
receive data from the current pass, causing further delay in transmission to the end user 
by the length of time it takes to make a complete orbit. Conversely, the ground station 
may not be in position to transmit timely housekeeping data to a passing satellite, thereby 
delaying reaction by one orbit cycle (roughly 1 hour 30 minutes). For this reason, actual 
spacecraft flight would most efficiently be handled by existing control facilities which 
utilize relay satellites to maintain constant control and monitoring. 
For communications relay, arguably an infinite rate or continuous access is 
desirable. However cost constraints on the TacSat program limit the orbit selection and 
size of the constellation, so other relay methodologies must be used. In the case of 
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relaying data from a remote sensor, the sensor would need to store the data until uplink 
could be established. Similarly, if immediate relay operations are not attainable because 
the ground station is not simultaneously in the satellite’s footprint with the sensor, then 
the satellite would need to provide store and forward capabilities as well or utilize other 
methods to pass the data such as relaying to an existing GEO constellation such as Track 
and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS). 
5.1.3  Specialized Orbits 
The Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) was modeled for consideration with respect to 
communication and communication relay requirements.  In this scenario, a DADS array 
was the simulated target off of the west coast of Mindanao in the Sulu Sea. It was 
determined that a constellation of three satellites could maintain near 24x7 persistent 
coverage over the target requiring relay services. Each satellite had an apogee altitude of 
32,500 km and a perigee altitude of 600 km at an inclination of 8 degrees. Each satellite 
orbit’s Right Ascension of the Ascending Node (RAAN) was 120 degrees out of phase 
with its neighbor and the orbit planes are 120 degrees out of phase.  Generally speaking, 
coverage of this magnitude would best be provided by existing GEO communications 
satellites, assuming that sufficient channels are available for all contingency 
requirements. Due to the HEO’s high apogee altitude, there would be little if any 
reduction in required power of the ground terminal relative to up-linking with a GEO 
satellite. Likewise, there would be a corresponding increase in power required on the 
satellite for downlink back to the mission center. The cost of a HEO launch is also much 
greater than a LEO launch. For TacSat to remain a truly low cost solution, specialized 
orbits are cost prohibitive. 
5.1.4  Constellation Size/Orbit Design Trades 
The entering arguments for determining constellation size and orbit type include 
mission environmental constraints, requirements, and payload performance.  The 
environmental factors previously evaluated included space radiation, space debris, and  
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the consequences of altitude versus orbital decay.  Orbital constraints are considered 
based on the assumption that low cost is paramount and therefore spacecraft hardening is 
to be avoided. 
Since the Van Allen belt (South Atlantic Anomaly) dips to only 320 km between 
350 S and 600 S a constraint is set at either 350 inclination or an altitude of less then 320 
km.  In this scenario the optimal inclination is about 200 so a higher altitude of up to 
about 800 km can be considered although space debris is least severe at altitudes under 
550 km. 
While the lowest possible altitude is desirable to reduce launch cost and maximize 
imagery payload performance, a constraint that TacSat must last at least one year dictates 
a minimum altitude of 400 km to avoid rapid orbit decay due to atmospheric drag.  This 
constraint may push the satellite to higher altitudes and/or drive the architecture to 
include a propulsion system and extra fuel in order to maintain altitude as well as 
momentum wheels to maintain steady flight. Drag effects are strongest for low mass 
satellites with large frontal areas or low ballistic coefficients.  The basic formula for 
ballistic coefficient is (BC) = 2/116 mkgAC
m
D
≈   where:  m = 450 kg for the initial 
estimate, CD = 2.2 (avg low value from SMAD); and A = frontal area of the satellite, 
which is estimated to be 1.8 m2. At the base target height of 400 km, altitude (a) = 
(6,378.14 + 400) * 1000 = 6,778,140 m and atmospheric density max (p)= 5.04E-11 
kg/m3 during max solar activity. This is entered into the below equation to get a rough 
estimate of the change in altitude per revolution. This value can be used in the propulsion 













The following spreadsheet (Figure 5-3) calculator shows the impact of mass, drag 
coefficient, and spacecraft cross section on Ballistic Coefficient.  It shows that 
minimizing spacecraft cross section is critical in overall design.  
69
72 Mass of Payload
103 Mass of Payload
52 Mass of Propulsion
224 Mass of Bus
Total Mass (kg) 451
Drag Coefficient (Cd) 2 20
 
Diameter (m) 1.5 15 Input diameter (m) 
1.77
Ballistic Coefficient (kg/m2) 127.6066
Generally, use 2.2
Cross-section area relative to 
direction of velocity vector (m2)
Enter spacecraft diameter (assumed cylinder  )
Enter drag coefficient 
Enter mass of payloads and bus
Ballistic Coefficient
 
Figure 5-3.  Ballistic Coefficient {Active excel model} 
 
Estimated orbit life is approximated by the equation L~-H/∆a where H is 
atmospheric scale height of -87.5 km at 400 km. L~-(87.5 * 1000)/ -125.63 or 697 
revolutions or about 45 days. A spreadsheet calculator is provided to assist with future 
investigation of the impact of satellite size and shape, orbit altitude, and weight on system 
orbit lifetime. A graph of lifetime vs. altitude for a given configuration is presented below 
to show the effects. Of note, increasing altitude from 400 km to 450 km increases orbit 
lifetime by almost 40 days at solar max and reduces the loss of altitude per revolution by 
45%. This corresponds to a reduction of fuel required to maintain altitude. As will be 
shown in the payload section, this increase in altitude slightly improves the FOV and 
does not keep the imager from meeting resolution requirements.  (Figure 5-4) 
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Orbit Lifetime


















Figure 5-4.  Orbit Lifetime 
 
In summation, the environmental constraints set orbit constraints at between 400 
and 550 km at between mission-specified 150 to 200 inclinations. 
Temporal resolution requirements are keys in determining how many satellites are 
required in a constellation and are key trade space parameters for both imagery and 
communication payloads.  As mentioned in the temporal resolution section, the required 
revisit rate within the AOR was achieved with two satellites. Table 5-6, generated from 
an STK access summary report, shows coverage times for the entire AOR over a 24 hour 
period, treating the AOR as a single target. A constellation of two LEO orbiting satellites 
with 400-km altitude, inclination 200, and separation of 1800 RAAN have a revisit rate 
approximately 40 minutes. 
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Table 5-6.  AOR Revisit Times 












1 0:00:00 0:08:55 8.9   
2 1:28:24 1:46:39 18.3 1:19:29 
3 3:06:35 3:23:57 17.4 1:19:56 
4 4:45:02 5:01:18 16.3 1:21:06 
5 6:23:24 6:39:04 15.7 1:22:05 
6 8:01:38 8:17:31 15.9 1:22:34 
7 9:39:36 9:56:33 16.9 1:22:05 
8 11:17:15 11:35:09 17.9 1:20:42 
9 12:54:54 13:13:05 18.2 1:19:45 
10 14:32:50 14:50:38 17.8 1:19:44 
11 16:10:52 16:28:13 17.4 1:20:13 
12 17:48:55 18:05:57 17.0 1:20:42 
13 19:27:09 19:44:00 16.9 1:21:12 
14 21:05:14 21:22:34 17.3 1:21:13 
15 22:43:00 23:01:06 18.1 1:20:25 
     












1 0:49:56 1:07:35 17.7   
2 2:28:00 2:45:13 17.2 1:20:25 
3 4:06:08 4:23:02 16.9 1:20:56 
4 5:44:22 6:01:17 16.9 1:21:19 
5 7:22:19 7:39:58 17.6 1:21:03 
6 9:00:01 9:18:17 18.3 1:20:03 
7 10:37:47 10:55:59 18.2 1:19:30 
8 12:16:01 12:33:16 17.3 1:20:02 
9 13:54:28 14:10:39 16.2 1:21:12 
10 15:32:49 15:48:28 15.6 1:22:09 
11 17:11:03 17:26:59 15.9 1:22:35 
12 18:49:00 19:06:01 17.0 1:22:01 
13 20:26:38 20:44:35 18.0 1:20:37 
14 22:04:17 22:22:30 18.2 1:19:42 




In addition, the parameters of the selected orbits provide critical information 
needed to complete the analysis of other subsystems in the TacSat system.  Key 
information includes launch windows, periods of eclipse, and height above ground.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, there are two overriding issues in determining the 
feasibility of a TacSat system.  The first is cost and one of the key cost estimating 
relationships for imagery payloads is aperture.  This is determined by a combination of 
required ground resolution and altitude.  Altitude also is important in determining how 
much power needs to be transmitted to close the link for a communications satellite and 
power requirements in turn drive mass.  Mass is the primary parameter in the cost 
estimating relationship for determining the cost of a communications payload.  The 
required power and resulting mass are also cost drivers for the satellite bus.  These are 
greatly influenced by the amount of time that the satellite is in eclipse.  Eclipse time 
determines the amount of time that satellites solar panels are out of view of the Sun.  
(Table 5-7) 
Table 5-7.  Lighting definitions 
Lighting Condition Description 
Direct Sun Total sunlight. 
Penumbra or Direct Sun Partial or total sunlight. 
Penumbra Partial sunlight. 
Penumbra or Umbra Partial sunlight or total shadow. 
Umbra Total shadow. 
Umbra or Direct Sun Total shadow or total sunlight 
 
These lighting conditions coupled with power requirements determine battery 
size.  The orbit also determines the amount of time the satellite’s solar panels are viewed 
by the sun and that determines the size of the solar panels.  The size of the solar panels 
and batteries are very important cost drivers for the bus. Umbra is equivalent is where the 
satellite is in total shadow which happens approximately 16 times per day for about 36 
minutes. Preceding and following each umbra is an 8 second penumbra time period.  
Table 5-8 gives half-day umbra and penumbra times for a single satellite in circular orbit 
at 400 km and 200 inclination. 
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Table 5-8 .  Half-day umbra and penumbra times 
 
 Lighting Start Time Stop Time 
Duration 
(min) 
  Penumbra 0:07:20 0:07:28 0.135 
1 Umbra 0:07:28 0:43:27 35.98 
  Penumbra 0:43:27 0:43:35 0.135 
  Penumbra 1:39:06 1:39:14 0.135 
2 Umbra 1:39:14 2:15:13 35.99 
  Penumbra 2:15:13 2:15:21 0.135 
  Penumbra 3:10:52 3:11:00 0.135 
3 Umbra 3:11:00 3:46:59 35.99 
  Penumbra 3:46:59 3:47:07 0.135 
  Penumbra 4:42:38 4:42:46 0.135 
4 Umbra 4:42:46 5:18:45 35.99 
  Penumbra 5:18:45 5:18:53 0.135 
  Penumbra 6:14:24 6:14:32 0.135 
5 Umbra 6:14:32 6:50:31 35.99 
  Penumbra 6:50:31 6:50:39 0.135 
  Penumbra 7:46:10 7:46:18 0.135 
6 Umbra 7:46:18 8:22:17 35.99 
  Penumbra 8:22:17 8:22:25 0.135 
  Penumbra 9:17:55 9:18:04 0.135 
7 Umbra 9:18:04 9:54:03 35.99 
  Penumbra 9:54:03 9:54:11 0.135 
  Penumbra 10:49:41 10:49:49 0.135 
8 Umbra 10:49:49 11:25:49 35.99 
  Penumbra 11:25:49 11:25:57 0.135 
  Penumbra 12:21:27 12:21:35 0.135 
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5.1.5  Assess Launch and Disposal Options 
Major launch sites are listed below in figure 5-5.   From a purely geographically 
point of view a launch site near the equator is ideal for TacSat so from this list the sites of 
Korou in French Guiana, Alcantara in Brazil, , and Italy’s San Marco Range near Kenya 
are most suitable.    From a political and military perspective sites in the United States are 
ideal which may include the current sites listed in figure 5-5 plus planned sites at Mojave  
California, Las Cruces New Mexico, and Lompoc California. 
 
1 - Vandenberg 7 - Hammaguir 12 - Palmachim 17 - Xichang 
2 - Edwards 8 - Torrejon 13 - San Marco 18 - Taiyuan 
3 - Wallops Island 9 - Andoya 14 - Baikonur 19 - Svobodny 
4 - Cape Canaveral 10 - Plesetsk 15 - Sriharikota 20 - Kagoshima 
5 - Kourou 11 - Kapustin Yar  16 - Jiuquan  21 - Tanegashima 
6 - Alcantara    22 - Woomera  
 
Figure 5-5.  Launch Sites [Space Today] 
 
However, perhaps the most suitable site is the U.S. Army missile test range at 
Kwajalein Missile Range.  At 100 N Latitude it is an ideal location for launching a 
satellite into orbit around the equator.  It is the launch site choice for the current TacSat 





Figure 5-6.  Kwajalein Missile Range [From USAKA] 
 
Another factor in determining the viability of a TacSat system is timeliness of 
launch.  If the TacSat constellation can’t be made available to a tactical commander in a 
reasonable time frame it will be useless.  One of the drivers of timeliness is the 
availability of launch windows.  Whatever other time constraints there may be, if launch 
windows are not available to get a sufficient number of TacSats into orbit, then the 
system will fail to have military utility.  One possible solution to this problem can be 
addressed by the deployment CONOPS. Instead of using launch on demand concepts 
during an operation, TacSat would be deployed much the same as any other large 
headquarters support system. If available in a tactical commander’s arsenal of tools, it 
would be deployed at the onset of an operation based on key decision points such as 
expected length of operation, overall area of operation, or size of operation in terms of 
military depth of involvement. 
5.1.6  Document Orbit Parameters, Selection Criteria 
After careful analysis of the mission requirements, payload parameters, the 
environment, and orbital mechanics the most feasible orbits are between 400 and 500 
KM.  Table 5-9 summarizes the issues and conclusions drawn from detailed analysis 
performed in the following sections. 
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Table 5-9.  Orbit Summary Table 
Factors affecting Orbit Altitude Selection 
Factors     km Comments 
Environmental Constraints    
Radiation < 750 Van Allen Belts 
Radiation (at Inclinations > 30 degrees) < 321 N/A for 
Philippine 
scenario 
Micrometeoroid Impacts < 550  
Imagery sensor performance (see section 5.2.2)     
Spatial Resolution/ GSD-performance w/ 0.3 mirror 
diameter < 400 
For 1 meter 
GSD 
Spatial Resolution/ GSD-performance w/ 0.45 mirror 
diameter < 450 
For 1 meter 
GSD 
Temporal Resolution (from STK) > 300  
Communications Sensor performance – CDL link budget < 450 *1 
Communications Sensor Performance – Data Rate > 200 
For up to 274 
Mbps 
Orbit Lifetime  > 400  
Time in view (from ground site) > 300 w 200 elevation 
Constellation Size Constraint > 400  
Constraint -High  < 450 
(w/ 0.4 
aperture) 
Constraint - Low > 400  
*. Note:  Link budget for TacSat II CDL at 300 km showed 7.4 db excess.  Free 
space path loss is about 1.75 db per 100 km (10 GHz).  Given a required 5 db margin the 
limit is reached at about 450 km. 
 
Constellation size has the greatest ability to directly impact cost. The goal for 
imagery was to provide complete accessibility to the AOR within a 24-hour period and 
revisit the AOR up to once per hour.  At altitudes between 400 and 500 km all points in 
the AOR are not accessible within a 24-hour period by one satellite, and the revisit rate 
falls short of the objective as shown in Table 5-6.  Adding one more satellite to the 
constellation with a RAAN 1800 from the first satellite provides the objective revisit rate. 
The ground track separation between the different satellites is also cut in half, providing 
complete accessibility to all points in the AOR within a 24-hour period.  As discussed 
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previously for communications, 24x7 coverage can be obtained with a constellation of 
three satellites in HEO with each satellite’s RAAN separated by 1200.  
5.2  PAYLOAD OPTIONS  
The payloads that have been determined to have military utility in the previous 
sections of this paper fall into two major categories.  The first is communication and the 
second is reconnaissance or ISR.  The ISR payloads in turn fall into two sub categories: 
SIGINT payloads and imagery payloads.  SIGINT payloads tend to be small, light, and 
not draw too much power.  As such they are not cost drivers.  In fact TacSats configured 
for either communications payloads or imagery payloads could carry an additional 
SIGINT payload with little cost impact.  Consequently, this study will concentrate 
analysis on the imagery and communications payloads.  It is beyond the scope of this 
analysis to do a detailed design of these payloads.  Rather, it is the goal of the payload 
section to determine the top level characteristics of the payloads so that the key cost 
drivers can be identified and fed into the cost model.  These top level descriptions also 
provide the required data to describe the bus and its subsystems in sufficient detail that its 
cost drivers can be identified and fed into the cost model. 
5.2.1  Communications Payload Architecture  
This section will explore the architecture alternatives for providing a 
communications link for the conceptual tactical satellite system.  The SMAD process for 
specifying communication architecture was used as a basis for this analysis, but altered to 
accommodate the nature of this analysis as a feasibility study rather than a standard 
architecture design process.  The process followed is detailed below: 
1) Identify communications requirements from derived scenario requirements 
a. Identify data sources, end users, and locations 
b. Specify derived performance requirements 
c. Specify orbital constraints 
2) Specify Alternate Communications Architectures 
a. Identify fielded LEO communications technologies 
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b. Identify links and ground station locations 
3) Design and Size Each Configuration Link 
a. Identify currently available technology to leverage for rapid development 
b. Link budget analysis  
c. Specify concept of operations (CONOPS)  
4) Identify Feasible Architectures 
a. Specify optimal technology candidates 
b. Specify additional development requirements 
5.2.1.1  Identify Data Sources, End Users, and Locations 
The requirements generation process identified a set of data sources, end users, 
and locations, based on the Philippines Sea Scenario, that require satellite 
communications bandwidth.  
1) Field Commanders who require voice / medium data rate satellite 
communication bandwidth not available from national or commercial assets. 
2) Navy ships requiring voice / medium data rate satellite communication 
bandwidth not available from national or commercial assets. 
3) Unmanned/Autonomous Vehicles requiring high data rate channels for real-
time control and data relay not available from national or commercial assets. 
4) Autonomous Vehicles requiring small channels (< 9600 bps) for data burst 
communications in a less time sensitive decision loop. 
5) DADS – The Deployable Autonomous Distributed System is a set of undersea 
sensors that rely on a gateway buoy with LOS RF or Iridium SATCOM link to 
send very small (~100 byte) bursts of data. 
6) Field commanders and in-theatre HQs requiring real-time reception of the 
sensor data from the ISR payload. 
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5.2.1.2  Specify Performance Requirements 
The process to identify and analyze potential candidates for the communications 
payload starts with the set of performance requirements derived from the scenario in 
section 3.5.  These requirements serve as the filter to find a set of feasible candidates.  
Given the number of candidates identified, the need to either strength or relax these 
requirements is determined and the iterative process proceeds.   
The requirements section calls for two types of communications payloads: one to 
support continuous, bi-directional data/voice transmissions for users in the op area and 
one to support the downlink of data for the ISR payload.  The first design assumption 
made in this analysis is that the requirement for providing continuous communications 
from low earth orbit will require multiple satellites on the order of 25+ based on 
preliminary calculations.  Due to this assumption, the bi-directional communications 
configuration is split into two sub-configurations.  The Communications Repeater 
configuration will analyze the architecture for providing continuous communications 
with a constellation of satellites while the Store and Forward configuration will analyze 
the architecture for providing asynchronous communications with as few as one satellite. 
 
5.2.1.2.1  Communications Repeater Assumptions, Requirements, and Users 
The need for a tactical satellite acting as a communication repeater is established 
by the scenario based on four assumptions: 
1) The demand for commercial satellite services during the natural disaster will 
be so high that they will not be available to augment MILSATCOM.   
2) The effectiveness of national assets in Geo-Stationary orbits will be reduced 
due to environmental effects. 
3) The availability of national assets may be reduced due to high demand in 
other theaters and or physical damage or loss. 
4) Demand will exist for satellite communications supporting Anti-Jamming and 
Low Probability of Detection/Intercept that cannot be met by national assets. 
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The requirements that will drive the Communication Repeater payload analysis 
include: 
1) Total payload weight < 105.3 kg or 232.1 lbs (23% of 458 kg) 
2) Downlink/Uplink Data Rate of 1.0 Mbps 
3) Access and Control in < 1 min 
4) Interoperable with at least one type of ground terminal employed by the 
combatant commands and JTF  
5) Continuous Coverage 24 hr/day 
6) Constellation Availability of 97% and Link Availability of 95% 
7) Bit Error Rate <= 10-7 
 
The potential end users for this configuration include: 
1) Field Commanders who require satellite communication bandwidth not 
available from national or commercial assets. 
2) Navy ships requiring satellite communication bandwidth not available from 
national or commercial assets. 
3) Unmanned/Autonomous Vehicles requiring high data rate channels for real-
time control and data relay not available from national or commercial assets. 
4) DADS – The Deployable Autonomous Distributed System is a set of undersea 
sensors that rely on a gateway buoy with LOS RF or Iridium SATCOM link to 
send very small (~100 byte) bursts of data. 
 
5.2.1.2.2  Store and Forward Assumptions, Requirements, and Users 
The effective implementation of a tactical continuous satellite communications 
constellation in LEO will require many satellites to provide the 24 hr/day coverage 
stipulated in the initial requirements.  The Tactical Satellite effort aims to provide rapid 
deployment of space based ISR and Communications anywhere on the globe.  In keeping 
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with this aim, a Store and Forward communications payload could rapidly deliver 
satellite communications services, albeit with reduced requirements to a more select set 
of end users detailed below.  Essentially, if the time and resources are not available to 
deploy a full satellite communications constellation providing continuous coverage in the 
op area, deploying fewer satellites configured with a Store and Forward payload will still 
provide a useful service.  
The requirements that will drive the Store and Forward communications payload 
analysis are drawn from the Communications Relay above, with the following 
modifications: 
1) Downlink/Uplink Data Rate of 9600 bps 
2) Coverage based on number of passes per day given orbit 
 
The potential end users for this configuration include: 
1) Autonomous Vehicles requiring small channels (< 9600 bps) for data burst 
communications in a less time sensitive decision loop. 
2) DADS – The Deployable Autonomous Distributed System is a set of undersea 
sensors that rely on a gateway buoy with LOS RF or Iridium SATCOM link to 
send very small (~100 byte) bursts of data. 
 
5.2.1.2.3  ISR Payload Data Link Assumptions, Requirements, and Users 
The need for a tactical satellite with ISR capabilities is detailed in both the 
Requirements section and the ISR Payload section.  The need for a communications 
downlink to support the ISR Payload is a basic system requirement as it is assumed a 
launch and recover system would not provide the dissemination timeliness required. 
The requirements that will drive the ISR Downlink communications payload 
analysis are drawn from the requirement for the Communication Relay above, with the 
following modifications: 
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1) Downlink/Uplink Data Rate capable of supporting the bit rate generated by 
the ISR payload, currently 274 Mbps. 
2) Access and Control times capable of 
a. supporting real-time downlink of imagery during time over station, or 
b. supporting satellite cross-linking to communication relay satellite 
3) Coverage requirements based on ISR constellation orbits 
 
The potential end users for this configuration include: 
1) Field commanders and in-theatre HQs requiring real-time reception of the 
sensor data from the ISR payload. 
5.2.1.3  Specify Orbital Constraints 
This analysis seeks to provide a feasible set of communications payload 
candidates for the conceptual tactical satellite system.  While the standard 
communications satellite design approach would have the payload requirements drive the 
orbital selection, the primary driving requirements for this system are those associated 
with cost and time.  Analysis performed in the previous sections has determined that a 
low earth orbit with an altitude in the range of 400 to 450 km is optimal for 
accommodating the constraints of a low-cost, imaging satellite system.   
As such, altitude will drive many trades in the communications architecture 
design space.  Altitude will drive time in view and transmission delays; time in view and 
antenna max angles will drive access times; access times will drive data rates, and so on.   
Given the orbital altitude constraint, the transmission delay ranges and access 
time ranges will be specified for the low end of this range, 400 km.  This altitude 
corresponds to a slant range varying with elevation angle, charted below. 
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Figure 5-7.  Slant Range vs. Elevation Angle for 400 km Altitude 
 
The slant range varies from 2293 km to 400 km as the satellite comes over the 
horizon and back down.  (Figure 5-7)  This range, in turn, translates to a transmission 
delay varying with elevation angle charted below.  The range of transmission delays at 
this altitude vary from ~7.64 to 1.33 milliseconds.  (Figure 5-8) 
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Figure 5-8.  Transmission Delay vs. Elevation Angle at 400 km Altitude 
 
Parameters considered include slant range, transmission delay specifications, 
access time, and angle constraints.  Analysis is performed in the ISR Payload section that 
calculates the time in view values for the 400 km altitude.  Considerations for providing 
communications payload constraints include elevation angle vs. time in view, nadir angle 
from the satellite, and the maximum slant range that the payload would have to close the 
link over.  These values are specified in the Table 5-10. 
 
Table 5-10.  Orbital Communications Constraints 
Elevation Angle (degrees) 0 5 10 20 
Time in View (min) 10.17 7.91 6.21 4.03 
Nadir Angle (degrees) 70.2 69.6 67.9 62.15 
Max Slant Range (km) 2293 1804 1439 984 
 
At this altitude, a zero degree elevation angle corresponds to a 70.2-degree nadir 
angle from the satellite.  To utilize the entire 10.17 minute window would require a 
communications payload capable of closing a link over 2293 km with an antenna that 
supports a pointing angle of 70.2 degrees off nadir. 
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5.2.1.4  Specify Alternate Communications Architectures 
In order to obtain an understanding of the technology base for these types of 
payloads, fielded systems providing communications services in low earth orbits were 
researched.  System specifications are detailed below to assist in determining candidate 
frequency bands and equipment technologies for use in the tactical satellite 
communications payload architecture. 
Globalstar and Iridium are two of the most technically, though not economically, 
successful systems, in the domain of LEO communication satellite systems.  In the 
context of this scenario, the assumption is that commercial assets of this type are either 
saturated with use or the demand for military bandwidth exceeds that which the system 
can support.  Both of these systems provide a solid historic technology baseline that helps 
determine initial parameters for the Tactical Satellite communications architecture. 
The Globalstar satellite system is a LEO constellation of 48 satellites providing 
voice and low rate data channels to much of the globe.  The system configuration is 
detailed in Table 5-11. [Wood L, 1999] 
 
Table 5-11.  Globalstar Satellite System Specification 
Number of Satellites 48 
Orbit 1414 km, 52 deg 
Constellation Config 8 planes with 6 satellites each 
Coverage +- 70 deg Latitude 
Period / Visibility 114 min / 16.4 min 
Bus Mass 400 kg dry 
System Power 1000 W from two solar panels 
Access Method CDMA / FDMA 
Transponders (User) 1.610-1.6265 GHz  Up / 2.4835 – 2.50 GHz Down  
Transponders (Gateway) 5.091 –5.250 GHz  Up / 6.70 – 7.075 GHz Down  
Beams / Satellite 16 
Beam Diameter 2254 km 
Channels / Satellite Up to 3000 
Data Rate (Avg) 4.8Kbps Voice Channel / 9.6Kbps Data Channel 
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Table 5-12.  Globalstar Link Budget [Gkizeli et al, 1999] 
 
 
The Department of Defense has contracted with Iridium to provide bandwidth 
through a dedicated gateway on the system as part of the Enhanced Mobile Satellite 
Service (EMSS).  The technology used in the Iridium satellites has proven to be a 
relevant model for small, low-cost, mass-produced communication satellites.  The 
specifications of the Iridium system are detailed in Table 5-13. [Wood L, 1999] 
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Table 5-13.  Iridium Satellite System Specifications 
Number of Satellites 66 
Orbit 780 km, 86.4 deg 
Constellation Config 6 planes with 11 satellites each 
Coverage Global 
Period / Visibility 100 min / 11.1 min 
Bus Mass 689 kg 
System Power 1400 W from two solar panels 
Transmitter Power 400 W 
Access Method TDMA / FDMA 
Transponders (User) 1.616 – 1626.5 GHz  Up/Down  
Transponders (Gateway) 27.5 – 30.0 GHz  Up / 18.8 – 20.2 GHz Down  
Beams / Satellite 48 
Beam Diameter 600 km 
Channels / Satellite 1100 Duplex 
Data Rate (Avg) 4800 bps / Channel 
 




One interesting distinction between the two systems is the Globalstar constellation 
uses fewer satellites at higher altitudes, but is able to provide similar if not better service 
with lower overall weight and power requirements than the Iridium system.  One reason 
is the system's use of a CDMA waveform that provides greater power efficiency over the 
channel.  The CDMA waveforms spreads the signal over a wide frequency range at lower 
power resulting is much lower total power draw.  Additionally, the reason identified as 
88
the primary contributor to this difference is Globalstar satellites’ higher orbit results in 
the possibility that more than one satellite may be in view at a given location on Earth 
and both the terminal and on-board satellite processors are designed to combine these 
signals to improve the quality. [Hirshfield, 1996] 
5.2.1.5  Identify Communication Links 
Identification of communication links includes discussion of general frequency 
band suitability and an examination of the Common Data Link (CDL) system. 
5.2.1.5.1  Frequency Band Analysis 
The potential technology candidate are not filtered specifically by the frequency 
bands they support, but certain bands are more suitable than other given the requirements 
for high data rates, antenna size, and the environmental considerations imposed by the 
scenario. 
The VHF/UHF band is primarily employed for mobile applications in adverse 
environmental conditions, but the supported data rates are so low that they will only be 
able to support the Low Data Rate (LDR) applications in the Store and Forward 
configuration.  [Larson W, Wertz J 1999] 
The SHF band provides a more desirable range of spectrum to work with given 
the wide bandwidth supporting high data rates, inherent jam resistance and immunity to 
most weather conditions. The X band and Ku band are currently the most utilized 
frequencies in SHF.  The U.S. military has designated portions of each band for military 
use only.  While the X band provides better immunity to environmental effects and less 
free space path loss, the Ku band provides greater bandwidth to setup channels.  
Utilization of the Ka band has been growing since the late nineties, primarily for 
multimedia applications such as satellite internet services. [Exec Sum] 
The EHF band holds great potential as a highly survivable and secure range of 
spectrum, though it suffers in adverse weather conditions. [Executive Summary of 
Commercial Satellite Communications Report]  The high cost of development for this 
frequency range currently puts it outside the feasible set for a low cost tactical satellite. 
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Consideration is also given to the congestion of the frequency bands by 
commercial and national assets.  The C, X and Ku bands are highly used by many 
commercial satellite operators to provide fixed satellite services.  The Ka band is filling 
with commercial assets as well, given its ability to support higher data rates and smaller 
terminals. [Exec Sum]  In the context of this scenario it is expected that many 
commercial satellite assets will be in a state of increased use, introducing much greater 
channel utilization concerns in those bands.  
The X and Ku Bands currently constitute the spectrum frequencies with the 
lowest development costs that support the bandwidth and data rate requirements for the 
ISR downlink payload.  A future tactical satellite system might utilize the Ka band if 
channel utilization becomes an issue in the lower bands or the need for even more 
mobile, or possibly man portable systems drives the technology costs down. 
5.2.1.5.2  Identify Data Link Technology 
Common Data Link 
The Common Data Link program was developed in 1988 out of an earlier Air 
Force / NSA data link program as a standard communication architecture that would span 
all DoD Services.  The CDL architecture was designed as a "full-duplex, jam resistant 
spread spectrum, point-to-point digital link" providing uplink data rates reaching 45 
Mbps and downlink data rates reaching 274 Mbps.  The CDL family has five classes 
detailed below. [Pike J, 2005] 
• Class I: Ground/Airborne platforms up to 80,000 ft 
• Class II: Ground/Airborne platforms up to 150,000 ft 
• Class III: Ground/Airborne platforms up to 500,000 ft 
• Class IV: Satellite terminals up to 750 nm 
• Class V: Satellite terminal above 750 nm 
 
The first use of off the shelf Common Data Link equipment in a low earth orbit 
satellite system will be on TacSat-2, planned for launch in late 2006 on a Minotaur I 
rocket.  The system to be flown on this test platform is a modified L3 ABIT CDL radio  
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used in the Tactical Aerial Reconnaissance System (TARS) pod on the F-16 fighter.  This 
implementation provides the full 274 Mbps bandwidth equipment. [Dewey RG, Bishop J 
2005] 
The Microwave Model Assembly (MMA) is the primary component of the ABIT 
CDL radio.  The gimbaled antenna, and its accompanying diplexer and power amp, were 
removed and replaced by an electronically steerable array (ESA) antenna for the 
downlink and a patch antenna for the uplink.  The chassis was physically extended to 
accommodate more room for the wiring harness and then rotated to fit the internal 
satellite space.  This was basically the extent of the modifications and allowed the 
program to rapidly progress from an off the shelf airborne CDL system to a satellite 
based system. (Figure 5-9)  [Dewey RG, Bishop J 2005] 
 
 
Figure 5-9.  TacSat-2 Communications Antennas [Dewey RG, Bishop J 2005] 
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The need for hardening the payload environmentally was mitigated by the low 
earth orbit, staying below the radiation belts.  The aluminum casing of the ABIT 
equipment was deemed sufficient shielding for the application and expected life cycle.  
Vacuum related issues were vetted and all components of the MMA were found to be 
suitable, though some antenna components were modified to ensure no exposed 
unsuitable materials. [Dewey RG, Bishop J 2005]  Thermal heat sinking of the 
electronics was mitigated with the modified mounting orientation and the satellite bus 
provides heating for the downlink antenna.  Finally, shock and vibration issue were 
mitigated by the ruggedness of both the MMA and antenna designs. 
5.2.1.6  Ground Stations 
The selection of the Common Data Link equipment as the primary radio link 
system must be made with the knowledge that an existing surface terminal is available 
that meets the requirements of the tactical scenario.  The key requirements for the surface 
terminal include: 
1) Mobile 
2) Support high data rate downlinks 
3) Support military encryption 
4) Provide interconnections for modular external system 
 
The Army’s Modular Interoperable Surface Terminal, or MIST, was developed 
specifically for interface with the CDL link family.  It employs a 6 ft parabolic dish in the 
standard configuration that provides 43 dB of gain in the X Band and 44 dB of gain in the 
Ku Band.  It is capable of tuning frequencies from the L through the EHF bands, but the 
standard configuration is for use with X or KU bands.  The terminal provides a selection 
of 10 W or 50 W output power.  It supports BPSK modulation for the uplink and OQPSK 
modulation for the downlink with a BER of 1 E8 and convolution encoding FEC.  The 
terminal supports data rates up to 200 kbps for the uplink and 274 Mbps for the 
downlink.  The MIST ground station would be locating at the forward operating base, 
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which for the purposes of the scenario would be in the Philippine islands.  
(Figure 5-10)   [L3, “Modular Interoperable”] 
 
 
Figure 5-10.  Modular Interoperable Surface Terminal (MIST) [Pike J, 2005] 
 
The naval surface terminal for use with the Common Data Link family was 
originally called the Common High Bandwidth Data Link – Surface Terminal (CHBDL-
ST), but has since been renamed simply as CDL-Navy, or CDL-N.  The first physical 
embodiment of this system is in the USQ-123 terminal currently in production.  The first 
installations were aboard aircraft carriers, with follow on installations on LHAs, LHDs, 
LPDs, and AGF/LCCs.   The scenario envisions at least one Carrier Task Force in the 
area will be equipped with a CDL-N terminal. [Pike J, 2005] 
5.2.1.7  Preliminary Link Budget Analysis 
The preliminary concept of using CDL as the data link provided an initial set of 
ground terminal specifications based on MIST that allowed for an early estimation of the 
EIRP that would be required to close an uplink or downlink in the X and Ku Bands at the 
target data rates.  Prior to defining the satellite antenna, the most challenging 
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communications link configuration would occur just as the satellite appears over the 
horizon from the ground terminal, at an elevation of 0 degrees.  At an altitude of 400 km, 
this corresponds to a nadir angle of 70.2 degrees and a slant range of 2293 km.  The 
downlink EIRP is determined by using these values and the MIST ground antenna.  
 
Table 5-15.  Initial Downlink Budget to Determine EIRP at X and Ku Bands 
X Ku X Ku
Frequency 7.4 11.8 7.4 11.8 GHz
Equiv. Isotropic Radiated Power 30.5 34.4 22.7 26.5 dBw
Propogation Path Length 2293 2293 2293 2293 km Slant range at Elevation Angle = 0
Space Loss -177.0427 -181.0957 -177.0427 -181.0957 dB
Propagation & Polarization Loss -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 dB Average value from SMAD
Receive Antenna Diameter 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 m 6ft MIST Antenna
Peak Receive Antenna Gain (net) 40.44728 44.50029 40.44728 44.50029 dBi
Receive Antenna Beamwidth 1.550731 0.972492 1.550731 0.972492 deg
Receive Antenna Pointing Error 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 deg Assume 0.5 degree pointing error
Receive Antenna Pointing Loss -1.247522 -3.172115 -1.247522 -3.172115 dB
Receive Antenna Gain 39.19976 41.32817 39.19976 41.32817 dBi
System Noise Temperature 135 135 135 135 K SMAD Table 13-10
Data Rate 2.74E+08 2.74E+08 4.50E+07 4.50E+07 bps
Eb/N0 14.03 14.08 14.07 14.02 dB
C/N Density 98.41 98.46 90.61 90.56 dB-HZ
Bit Error Rate 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 -
Required Eb/N0 12 12 12 12 dB OQPSK requires ~12 dB at 10^-18 BER
Implementation Loss -2 -2 -2 -2 dB
Margin 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.02 dB




The downlink budget shows the EIRP necessary to close the link over the greatest 
slant range possible at the 400 km altitude for both frequency bands and both data rates.  
If the satellite power and antenna configuration can produce these EIRPs, they can close 
the link at any point during the time in view. 
The uplink budget starts with the MIST station’s high power mode, 50 W, and 
both the ISR Payload uplink data rate (200 kbps) and the SATCOM uplink data rate (45 
Mbps) are used to calculate the antenna gain that must be obtained at the satellite. 
The uplink budget shows that the high data rate modes for the SATCOM 
configuration in both bands require between ~5 and ~9 dBi of antenna gain, while the 
medium data rate modes for ISR commands can close the link with an extremely low 
signal. 
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5.2.1.8  Identify CDL Technology Candidates 
The CDL data link family equipment currently provides one of the only low cost, 
relatively lightweight radio packages that support Extremely High Data Rates in the SHF 
frequency band.  Multiple companies provide satellite data link equipment that is either 
designed for high data rates in large satellites or low data rates in smaller satellites.  L3 
Communications is the sole contract vendor for CDL compliant data link equipment sized 
for airborne platforms, which have been proven suitable for conversion to micro-satellite 
payloads.  Table 5-16 provides a comparison of the primary off the shelf equipment 
available as of the writing of this paper. 
Table 5-16.  Potential Airborne Transitional Equipment Technology 
 ABIT T-Series U T-Series WB 
Modem Dims (m) .251 x .343 x .419 .290 x .203 x .128 .305 x .320 x .404 
Modem Volume (m^3) .0361 .00754 .0394 
Modem Wt (kg) 26.3 5.82 31.7 
Modem Power (W) 272 150 750 
Max Data Rate Down 274 Mbps 44.73 Mbps 274 Mbps 
Max Data Rate Up 10.71 Mbps 44.73 Mbps 10.71 Mbps 
Frequency Band  Ku / X Ku Ku 
 
The L3 ABIT Data Link system is comprised of a Microwave Modem Assembly 
unit that houses the data modem, RF transceiver, and power amplifier sub-systems in a 
single chassis.  The MMA is a 26.3 kg chassis that draws 272 watts at 28 VDC.  It also 
includes a gimbaled parabolic antenna and waveguide array antenna, though these are not 
included in the size and weight specifications above. 
The L3 T-Series Model U system is comprised of two modules, a Microwave 
Modem Assembly containing the data modem and a Link Interface Assembly containing 
the RF transceiver and power amplifier.  The MMA is a 2.72 kg chassis and the LIA is a 
3.18 kg chassis.  The modules are interconnected and draw a total of 150 watts at 28 V 
DC.  This system also provides a 5” omni-directional antenna assembly, though it is not 
included in the size and weight specifications above. 
The L3 T-Series Model WB system is comprised of an Airborne Modem 
Assembly module containing the data modem and a Radio Frequency Equipment module 
95
containing a RF transceiver and power amplifier.  The AMA is an 18.1 kg chassis 
drawing 250 watts at 120 VAC and the RFE is a 13.6 kg chassis drawing 500 watts at 
120 VAC.  This system also includes a 9.5” 2-Axis gimbaled parabolic antenna, though it 
is not included in the size and weight specifications above. 
These equipment specifications provide a reasonable baseline for root equipment 
that has been or could be modified for use in LEO communication satellites.  The ABIT 
equipment was modified for use in the TacSat-2 program, although additional 
modifications of both the equipment and the platform will be necessary to arrive at a 
production design.  The ABIT equipment would be the most likely candidate as the 
baseline design for a HDR Communications Relay or definitely as the ISR Payload Data 
Link.  A LDR Communications Relay or Store and Forward configuration could be 
implemented with the lighter, lower data rate T-Series U equipment as the baseline for 
the design. 
As this equipment was all designed for airborne applications, the antennas 
included in the off the shelf packages will not be optimal for a space based 
implementation.  Just as with the TacSat-2 program, hard mounted electronically 
steerable antenna designs will provide the optimal solution, though software challenges in 
the steering of these antennas with mobile users will need to be addressed. 
5.2.1.9  Identify Antenna Technology Candidates 
The TacSat-2 team determined that a fixed parabolic antenna would not provide a 
suitable balance of gain and beam steering to be operationally effective.    
5.2.1.9.1  TacSat-2 Electronically Steerable Antenna 
An electronically steerable antenna design was specifically chosen for the satellite 
to lower complexity and aerodynamic impacts.  This new downlink antenna was 
developed by ATK-Mission Research Corporation.  It is made of 16 helical elements, 
each connected to an amplifier and phase shifter.  The entire assembly is encased in foam 
to provide structural strength and protect the components.  The antenna provides a 6.5 
degree spot beam that can be steered within a 30 degree cone without the need for a 
gimbaled dish. [Dewey RG, Bishop J 2005] 
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5.2.1.9.2  X Band Phased Array Antenna 
The X Band Phased Array Antenna (XPAA) was developed by Boeing’s Phantom 
Works for NASA’s Earth Observing satellite specifically for facilitating a high data rate 
downlink to support the gigabytes of data collected by the satellite each day.  The antenna 
is comprised of 64 modules arranged in an 8 x 8 array.  A circular waveguide, two 
antenna feeds, a phase shifter and two power amplifiers make up each module.  The 
entire enclosure measures 12” x 13” x 2.9” and weighs 5.5 kg.  The antenna can scan 60 
degrees half-angle and has a 3 dB beamwidth of 10 degrees.  It generates a LHCP 
polarization and draws approximately 58 watts of DC input power.  The antenna has no 
moving parts, has proven highly reliable and space qualifiable, and currently is used to 
transmit over 160 gigabytes per day at 108 Mbps. [Perko K et al, 2002] 
 
 
Figure 5-11.  X-Band Phased Array Antenna [Perko K et al, 2002] 
 
5.2.1.10  Detailed Link Budget Analysis 
Additional link budgets are developed using the specification of the technologies 
identified in previous sections.  Specifically, the XPAA antenna will be used as it gives 
the widest pointing angle of the two electronically steerable antennas identified to 
provide the EIRP necessary to close the high data rate downlink.  The XPAA provides 
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the ability to electronically steer the beam up to 60 degrees off nadir.  This translates to 
an elevation angle of approximately 22 degrees and a slant range of 895 km. 
 
Table 5-17.  Downlink Budget for 274 Mbps (ISR) and 45 Mbps (SATCOM) Modes  
X Ku X Ku
Frequency 7.4 11.8 7.4 11.8 GHz
Transmitter Power 2.9 3.4 0.48 0.55 Watts
Transmitter Power 4.62 5.31 -3.19 -2.60 dBW
Transmitter Line Loss -1 -1 -1 -1 dB
Transmit Antenna Beamwidth 10 10 10 10 deg Beamwidth of XPAA
Peak Transmit Antenna Gain 24.30 24.30 24.30 24.30 dBi
Transmit Antenna Diameter 0.28 0.18 0.28 0.18 m
Transmit Antenna Pointing Offset 8 8 8 8 deg Assume 80% error in pointing
Transmit Antenna Pointing Loss -7.68 -7.68 -7.68 -7.68 dB
Transmit Antenna Gain (net) 16.62 16.62 16.62 16.62 dBi
Equiv. Isotropic Radiated Power 20.24 20.93 12.43 13.02 dBw
Propogation Path Length 895 895 895 895 km Slant range at max nadir angle = 60
Space Loss -168.87 -172.92 -168.87 -172.92 dB
Propagation & Polarization Loss -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 dB SMAD given value
Receive Antenna Diameter 1.83 1.83 1.83 1.83 m 6 ft MIST antenna
Peak Receive Antenna Gain (net) 40.45 44.50 40.45 44.50 dBi
Receive Antenna Beamwidth 1.55 0.97 1.55 0.97 deg
Receive Antenna Pointing Error 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 deg
Receive Antenna Pointing Loss -0.20 -0.51 -0.20 -0.51 dB
Receive Antenna Gain 40.25 43.99 40.25 43.99 dBi
System Noise Temperature 135 135 135 135 K SMAD Table 13-10
Data Rate 2.74E+08 2.74E+08 4.50E+07 4.50E+07 bps
Eb/N0 14.04 14.12 14.07 14.05 dB
C/N Density 98.42 98.49 90.61 90.58 dB-HZ
Bit Error Rate 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 -
Required Eb/N0 12 12 12 12 dB Required for OQPSK at 10^-8 BER
Implementation Loss -2 -2 -2 -2 dB
Margin 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.05 dB
Item 274Mbps Downlink 45Mbps Downlink Units Comments
 
 
The highest power requirement based on this configuration is 3.4 W at the longest 
slant range.  As the satellite travels further into view, the power requirement will 
decrease.  The power requirements determined for the uplink in the preliminary analysis 
show that a simple semi-directional fixed antenna will provide sufficient gain to close the 
uplink. 
5.2.1.11  Specify the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
The Communications Architectures defined in the requirements analysis have 
unique concepts of operation.  The CONOPS for the communications repeater and store 
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and forward architectures is defined here, while the CONOPS for the ISR Payload Data 
Link architecture will be defined in the ISR Payload section. 
5.2.1.11.1  Communications Repeater CONOPS 
Under the constraints of the orbital parameters determined as an integral part of 
the design, providing continuous coverage over the scenario op area will require a 
constellation of satellites.  The elevation angle at which the data link can be successfully 
closed is based on the antenna maximum steerable angle for the two phased array 
antennas identified for this application.  The XPAA antenna provides the greatest 
steerable angle of 60 degrees off nadir.  This translates to an elevation angle of 22 
degrees, which gives a communications window of just under four minutes.  Allowing for 
30 seconds to initialize the link means cutting the window down to about three minutes 
for a continuous hand off from satellites to satellite (4min – 30 sec Sat 1 init – 30 Sat 2 
init).  At the 400 km altitude, the orbital period is approximately 92 minutes, meaning the 
constellation would require at least 31 satellites to provide continuous coverage. 
Assuming that such a constellation could be rapidly launched at a cost that 
corresponded with the demand, in field surface terminals could use the system to achieve 
high data rate links (up to 45 Mbps).  In the context of this scenario and the cost and time 
constraints, this is not found to be a technically feasible concept. 
5.2.1.11.2  Store and Forward CONOPS 
A far more achievable role for LEO tactical satellites is found in the store and 
forward architecture.  Asynchronous communications can be achieved with as little as a 
single satellite.  The satellite would pass over the op area once every 92 minutes, 
accepting uplinks of new data while down-linking stored data in full duplex.  The 
primary implementations would include: 
a. Autonomous unmanned vehicles loitering would upload data for delivery back 
to the GIG and asynchronous commands would be sent out from the AUVs 
mission control.   
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b. Deployed sensors such as DADS would pass along recorded data for delivery 
back to mission control centers.   
c. In field command posts or possibly even man portable terminals would send 
text, voice, image, or video messages up the chain while simultaneously 
receiving updated orders, intelligence, imagery, etc. 
The time between reception and delivery would be minimized by employing at 
least two tactical satellites in opposing (one prograde, one retrograde) orbits.  In this way 
the satellite with an eastward ground track could deliver messages quickly within theatre 
to recipients located east of the sender, and vise versa. 
5.2.1.12  Specify Optimal Technology Candidates 
Communications Repeater / Store and Forward Configuration 
The L3 T-Series Model U equipment provides more than sufficient data rates at 
extremely low weight and cost that would be capable of supporting both the 
Communications Repeater and Store and Forward configurations of the TacSat 
Communications Payload Architecture.  The use of the Ku frequency band and full 
duplex support provide an effective path to small, mobile terminals for LDR or MDR 
voice/data communications.  The CDL compliance makes it interoperable with the MIST 
surface terminal as well. 
 
ISR Payload Downlink Configuration 
The L3 ABIT equipment was used in the TacSat-2 program for very good reason.  
It is the lightest link equipment that is both CDL compliant and supports data rates up to 
274 Mbps.  This meets the required data rate to downlink the ISR payload imagery in 
real-time given the orbital selection and system CONOPS.  This payload provides the 
flexibility to utilize bandwidth in the X or Ku band. 
5.2.1.13  Specify Additional Development Requirements 
Both architecture implementations would require the modification of existing 
airborne systems to ensure reliability in the space environment.  The many lessons 
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learned during the TacSat-2 CDL development program could be leveraged to  
mitigate risk and expedite the process. 
 
TacSat-2 CDL Lessons Learned [Dewey RG, Bishop J 2005] 
 
1) The MMA uses a native MIL-STD-1553 bus, which was not available on 
TacSat-2 Integrated Avionics Unit, but should be considered in the selection 
of the IAU for a final Tactical Satellite System. 
2) Steering the antenna beam is done blindly due to no status information coming 
back from the control interface.  Currently relies on calculating the angles 
based on the location of the ground terminal.  For mobile applications this will 
have to be enhanced. 
3) Software modifications were required in the MMA to account for the higher 
Doppler shift experienced with LEO satellites versus airborne platforms.  The 
original range of 0-40 KHz was far below the expected range as high as 250 
KHz with a 5 KHz maximum rate of change. 
4) The COMSEC implemented in the ABIT MMA was designed for single sortie 
airborne missions and only holds one key.  Final designs will require a 
modification of the KG-135 device to handle multiple keys. 
5.2.2  ISR Payload Architecture 
In order to limit the scope of this study to the topics of greatest significance, 
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) efforts will be limited to imagery 
(IMINT) with a small discussion of signals intelligence (SIGINT). Acoustic intelligence 
(ACINT) will be supported through TacSat communication relay capabilities.  
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) as well as other potential ISR uses 
will not be discussed.  
The derived mission requirements did not cover SIGINT however this team feels 
that if a viable TacSat solution is developed, a SIGINT package could be a simple and 
inexpensive addition. A brief discussion in provided below. The derived mission 
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requirements for imagery that drive the presented payload concept dealt mostly with 
spectral and spatial resolution, image size and the field of view.  
In keeping with the larger TacSat concept of providing a low cost and responsive 
solution, the primary physical payload constraints were mass and power budget. 
Simplicity also plays a role in keeping costs down.  
5.2.2.1  SIGINT 
SIGINT is comprised of COMINT and ELINT and involves “listening” to various 
bands of electromagnetic energy and extracting usable information for further analysis. 
COMINT refers to intelligence obtained from clear and covered voice transmissions and 
from the indications of transmissions known as communications externals. ELINT refers 
to intelligence gathered from interception of other than voice transmissions: telemetry 
(TELINT), radar (sometimes called RADINT), and other sources of electromagnetic 
emanations.  
The resources required to provide a tactical SIGINT capability on a TacSat should 
be comparatively small. Covering the entire spectrum from a TacSat is not feasible so a 
narrower selection of frequencies must be targeted for interception. Using a system such 
as the sub-satellite ferret on some of the Key Hole satellites would keep size, weight, 
power, and costs low. Very little unclassified information is available about sub-satellite 
SIGINT ferrets but they were used with some success prior to 1990. Current solid state 
receiver technology should be able to provide an affordable solution. A passive wide 
band antenna/receiver could be added to an imagery bird or a communications relay bird 
and utilize the same storage and downlink capability already provided. The increase in 
weight and required power would be relatively small. For this study, the team derived a 
total mass for the satellite of approximately 450 kg and a small receive-only suit could 
add 2-4% total mass which is acceptable at this stage of concept exploration. 
Since the satellites are in LEO, loiter time over a desired target will be very short 
and infrequent. Short loiter times still support detection and classification of signals but 
will not support analysis of complete communications. For this reason, a LEO SIGINT 
solution would be used primarily for ELINT and communications externals. The 
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intercepted data would be stored on board until such time as the bird was in view of its 
ground station. Aside from compression, no other post-interception processing would be 
performed by the space segment. Again, this is to keep costs low and utilize existing 
ground capabilities. A small price would be paid in terms of the amount of raw data being 
down linked but this is offset by the reduction in complexity weight and power required 
for on board processing.  
As an alternative, a HEO TacSat could provide the temporal resolution to enable 
good COMINT but the additional costs incurred by HEO are not desirable for this 
program.  
5.2.2.2  Imagery 
The choices available for imagery payload are varied. From infrared to visible 
light, active or passive microwave, film or electro-optic detector, framing, cross-track 
scanning, and along-track scanning; each has its own capabilities and limitations.  
Roughly using the steps outlined in SMAD 3rd ed. (Larson, 2005), the abbreviated 
process for choosing an imagery payload is as follows: 
1) Select payload objectives. 
2) Conduct subject trades. 
3) Develop payload operations concept. 
4) Determine required payload capability. 
5) Identify candidate payloads. 
6) Estimate candidate payload characteristics. 
7) Evaluate candidates and select a baseline. 
5.2.2.2.1  Select Payload Objectives 
The imagery payload objectives from section 3 are to provide imagery in a useful 
format that shows enemy movement and positions, friendly movement and positions, 
camouflaged equipment, terrain, contaminated areas, and obstacles. This statement 
encompasses a wide variety of information requirements that can be met by specific types 
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of imagery technology. This will greatly reduce the field of viable payload candidates as 
well as allow for trade space when balancing performance with cost. The derived 
performance requirements for spatial resolution listed in section 3 are 2 meter threshold 
and 1 meter objective for pan chromatic and a revisit rate of 2 hours threshold and 1 hour 
objective.  
5.2.2.2.2  Conduct Subject Trades 
The SMAD definition of subject is basically objects of interest for the imagery 
payload. There are a few subjects listed in the objective statement: moving and stationary 
personnel, moving and stationary equipment, facilities, and terrain to various degrees. As 
a subject trade to keep costs low, TacSat’s imagery capabilities will be limited to 
covering a single type of subject that can be supported by a single imagery payload. For 
this TacSat imagery variant, the team chose to examine the subject type that would 
provide the most general benefit to the tactical commander. From a tactical perspective, 
imagery of unit activity would provide the greatest benefit. This drives the resolution and 
revisit rate requirements as stated in section 3. From a subject trade perspective, this high 
resolution limits the ability to provide wide area terrain imagery due to the limited field 
of view of higher resolution systems at lower altitudes. Furthermore the available 
unclassified COTS systems that provide resolution in the 1-2 m range are panchromatic, 
visible spectrum solutions.   Technology and cost constraints render infrared, multi-
spectral, and hyper-spectral solutions non- feasible and these systems will be eliminated 
from the subject trade space.  This reduces the choice of subjects by eliminating the 
camouflage subjects that could be detected by infrared systems as well as eliminating the 
contaminated areas that could be detected with multi-spectral and hyper-spectral systems.  
5.2.2.2.3  Develop Payload Operations Concept 
The operating concept for the payload is closely tied to the total system CONOP 
developed in section 3.6. From the tactical commander’s request for information through 
tasking, collection and dissemination, the payload design needs to support these basic 
functions. The ideal CONOP would encompass an ability for the tactical commander to 
send instantaneous requests to the TacSat, affect an immediate adjustment to the orbit to 
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provide the requested target coverage on the same or subsequent pass, collect imagery 
and relay the imagery in real-time to the tactical commander. A CONOP of this nature 
would require extensive reliance on existing national communications capabilities for 
transmitting the data to and from the TacSat.  Ideally, if TacSat is considered feasible for 
full rate production, it should be developed spirally and in parallel with emerging 
communications capabilities such as Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) and the 
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) waveform. In this manner, TacSat would be able to 
take advantage of MUOS for reach-back and tactical units would not need different 
radios to relay data over TacSat.  It would be fully integrated into the Global Information 
Grid (GIG) and support FORCEnet concepts.  In this initial CONOP, requests will be 
passed to the VMOC for tasking and data will be returned via CDL.  
The CONOPS for up-linking commands to the payload will be to use current Air 
Force infrastructure, direct control from CDL/MIST command posts, and through the use 
of VMOC. The CONOPS for down-linking imagery data is to transmit at up to 274 Mbps 
directly to a CDL/MIST command post or transmit compressed imagery data to existing 
constellations such as TDRS.  The requirements for data rate are illustrated in Figure 5-
12.  Given a one meter pixel size, and 11 to 12 bits per pixel (to support high resolution 
black and white), a target altitude of four hundred kilometers, and a swath width of 
eleven kilometers, TacSat will record data at a rate of between 928 and 1012 Mbps.  This 
data rate needs to be compressed at a 4:1 ratio to reduce the output data rate to below the 
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Figure 5-12. Data Rate Calculator (Active excel model) 
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The goal for TacSat is to transmit data in real time to a CDL/MIST command post 
in theater.  Given an altitude of 400 km the maximum time TacSat will be in view of the 
command post for downlink transmission is between 4.03 and 10.17 minutes depending 
on elevation if the ground station is along the ground track (Table 5-18). 
Table 5-18.  Time in View [Larson W, Wertz J 1999] 
MAXIMUM TIME IN VIEW (minutes) 
 
Degrees of elevation off horizon from ground station 
(degrees) 
Altitude (km) 0 5 10 20 
300 8.67 6.50 4.95 3.10
350 9.44 7.22 5.59 3.57
400 10.17 7.91 6.21 4.03
450 10.88 8.57 6.80 4.49
500 11.55 9.21 7.38 4.93
550 12.21 9.83 7.95 5.37
 600 12.86 10.43 8.50 5.81
650 13.48 11.02 9.04 6.24
700 14.10 11.60 9.58 6.66
750 14.71 12.17 10.10 7.08
800 15.30 12.74 10.62 7.50
 
In consideration of rough terrain a constraint of 200 was set and the maximum 
time was about 4.03 minutes.  This time can be further reduced depending on the relative 
location of the ground station to the area being imaged so planning the location of the 
ground station is important.  The worst case scenario is that TacSat would be in range to 
downlink for about 90 seconds (30 degree elevation for half the arc).  However, at 1 
meter pixel size, 12 bits per pixel, and an 11 meter swath, TacSat needs to collect 
imagery at about at 1012 Mbps and downlink compressed data at about 253 Mbps.  
Therefore, an 11 km x 24 km section of imagery can be down-linked in about 13 seconds.    
The largest sections of imagery TacSat would be required to image in this scenario are 11 
km x 66 km which would take about 35 seconds to downlink.  Depending on ground 
track TacSat may be in position to image as many as four areas of interest per pass for a 
total (maximum) downlink time of about 2 minutes.  The combined time of 2:20 minutes 
can be accomplished within the allowed overhead time (time in view) for this scenario.  
Positioning the ground station for any scenario is important. 
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The collection portion of the CONOP relies on the target being accessible by the 
sensor. This can be achieved by adjusting the orbit of the satellite, pointing the entire 
satellite, pointing a gimbaled sensor within the fixed satellite, or using a pivoting mirror 
to redirect the path of the sensor’s FOV. Table 5-19 discusses some of the advantages and 
disadvantages . 
Table 5-19.  Pointing Options 
Method Advantages Disadvantages 
Orbit  
adjustment 
Reduced spatial distortion of off-nadir 
imagery. Larger total coverage area 
available. 
High cost for propulsion system 
and fuel in terms of weight and 




Less expensive and quicker than orbit 
adjustment. 
Spatial distortion off nadir. 
Higher inertial forces required 
than mirror pointing. 
Sensor  
pointing 
Less expensive and quicker than orbit 
adjustment. 
Spatial distortion off nadir. 
Potentially larger satellite 
required to accommodate 
physical sweep area of sensor 
within the bus. Higher inertial 




Simplest, low mass, low cost. 
Requirements to rotate a small mirror will 
be less than to rotate sensor or satellite. 
Spatial distortion off nadir. 
 
Using the mirror would provide the same general capability as other pointing 
methods without going to the extreme of adjusting the entire orbit of a satellite. A 
maximum slew angle of 310 will provide the necessary coverage to see all points in 
between the ground traces of the two consecutive satellites in the constellation chosen in 
section 4.3 for any altitude selected between 400 km and 550 km. 
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5.2.2.2.4  Determine Required Payload Capability 
With a well defined subject and a goal of providing general applicability at low 
cost, an imager in the visible (380-780 nm) to near-IR (750-1400 nm) spectrum is 
dictated. The longer wavelengths will provide better atmospheric transmittance and 
approaching near-IR wavelengths may help penetrate smoke, foliage, and camouflage. A 
low cost, panchromatic system with a silicon detector element will provide visible and 
some near-IR capability (400-900 nm) and require less cooling than other types of 
elements. [Olsen, 2005]  
This wavelength capability must be traded against the other parameters to gain the 
required resolution within cost constraints. As a general rule of thumb, the cost of an 
imager is proportional to the aperture diameter (D) which is directly proportional to the 
wavelength (λ) by λ
d
fQD 44.2=  (SMAD, ‘05). As mentioned above, aperture diameters 
between 0.2 m and 0.5 m should be affordable based on existing systems. Of note, cost 
can then also be shown to be proportional to the focal length (f) and image quality (Q) 
while inversely proportional to the size of the detector element (d).  
Wavelength also affects resolution by λ
D
hR 22.1=  [Wertz J, Van Allen R 2006], 
so again the desire is to trade for smaller wavelength for better (smaller) resolution. As a 
baseline, the wavelength parameter constraints will be set to a minimum of 400 nm and a 
maximum of 1000 nm which closely coincides with silicon’s effective range. Figure 5-13 
shows the relationship between resolution and wavelength for altitudes of 400 km and 
450 km over a range of aperture diameters. Of note, one meter resolution in the visible 

































Figure 5-13.  Resolution vs. Wavelength 
 
Focal length also directly affects the size of the payload and hence satellite size, 
weight, cost… From the formula 
oif
111 +=  where f is focal length and i and o distance 
to image and distance to object respectively from the primary optics, if ≈  for very large 
relative values of o. [Olsen, 2005] 
As mentioned earlier, the imagery payload cost is closely related to aperture size.  
Using the equation 
D
hR λ22.1=  the Table 5-20 shows resolution capabilities for a range 
of aperture diameters at a mean visible spectrum wavelength of 0.50 microns.  It includes 
a factor (0.15) for mirror distortions and other imperfections.  At 0.5 m aperture diameter, 
the payload can achieve better than required resolution up to an altitude of 500 km.  
(Figure 5-14) 
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Table 5-20. GSD as a function of mirror diameter and altitude 
Predicted GSD 30 degrees off nadir 
Mirror diameter (meters) 
  TopSat   Orbview    Quickbird Ikonos    




















nadir    
Altitude 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.70 0.70 1.00 2.40 
200 0.85   0.56 0.42 0.38   0.34 0.28   0.24   0.17 0.07
250 1.06  0.70 0.53 0.47  0.42 0.35  0.30  0.21 0.09
300 1.27  0.85 0.63 0.56  0.51 0.42  0.36  0.25 0.11
350 1.48  0.99 0.74 0.66  0.59 0.49  0.42  0.30 0.12
400 1.69  1.13 0.85 0.75  0.68 0.56  0.48  0.34 0.14
450 1.90  1.27 0.95 0.85  0.76 0.63 0.66 0.54  0.38 0.16
500 2.11  1.41 1.06 0.94 1.00 0.85 0.70  0.60  0.42 0.18
550 2.32  1.55 1.16 1.03  0.93 0.77  0.66  0.46 0.19
600 2.54 2.80 1.69 1.27 1.13  1.01 0.85  0.72  0.51 0.21
650 2.75  1.83 1.37 1.22  1.10 0.92  0.78  0.55 0.23
700 2.96  1.97 1.48 1.31  1.18 0.99  0.85 0.82 0.59 0.25
750 3.17  2.11 1.58 1.41  1.27 1.06  0.91  0.63 0.26










































Figure 5-14.  Altitude vs. GSD at 0.50 µ for various altitudes (Based on X = 1.22 
hλ/D*0.15)  
 
The width of the instantaneous field of view of the imager will depend on the 
number of detector elements in the linear array and the pixel resolution. With a one meter 
pixel resolution, the imager should produce images roughly as wide in meters as the 
number of elements in the array with the appropriate optics. Anticipated capabilities 
should be from roughly 10 km to 20 km of image width. 
5.2.2.2.5  Identify Candidate Payloads and Estimate Characteristics 
Many unclassified commercial of the shelf solutions were researched. Almost all 
were linear arrays of charge coupled devices. Most were off-axis tri-mirror anastigmatic 
cameras; the physical configuration of which helps reduce overall length of the required 
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bus while still achieving an effective focal length. The Table 5-21 is a compilation of 
available data of commercial products whose capabilities are considered to be high 
resolution. The information found allowed the team to arrive at an understanding of what 
was feasible and what could be expected from industry.  
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ElOp EROS A 250(42) 500 1.9 14 45 0.5 - 0.9     
ElOp EROS B 290 500 0.7 14   0.5 - 0.9     
ElOp EROS C <350 600 0.9 11   0.5 - 0.9     
ElOp MSC 
(KompSat-2) 800 685 1.0 15X15 56 0.5 - 0.9     
TOPSAT 120/(32) 600 2.5 25     7   
IRS-1D      5.8 63-70   0.5 - 0.75 7 7E-06 
IRS-P5      2.5 27-30   0.5 - 0.85 7   
OrbView-3 300/(66) 470 1.0 8 50 0.45 - 0.9     




900 0.5 - 1.25 14-34         
Kodak Model 1000  (88) 600 0.88 12.2   0.45 - 0.9 12   
Kodak OSA 
(IKONOS) (171) 700  1.0 11-13 30 0.45 - 0.9 12   
AVNIR-2     2.5 35 40 
0.52 - 
0.77     
CBERS-4   778 5.0 60 32 
0.51 - 
0.75     
RazakSAT   685 1.0 20   
0.51 - 
0.73     
Syers (180) 300 1.0 6-10 30       



















ElOp EROS A 2x7490  750  1.5  0.3  3.45  11 70 300  
ElOp EROS B     1.5  0.5  5  10 280   
ElOp EROS C           10 455   
ElOp MSC 
(KompSat-2) 15000 7100       10 320   
TOPSAT     1.2x.35 0.2 1.68       
IRS-1D  3*4096       0.9748 6     
IRS-P5  12288       1.945 10     
OrbView-3   
2*250
0   0.45      150  625  
OrbView-5            11     
BHRC 60 
(Quickbird)       0.6    11 320 792 
Kodak Model 1000  13816 6500 1.19x.75 0.448 8 11   315 
Kodak OSA 
(IKONOS) 13500 6500   0.7 10 11   350 
AVNIR-2                 
CBERS-4           8 140   
RazakSAT           8    
Syers       0.28 2.8 10 <274 200 
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5.2.2.2.6  Evaluate Candidates and Select a Baseline 
In evaluating the available systems above, efforts were focused on achieving 1.0 
meter resolution or better with moderate mass and small aperture measurements as 
discussed in the payload requirements section.  Number of bits per pixel was also 
considered. While a lower number corresponds to a smaller downlink, much detail can be 
lost if the number is too low.  According to the online Optical Microscopy Primer, 
humans can only distinguish about 50 discrete shades of gray. This corresponds to 6 to 7 
bits per pixel. This number should be bumped up to 8 bits per pixel to avoid producing 
noticeable steps between gray levels for normal imaging. However, for high resolution 
imaging where analysts often magnify the image greatly, a dynamic range of 11 to 12 bits 
is necessary. This produces 2048 to 4096 grayscale levels, allowing the analyst the ability 
to pick objects out of shadows when digitally adjusting the contrast. [Optical Micro, 
2006] 
Israel’s ElOp provided a viable panchromatic candidate for the EROS-B. EROS-
C’s panchromatic imager should be similar to B’s. Orbview 3 also looks promising with 
an aperture size within the desired range.  Orbview 4 had the same panchromatic sensor 
as 3 but failed to achieve orbit.  Orbview 5, while boasting good numbers will most likely 
be too expensive for TacSat due to anticipated aperture size. The Kodak offering for 
IKONOS also has a large aperture, but the Model 1000 seems to have good resolution at 
smaller aperture size. Though the initial bit rate calculation looks large, Kodak has a 
proprietary compression algorithm that reduces the bits/pixel from 11 to 2.5 producing a 
data rate of ~225 Mbps. The Goodrich Syers-2 camera currently used on the U2 platform 
as well as its successor the DB-110 currently used on tactical aircraft are being looked at 
for possible modifications to make them viable satellite payloads. Increasing the orbit 
though will increase the anticipated resolution beyond the objective requirements. 
The Kodak Model 1000 is a good baseline candidate as it meets all objective 
requirements and its digital processing unit can receive input via a standard 1553 data 
bus. The DPU runs the compression algorithm and then provides the data to an onboard 
storage unit or data downlink. [Optical Micro, 2006] 
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5.3  BUS OPTIONS 
Section 5.0 outlined common rules of thumb to get first approximations for the 
spacecraft’s key budgets for power, mass, and volume.  This section takes the inputs from 
the payloads analysis, the orbits and constellation analysis, and mission operations 
sections to perform a more detailed analysis of the spacecraft.  This analysis consists of a 
Microsoft Excel workbook with a series of spreadsheets for the various subsystems of the 
spacecraft bus.  These spreadsheets are linked to each other and changes in fundamental 
assumptions will propagate through the spreadsheet.  The key user inputs are satellite 
lifetime, the altitude of the orbit, and the mass and power required for the payload.  This 
input access a look-up table that then populates many key variables of the model. 
 
The subsystems analyzed were: 
• Propulsion 
• Attitude Determination and Control 
• Guidance and Navigation 
• Communications 
• Command and Data Handling 
• Thermal 
• Power 
• Structures and Mechanisms 
This Excel model is a powerful systems engineering tool and can be used to 
conduct analysis of alternatives studies for various configurations of a possible Tactical 
Satellite or can be used to see how changes in fundamental assumptions affect results.  
The results presented here are the best effort at achieving a satellite with the maximum 
tactical utility and the minimum cost.  The modeling for each subsystem is described 
below. 
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5.3.1  Propulsion 
The inputs for the propulsion subsystem analysis are the: 
• Satellite life in years 
• Spacecraft Dry Mass 
• Specific impulse for the selected propellant 
• Density of the selected propellant 
• Number of thrusters 
A monopropellant based system that uses twelve thrusters is recommended.  
Twelve thrusters provides control about all three axes and insures that torques about any 
axis are applied as pure couples.  [Brown P 169]  This should have enough specific 
impulse to meet the needs of a variety of TacSat missions but is based on simple, low 
cost, and proven technology.  The monopropellant selected for this analysis is Hydrazine.  
It is stable under most storage conditions, has good handling properties, and clean 
decomposition.  In addition a blow down fuel feed system using either a metal or rubber 
diaphragm would seem to offer simplicity and low cost. 
Given these inputs the first step in characterizing the propulsion system was to 
develop a delta V budget to describe the required satellite maneuvering.  Because 
TacSatS will use low earth orbits (LEO) they will have to use a significant amount of 
propellant to make up for drag.  To meet the mission needs a constellation is required so 
station keeping will be required.  In the Philippine Sea scenario the selected orbit will 
require North South station keeping.  Another fundamental requirement is to de-orbit the 
satellite when the mission is through.  This is required by international law.  Values for 
Orbit correction, and North South Station Keeping were taken from SMAD table 17-1 
and reflect typical values.  The value for Drag Makeup was taken from the Earth Satellite 
Parameters Table in the back of SMAD.  Here the worst case value for ballistic 
coefficient and solar cycle was used. 
Once the Delta V budget was generated a propellant budget was developed.  The 
delta V requirement was translated into a propellant requirement by using the rocket 
equation to solve for required propellant as a function of the dry mass of the spacecraft, 
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the required delta V and the specific impulse provided by the propellant.  An additional 
10 percent was added to this value to account for attitude control and another 25% was 
added to this total to provide a safety margin.  Finally, 2% of this total was added on to 
account for residual propellant.  These percentages were based on common rules of 
thumb.  [Larson W, Wertz J 1999 p 713] 
The propellant budget is the entering argument into determining propulsion 
system in terms of mass, volume and power.  The propellant mass was determined in the 
previous step and its volume was easily determined by its density.  Based on rules of 
thumb given by SMAD the mass of the tank was determined to be 10% of the mass for 
the propellant.  SMAD also provided typical values for the mass and power requirements 
for thrusters and their accompanying lines and fittings.  The summary of results for the 
propulsion system is shown in Table 5-22. 
Table 5-22.  Summary of propulsion system 
Component Mass (kg) Volume (m3) Power (w) 
Propellant 126.66 0.13   
Pressurant 2.67 0.06   
Tank 12.67 0.21   
Thrusters 4.80 0.00 60 
Lines and 
Fittings 7.00 0.00   
        
Total 153.80 0.21 60 
 
5.3.2  Attitude Determination and Control 
This section describes the mechanisms for determining the space crafts attitude 
and the mechanisms for controlling its attitude so the payload sensors and antennas are 
pointed at the appropriate target on the earth’s surface.  The methodology for conducting 
this analysis was as follows.  First, the general types of attitude sensor and control 
mechanisms were selected based on TacSat requirements.  Next, the disturbance 
torqueses due to various external factors were estimated.  Then taking the worst of these 
torques as an estimate of the requirement for the control authority of the attitude control 
actuators the requirements in terms of momentum and magnetic torque were determined.  
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This in turn allowed us to estimate the mass and power requirement for these actuators.  
Finally the mass and power for typical attitude sensors were added to complete the 
subsystem preliminary power and mass budgets. 
TacSat payloads such as communications systems and SIGINT systems have 
more liberal requirements than those for imagery payloads for pointing accuracy and 
platform stability.  Based on this the imagery payload was used to determine the pointing 
accuracy and stability requirements for the satellite.  Assuming a required stability of 
around 0.1 degree, and the requirement to minimize cost and complexity, momentum 
wheels were selected as the method for maintaining three-axis stability.  Eventually the 
wheels reach a maximum and there needs to be some way to dump the built up 
momentum.  It was decided to use magnetic “torquers” for this purpose.  While meeting 
the stability requirements for the TacSat system this arrangement also has a long pedigree 
and is relatively straight forward and low in cost.  To determine attitude and meet the 
requirements for pointing accuracy it was decided to use a combination of a sun sensor 
and an earth horizon sensor.  This provides both accuracy and some degree of 
redundancy.  Redundancy for the actuators is provided by using four wheels in a 
tetrahedron configuration.  Any one momentum wheel can be lost and the system will 
still provide three-axis stability. 
In estimating the external torques applied to the space craft the key inputs are the 
altitude and the required stability.  In addition there are several key inputs based on the 
configuration of the satellite itself.  These include the difference between the center of 
mass and the center of solar pressure and the difference between the center of mass and 
the aerodynamic center of pressure.  These two factors provide the lever arm for 
determining the torque applied by solar radiation and the atmosphere respectively.  In 
addition for determining gravity gradient torques it is necessary to estimate the 
spacecrafts difference in moment of inertia between its Z axis and the smaller of its 
remaining axes. An octagonal structure was used based on the assumption that an 
octagonal structure closely approximates a cylinder estimates for surface area, and 
moments of inertia were created using a cylindrical model.  Values for length and 
diameter were created based on the dimensions of the shroud for the Pegasus launch 
vehicle.  Given the masses resulting from this analysis Pegasus is an unlikely choice of 
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launch vehicle but its shroud size made an acceptable entering argument.  Like all these 
models further iterations can be done as more accurate information becomes available. 
Internal torques due to sloshing fluids, uncertainty in the center of gravity, 
thruster misalignment, mismatch of thruster outputs, flexing structural members and 
others factors were neglected.  For TacSat it was assumed that the external torques 
applied by environmental factors will dominate.  Using the simplified equations for 
estimating worst case disturbance torques provided in Table 11-9A of SMAD the effect 
on the spacecraft was estimated for Gravity gradient effects, solar radiation effects, 
magnetic field effects, and aerodynamic effects.  Because TacSat is intended for low 
earth orbit it is expected that gravity, magnetic and aerodynamic effects would 
predominate and this indeed was found to be the case.  The first orbit selected was at 350 
km.  Because this was a very low orbit aerodynamic effects were quite pronounced.  The 
model was run conducting various system trades and at an altitude of 400 km much better 
results were obtained.  In addition to environmental effects the torque needed to slew the 
spacecraft 15 degrees in ten minutes was examined.  This might be necessary for picking 
out specific targets to image. 
The worst case torque was found to be due to aerodynamic effects and was 
approximately 1.73e-4 Newton meters.  For a spacecraft this is a sizable torque.  Armed 
with this information the required momentum storage in the momentum wheels was 
determined using the simplified equations from SMAD Table 11-12.  The magnetic 
dipole required to dump this torque once the momentum wheels were saturated was 
calculated using simplified design equations from the same table.  A margin of five times 
was added to the value for the magnetic torque.  Finally based on this information mass 
and power were estimated based on existing systems that provide similar amounts of 
momentum storage and magnetic dipole moments.  The results are summarized in Table 
5-23. 
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Table 5-23.  Component Mass and Power 
Component 
Scaling Factor 
based on values 
in SMAD 
Mass 
(Kg) Power (w) Volume 
     
Momentum Wheel 3.43 17.18 51.54 2.15E-03
Electromagnets 3.38 6.76 27 8.45E-02
Sun Sensor  1 0.25 1.25E-02
Horizon Sensor  5 10 6.25E-02
     
Total  29.937 88.819 1.62E-01
 
5.3.3  Guidance and Navigation 
Guidance and Navigation is important for the TacSat mission for a number of 
reasons.  Since a constellation will be necessary to provide the needed coverage a station 
keeping function will be important.  In addition because of the low orbits used, there will 
be only a short time when the satellite is overhead so it is important to have sensors and 
antennas oriented quickly.  This implies accurate knowledge of the satellites location. 
Traditionally guidance and navigation functions have been carried out on the 
ground.  Ground observations are made to determine the satellites current position and 
velocity.  Positional accuracy of several kilometers is typical.  Algorithms are then used 
to propagate this orbital information forward to predict the satellites position at future 
times.  Recently, however, there has been several development efforts aimed at 
automating the guidance and navigation functions.  While most of these are in the 
proposed phase, GPS has been used operationally and the Microcosm Autonomous 
Navigation System (MANS) has been flight tested.  Adopting an automated approach to 
guidance and navigation would not only support TacSat’s flexible, tactically oriented 
concept of operation, it would also provide significant cost savings.  Additional 
development cost might be incurred up front but these would be more than offset by the 
savings in ground operations costs.  In contrast to ground processing of Navigational 
data, because of its real time nature onboard automated processing is particularly suited 
towards real time targeting of the sensors and antennas on their subjects below. 
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GPS provides a low cost but accurate (15m-100m) means of determining position.  
It also has the added advantage of providing precise timing information.  This 
information facilitates communications and geo-location functions.  GPS suffers the 
disadvantage, however, of being potentially vulnerable to enemy disruption.  For this 
reason GPS is recommended as the primary source of positional data and using MANS or 
a MANS like system as a back up.  The MANS itself provides accurate (100m-400m) 
position information.  It also provides algorithms for determining data on the ground look 
point and the sun’s direction.  The ground look point data could be particularly useful for 
supporting the TacSat CONOPS by insuring that the satellite is pointing at its subject as it 
passes overhead.  The MANS relies on Earth, Moon, and Sun positional data for its 
calculations.  The Earth and Sun data are already available from the sensors for the 
Attitude Determination and Control (AD&C) subsystem so achieving a MANS capability 
relies only on the addition of a Moon sensor. 
A Guidance and Navigation system based on GPS and MANS and leveraging the 
Sun and Earth sensors already used for Attitude Determination and Control would have 
mass, power, and volume profiles as depicted in Table 5-24. 
Table 5-24.  Mass, Power and Volume Profiles 
Item Mass (kg) Power (W) Volume (cu. m.) 
Additional Sensor for Moon 4 7   
GPS 4 12 0.0047
Total 8 19 0.0047
5.3.4  Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) 
The TT&C system outlined here supports the command and Telemetry functions 
of the bus.  In order to maintain the payload flexibility desired of a TacSat standard bus it 
was decided that the various types of payloads would be required to supply their own 
data down link. 
Sizing the TT&C down-link begins with assumptions regarding data rates and 
frequencies.  Based on these assumptions a high level link budget was constructed.  The 
required carrier to noise ratio and link margin was estimated which provided the basis for 
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solving the EIRP.  Backing out antenna gain and connector and cable losses gave us a 
value for the transmitted power.  The approximate power efficiency of a transmitter of a 
general type was based on the design curves given in SMAD figure 13-15.  The power 
requirements for the rest of the system were taken from the typical S band system 
described in SMAD table 10-23.  The mass for all components of the system was taken 
from this same table. 
There are some design decisions and assumptions that are implicit in this model 
and need to be explicitly acknowledged here.  First the decision was made to use an S 
band down link.  This choice was made because there are many such systems with 
extensive space pedigrees in use today.  S band communications is supported at most 
existing ground stations including the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN).  In 
fact the assumed receiver G/T and downlink data rates were based on this network.  A 
moderate antenna gain of 1.5 dB was assumed.  While a dish with some directivity is 
envisioned it is desired to keep the foot print wide so as to minimize the pointing and 
tracking requirements.  In order to determine slant range to the vehicle a factor of 1.5 was 
applied to the spacecraft altitude.  Because of the moderate transmit power requirements 
solid state components were selected as the basis of the design.  The results are shown in 
Table 5-25. 
Table 5-25.  Mass, Power, Volume Component 
Component Mass (kg) Power (W) Volume (cu. m) 
Antenna 2 0  
Diplexer 1.2 0  
Receiver 1.8 4  
Transmitter 2 4.7  
    
Total 7 8.7 0.09
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5.3.5  Command and Data Handling 
Required mass, power, and volume of the command and data handling (C&DH) 
subsystem were estimated by making a list of the required functions that needed to be 
handled by this system.  Armed with this data and an understanding of complexity, 
complexity, the mass, power, and volume were estimated based on historical data.  
 
The functions handled by the C&DH subsystem are: 
• Command processing 
o Orbit Correction 
o Station keeping 
o Payload instructions 
• Telemetry Processing 




The actual communications portion of this system is handled in the TT&C 
subsystem section above.  The focus was on the processor that interprets commands and 
formats telemetry as well as the sensors, interfaces, cabling, and switching equipment 
that collects the telemetry information and distributes the commands. 
In order to keep TacSat flexible and low cost, telemetry, command, guidance, and 
navigation functions were combined within a single processor.  With the simple low cost 
functionality anticipated for the TacSat bus and the capabilities of modern processors this 
should be feasible.  B rated military specification (milspec) parts were recommended. as 
opposed to space qualified parts since they are adequate for the low orbits and relatively 
short mission duration anticipated for TacSat.   
A separate data link for the reconnaissance payloads is recommended as the bus is 
expected to accommodate a variety of payloads.  This will require separate processors 
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and communications gear for the payload portion of the spacecraft.  Cross-links between 
this equipment and the bus could provide some redundancy. 
The guidelines for sizing a C&DH subsystem provided by SMAD require 
outlining the functions and configuration of the system as done above.  Then based on 
this description it is categorized based on its complexity and whether or not it combines 
telemetry with command and data handling into one processor.  The Complexity level is 
based on fundamental requirements coupled with system requirements such as parts 
quality and whether or not a distributed computing approach is used.  The design choices 
made include a combined architecture but TacSat system is still in the typical complexity 
range.  This is the middle ground between simple and complex. 
This data and the parametric estimation data given in Table 11-29 of SMAD 
permit estimates of the mass, power and volume requirements for the TacSat bus. Taking 
the midpoint of the ranges given in Table 5-26 results in the following estimations: 
Table 5-26.  TacSat Bus Volume 
Mass (kg) Power (W) Volume (cubic meters) 
5.5 16 0.0075 
5.3.6  Power 
Array Size 
Key factors in determining the capabilities of the proposed spacecraft, its 
reliability, and its cost include power generation, storage, conditioning, and control.  A 
model was developed to determine the required size and mass of the solar array, batteries, 
and the power distribution, control, and conditioning equipment. 
The model for the solar array and batteries is based on data for power 
requirements as well as data for expected performance of solar electric cells and data for 
the environment they are expected to operate in.  The entering argument is simply how 
much power is required.  This power must be supplied both during daylight and during 
orbital periods of eclipse.  Compensation for the different efficiencies of the distribution  
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system during times of charging (daylight) and during times of battery operation (eclipse) 
is required.  The equation below provides the value for the power that must be provided 
by the solar arrays. 
Psa = [(PeTe/Xe) + (PdTd/Xd)]/Td 
Pe is the power required during eclipse and is equal to Pd the power required 
during daylight.  Te is the expected time of eclipse in a single orbit and Td is the 
expected time of daylight in a single orbit.  Finally Xe and Xd are the energy transfer 
efficiencies for the times of eclipse and daylight. 
Once the power output from the solar panel was determined it was necessary to 
select a material for the solar cells and determine how much power they can produce per 
square meter.  The cheapest most easily used material is silicon.  In an effort to keep 
TacSat simple and inexpensive it was initially assumed that silicon is the material to be 
used.  Silicon has an efficiency of 0.148.  From this, the expected solar radiation of 1367 
Watts per meter squared and results in an estimated output power Po of 202 Watts per 
meter squared. 
There are several factors that degrade the performance of a solar array and these 
must be taken into account.  The most important are inefficiencies in design and 
assembly, temperature effects, and shadowing of cells by other parts of the spacecraft.  
Using nominal values form SMAD an inherent degradation factor was determined to be 
Id = 0.77.  In addition some compensation must be included for the pointing angle of the 
sun.  If the sun is not perpendicular to the array at all times then the maximum amount of 
energy will not be produced.  This factor is given by Cos(A), where A s the angle 
between the solar cells and the line to the sun.  All of these factors are combined to 
provide the arrays required power output per unit area at the beginning of its life.  This is 
given by the equation below 
Pbol = (Po)(Id)(Cos(A)) 
Finally compensation must be made for array performance as it degrades 
throughout its life due to environmental conditions.  This degradation is primarily due to 
thermal cycling, micrometeorite strikes, and from material out gassing during the  
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duration of the space mission.  The life time degradation is a function of the typical 
degradation per year and the desired satellite lifetime.  The degradation factor Ld is given 
by the equation below. 
Ld = (1 – degradation/year)^satellite life in years 
This in turn provides the expected array output per unit area at the end of the 
satellites life, Peol. 
Peol = (Pbol)(Ld)  
Now it is possible to calculate the array size Asa.  It is the required power from 
the array calculated in the first step divided by the expected output per square meter of 
array at the end of its life.   
Asa = Psa/Peol 
This model was instantiated in spreadsheet form and can be iterated for various 
power requirements, solar cell materials, or orbital parameters.  Using the rule of thumb 
that an array typically produces 25 W per kg of mass of the array is determined.  [Larson 
W, Wertz J 1999 table 11-33, p 410] 
This model assumes that a planar array is used.  The alternative would be to use 
solar panels on the body of the spacecraft.  This would provide a simpler, more reliable 
and less expensive approach.  Using this approach, however, imposes an additional 
penalty because the entire array is not seen by the sun.  For spin stabilized spacecraft the 
arrays would need to be larger by a factor of pi.  For three axis stabilized spacecraft with 
body mounted arrays the arrays must be increased in size by a factor of 4.  [Larson W, 
Wertz J 1999, p 416]
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Battery Requirements 
The most important factors for battery size are the orbital parameters.  The battery 
must be chosen so that it can supply the required power during times of eclipse.  This is 
given by the required power during eclipse multiplied by the length of the eclipse or 
PeTe. 
In addition it is not practical to completely drain the battery and then completely 
recharge it every cycle.  Some Depth of Discharge (DoD) must be determined.  The 
Depth of discharge has a dramatic effect on battery life.  The deeper the discharge, the 
less cycles the battery can endure.  A rule of thumb for NiCd batteries is if there will be 
less than 1,000 cycles throughout the mission lifetime the batteries can accommodate a 
DoD of 80%.  Conversely for a lifetime of more than 10,000 cycles a DoD of only 30% 
can be accommodated [Larson W, Wertz J 1999 figure 11-11, p 421] 
There is also the question of how many batteries (N) will be used and what their 
transmission efficiency (n) is for the system.  All of these factors taken together provide a 
required battery capacity in watt hours of  
Cr = (PeTe)/(DoD)(N)(n) 
The given power required in watt hours, divided by the specific energy density for 
the selected battery chemistry, equals an estimated mass.  For NiCd batteries which have 
seen extensive use in space and therefore are reliable and inexpensive the specific energy 
is approximately 27 Watt hours per kilogram.  Lithium Ion cells have recently seen a 
great deal of application and provide energy densities on the order of 75 Watt hours per 
kilogram.  [Larson W, Wertz J 1999.  Table 11-39, p 420]  It may be worth the extra cost 
to use these batteries in TacSat, especially if significant savings in mass and volume are 
gained.  Finally one should determine whether redundancy is necessary.  If so then the 
number of batteries should be doubled. 
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Power Distribution Control and Conditioning  
The initial budgeted mass for the power distribution, control, and conditioning is 
based on rules of thumb from SMAD P. 334.  While this is sufficient for this study it is 
worth making a few observations and recommendations.  The devices used to distribute 
the power, control the power, condition the power, and provide protection against short 
circuits all add cost, complexity, and mass to the spacecraft.  Based on the desire to keep 
TacSat simple, reliable, and low in cost the following recommendations are in order: 
• Use an unregulated power bus.  Because the payloads used with the TacSat 
spacecraft vary it is not possible to anticipate what their needs will be.  It is 
therefore better to simply have each payload design in its own power conditioning 
and regulation.  This is not so much a savings in cost and mass as it is a shifting of 
the requirement and the corresponding cost and mass to the payload portion of the 
spacecraft design. 
• A shunt regulator should be used to regulate the output of the solar array.  This is 
the simplest, most reliable way to achieve this requirement and has the added 
advantage of using less mass. 
• Parallel charging should be employed.  While this shortens the life of the batteries 
it provides significant savings in mass and complexity.  This approach is 
appropriate for a TacSat that anticipates a relatively short spacecraft lifetime but 
also requires simple inexpensive spacecraft.  
The sizing of the power subsystem is given in Table 5-27. 
Table 5-27.  Power Subsystem Size 
Item Mass (kg) Power Volume 
    
Array 51.3 0 0.0170
Batteries 25.4 0 0.0025
Control and conditioning 33.3 48.1 0.4165
    
Total 110.0 48.1 0.4362
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5.3.7  Structures 
The key requirement for the TacSat structures is operational flexibility.  (As 
opposed to structural flexibility.)  All the usual concerns about maintaining strength and 
rigidity while minimizing mass and cost apply.  In the case of TacSat, however, the 
structure must support a variety of payloads rather than just being optimized for one or a 
few particular ones.  This will be particularly difficult with regards to modal analysis. 
Of the three types of structural packaging concepts widely employed as outlined 
by Griffin and French in Space Vehicle design the Skin Panel/Frame type is 
recommended.  The dual sheer plate approach simply does not lend itself to the TacSat 
CONOPS because it requires custom packaging and cabling of the payload and 
electronics.  While the shelf type does lend itself to this it has poor heat transfer 
characteristics.  The Skin Panel/Frame approach easily accommodates standard black 
boxes for the electronics and maintains good thermal characteristics.  This type of 
structure consists of a frame with panels attached.  Frequently these panels are hinged.  
The electronic equipment is directly mounted on these panels.  This type of structure has 
the additional advantage of providing easy access.  This too is supportive of the TacSat 
CONOPS. 
The FLTSATCOM satellite is an excellent example of this kind of structure and 
packaging approach.  It has some additional characteristics that should also be applied to 
TacSat.  FLTSATCOM has two hexagonal frames with hinged panels for accommodating 
generic black box electronic packages.  The first frame contains the standard bus 
subsystems and the second frame hosts the payload.  In the case of FLTSATCOM the 
payload was a large communications transponder.  In the case of TacSat, however, this 
second frame could host a variety of payloads and could supply standard mechanical and 
electrical interfaces.  The mechanisms for storing the solar panels for launch and then 
deploying them when in orbit that was used by FLTSATCOM provides another proven 
approach that could be incorporated into TacSat.  Leveraging a scaled down version of 
the FLTSATCOM structural design would provided the mission flexibility needed by 
TacSat while minimizing costs by incorporating proven designs. 
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The appropriate size for the structures and mechanisms for TacSat is compared by 
analogy to FLTSATCOM.  To do this the rough estimate of dry mass was calculated for 
TacSat and divided it by the dry mass of FLTSATCOM to get a scaling factor.  The mass 
for the FLTSATCOM structures was then multiplied by this factor to obtain an estimate 
for TacSat.  The results are shown in Table 5-28. 
Table 5-28.  Mass for the FLTSATCOM 
 Dry mass Scaling factor Structures mass (kg) 
    
FLTSATCOM 841  154
TacSat 458 0.544 83.86
 
This technique of course assumes a linear relationship as large structure is scaled 
to a smaller one. 
Considering that TacSat will be in a LEO rather than GEO orbit some additional 
rigidity will be required and this will lead to a need for more mass.  Another satellite with 
similar construction but destined for LEO orbit is HEO-B.  Table 5-29 summarizes the 
structural scaling using this satellite.  This spacecraft, however, has a massive radar 
payload that requires considerable support.  The final estimate is an average between 
HEO-B and FLTSATCOM.  This results in an estimated structural mass of 64.61 kg.  
Table 5-30 summarizes other structural data for the satellite.  These estimates are based 
on it fitting within the shroud for a Pegasus launch vehicle. 
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Table 5-29.  Structure Scaling 
 Dry mass Scaling factor Structures mass (kg) 
    
HEO-B 2868.2  779
TacSat 284.2 0.09908 77.185
 
Table 5-30.  Spacecraft Structural Data 
 
Diameter (m) 1.1  Ix 150.60
Radius (m) 0.55  Iy 150.60
Length (m) 1.8  Iz 75.907
Surface Area (sq. m.) 8.12  Difference 74.694
Volume (cu. m.) 1.71    
5.3.8  Thermal 
A detailed thermal analysis is beyond the scope of this study.  A top level 
spacecraft design that is more detailed than this initial systems feasibility analysis would 
be necessary in order to have the inputs to develop a more detailed analysis.  In this 
section describes a high level approach to how the spacecraft can be thermally managed.  
This approach can then lead to a rough estimate of the necessary mass and cost for a 
thermal control system. 
The thermal energy that enters the spacecraft from the earth and the sun plus the 
thermal energy generated internally by the electronics needs to be balanced against 
thermal energy lost to the deep space environment.  Keeping this equation in balance is 
made more difficult by the fact that thermal energy entering the spacecraft can change 
considerably as the spacecraft orbits.  There can also be a tremendous temperature 
differential between the sun facing side of the spacecraft and the other sides. 
The classic approach to maintaining this thermal balance is to insulate the 
spacecraft to keep heat in and then use conduction to move internally generated heat to an 
exterior surface where it can be radiated into the cold of space.  Special coatings work to 
minimize the thermal coefficient of absorption and maximize the thermal coefficient of 
radiation for a given surface.  Variability of heat impinging on a spacecraft during an 
orbit can be compensated for by using mechanisms like louvers that open and close 
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depending on how much waste heat must be expended to space.  In some circumstances 
active measures must be taken to maintain a given temperature range.  These measures 
include the use of heating elements and cooling mechanisms such as heat pipes or 
cryogenic systems. 
Passive mechanisms are recommended to support simple, low mass, and low cost 
approaches.  Using the structural configuration outlined above, the mounting panels will 
serve to draw heat to the skin of the spacecraft with no additional mass or cost.  This will 
requires only the additional mass of the thermal blankets and coatings.  This was 
calculated using an average value of 0.73 kg per square meter for a blanket and assuming 
the entire space craft was covered.  [SMAD table 11-49, p 457] 
Most spacecraft have a custom thermal design for the particular spacecraft and 
orbit.  The TacSat mission CONOPS will not support this as TacSat is expected to 
operate in a variety of orbits with a variety of payloads.  A more generic and flexible 
approach can be adopted by leveraging the approach developed for the structural 
arrangement.  The recommended structural approach outlined above involved using two 
octagonal sections.  The first would be the spacecraft bus and the second would host the 
various TacSat payloads.  This approach allows a relatively straight forward approach to 
the thermal design of the first section at the expense of shifting complexity into the 
design of the second module.  However, the use of louvers in this section can provide the 
kind of flexibility needed not only for various orbits, but also for various payloads. 
Louvers can support up to a 6 times variation in heat transmission in the open to close 
position.  [SMAD, p 442]  In addition, they require no power to operate.  A louver was 
added to the system with a mass of 5 kg per square meter.  [Derived from SMAD table 
11-47A, p 443]  The result of this high-level estimate is given in Table 5-31.  The table 
reflects the fact that the analysis model will support numerous thermal control 
techniques.  The initial design approach uses only passive techniques and many of the 
inputs have been zeroed.   
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Table 5-31.  Initial Design Approach 
 
While not recommended here there is another approach that may be worth 
investigating further.  The Soviet space program made frequent use of pressurized vessels 
containing the equipment for the spacecraft bus and payload.  This allowed the use of 
forced convection for thermal transfer.  This approach is simple and inexpensive but 
carries with it the risk of a possible breach in the pressure vessel.  TacSat is designed to 
be an inexpensive spacecraft that makes up in numbers what it may lack in reliability.  




















         
Thermal Blanket 0.73 N/A 5.92 1 5.92 0 0 0.202 
Coatings  N/A 0 1 0 0 0  
Radiator Panels 3.3 N/A 26.78 0 0 0 0  
Louvres 5 N/A 2.25 1 2.25 0 0 0.028 
Active heaters N/A N/A  0 0 0 0  
Heat Pipes N/A 0.15 0.165 0 0 0 0  
Control for 
Active heaters N/A N/A 0.2 0 0 2 0  
         
Total     8.18  0 0.231 
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5.3.9  Conclusions 
The summary of the key bus parameters is given in Table 5-32. 
Table 5-32.  Key Bus Parameters Summary 
Subsystem Mass (kg) Power (W) 
Volume 
(cu. m) 
    
Propulsion (including propellant) 153.79 60.00 0.214
Attitude Determination and Control (AD&C) 29.93 88.82 0.162
Guidance and Navigation 8.00 19.00 0.005
Communications 7.00 8.75 0.088
Command and Data Handling (C&DH) 5.50 16.00 0.008
Thermal 8.18 0.00 0.232
Power 109.99 48.14 0.436
Structures and Mechanisms 64.61 0.00 0.022
Total 387.02 240.7 1.165
 
 
Table 5-33 compares the results in Table 5-32 to the initial estimates. 
























Propulsion 18.32 10.00 24.47 60.00 6.14 33.52 50.00 500.00
Attitude 
Control 32.07 30.00 29.94 88.82 -2.13 -6.64 58.82 196.07
TT&C 27.49 20.00 12.50 24.75 -14.99 -54.52 4.75 23.76
Thermal 9.16 10.00 8.18 0.00 -0.98 -10.72 -10.00 -100.00
Power 96.20 60.00 110.00 48.14 13.80 14.34 -11.86 -19.76
Structure 77.88 0.00 64.61 0.00 -13.26 -17.03 0.00 0.00
Totals 261.12 130.00 249.69 221.71 -11.42 -0.04 91.71 0.71
 
After attempting to refine estimates based on specific TacSat mission the bus 
mass has increased by only 4.37 percent.  The power, however, has increased by 70 
percent.  The absolute change in power, however, is 91.7 Watts.  Both propulsion and 
attitude control increased considerably compared to initial estimates.  This is due to the 
fact that the statistical data that the original estimates were based upon do not accurately 
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reflect the effect of the low orbit on these two subsystems.  While these are somewhat 
rough numbers they should provide good inputs to the cost estimating model. 
It should be pointed out that this bus is oversized both structurally and in terms of 
power for many candidate TacSat payloads.  The reason for this is that in order to realize 
the TacSat vision of a common bus for all payloads the bus must be designed in such a 
way that it accommodates the most demanding traits of the family of payloads.  It must 
accommodate the structural needs of an imagery payload as well as the power needs of a 
communications payload.  These worst case values were used as fundamental inputs to 
the bus design model. 
This study concluded by reproducing the calculations of Table 5-4 using the 
updated information from the more detailed analysis.  The results are shown in Table 5-
34.  The boost weight is 17 kg under of the nominal capability of FALCON I. 




















5.4  LAUNCH VEHICLE OPTIONS 
The launch vehicle represents the most critical interface with the spacecraft. 
[Brown C, 200239]  The selection of the launch vehicle occurs early in the process.  The 
critical technical interfaces are the launch mass capability and for the purposes of the 
study, cost.  Table 5-35 outlines the possibilities and capabilities of several launch 
vehicles: 
Table 5-35.  Launch Vehicle Options [Larson W, Wertz J 1999 p802] 
Launch Vehicles Max Payload (kg) 
to LEO 
Unit Cost  
(FY$00M) 
Cost per kg to 
LEO (FY$00K/kg) 
Atlas II 6,580 80-90 12.2-13.7 
Atlas II A 7,280 85-95 11.7-13.0 
Atlas II AS 8,640 100-110 11.6-12.7 
Athena 1 800 18 22.5 
Athena 2 1,950 26 13.3 
Athena 3 3,650 31 8.5 
Delta II 5,089 50-55 9.8-10.8 
Pegasus XL 460 13 28.3 
Titan II 1,905 37 19.4 
Taurus 1,400 20-22 14.3-15.7 
Falcon 1 570 6.7 11.8 
 
As shown from the table, launch vehicle costs can vary dramatically.  The last 
entry in the table refers to SpaceX’s re-usable launch vehicle – Falcon 1.  This promises 
to be a dynamic system that will revolutionize the industry of launch vehicles by 
providing a low-cost, highly reliable solution to the problem of expensive launches.  This 
promise has yet to be fulfilled at the time of this writing. 
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6.0  SYSTEM COST ANALYSIS 
6.1  COST ESTIMATING METHODS 
Several methods for cost estimation range from general to specific: expert 
opinion, analogy, parametric, engineering, and extrapolation.  Expert opinion is simply 
the judgment of an expert or group of experts upon the final cost of system based upon 
experience in the field.  Analogy is the process of comparing the system with a 
comparable existing system in the past.  Parametric estimation uses a database of systems 
in the field and creates cost estimating relationships (CERs) that relate the specified 
parameters of the new system with values calculated from the database.  Engineering 
estimation uses a compilation of estimates from the lowest levels of the Work Breakdown 
Structure (WBS).  Extrapolation is a method that uses cost information from the earlier or 
previous units of the same system. 
To estimate the cost of a new system, the primary methods used are analogy, 
parametric, and engineering.  Figure 6-1 shows the typical amount of use for each of 
these methods throughout the phases of a project.  The analogous method is best used 
when the new system is very similar to existing systems.  The analogous method is quick, 
inexpensive, and easy to change.  However, the analogous method is not very precise and 
is best used for high system level estimation. [Col. David Matthews, USA Ret.]  The 
parametric method calculates values by creating CERs that are reflective of values 
determined from a database.  The CERs are created by regression analysis on data points.  
The CER then represents a relationship between cost and some technical parameter(s).  
Parametric estimation has the advantage of being quick and easily adapted to model 
changes.  The disadvantage of parametric estimation is that the precision is only as good 
as the database.  Parametric estimation also requires the use of the appropriate class of 
system.  Satellites, for instance, have different categories.  Large satellite systems such as 
UFO and DSCS have different cost factors than small scale satellite systems such as a 
Microsat.  Thus, small scale satellite systems must be estimated differently on different 
databases than large scale systems.  This is particularly an issue with TacSat as it has 
missions and parameters that are very similar to traditional satellites and yet it is 
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envisioned as being smaller and lighter than these systems.  Thus it is difficult to find a 
good historical base to work with.  The engineering estimation method goes through a 
detailed cost estimation process for each component of the system from the lowest levels 
of the WBS.  This method should be the most reliable – however requires the largest 
amount of effort.  Engineering estimation requires the use of drawings, material costs, 
make/buy decisions, subcontracting for different components and so forth.  This method 
is not very easily adaptable to model changes and is subject to the accuracy of the WBS 
as well as the potential of omissions, failed risk assessments, and misinterpretations.  This 
method is not appropriate to a high level feasibility study such as this one. 
 
 
Figure 6-1.  Cost-Estimating Methods Usage [SSCM05 User’s Manual] 
 
In order to provide an estimate of the complete TacSat system, the following 
phases are assessed: the space segment (spacecraft and payload), the launch segment 
(launch vehicle and total launch cost), the ground segment (facilities, 
equipment/software, and O&M), and the program costs (systems engineering, program 
management and integration, assembly and test (IA&T)). [Anderson, Timothy P.]  In 
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order to decide on an approach, “the scope of the effort, the detail of technical design 
definition, the availability and applicability of usable historical costs, and the ability of 
the cost estimators” must all be evaluated. [SSCM05 User’s Manual, Page 3]  A 
combination of expert opinion, parametric, and analogous estimation methods are utilized 
to estimate the cost of the TacSat subsystems.  The engineering estimation method is not 
used since it requires the complete “spacecraft design, manufacturing, and procurement 
to be laid out in great detail.” [SSCM05 User’s Manual, p3] 
6.2  APPROACH 
6.2.1  Parametric Cost Estimates   
The Small Satellite Cost Model (SSCM), developed by the Aerospace 
Corporation, is a parametric cost model.  To assess the complete spacecraft bus, 
Aerospace used the data from 53 satellite programs to “derive and document CERs for 
each of the following bus subsystems and associated programmatic and integration costs: 
1) Attitude Determination and Control Subsystem (ADCS) 
2) Propulsion 
3) Power 




7) Integration, Assembly, & Test (IA&T) 
8) Program Management (PM)/ Systems Engineering (SE) 
9) Launch and Orbital Operations Support (LOOS) 
[SSCM05 User’s Manual, p2] 
SSCM provides a range of values for each technical parameter since “each CER 
was generated from a specific dataset and is only intended to be valid within this range”. 
[SSCM05 User’s Manual, Page 115]  If one or more values are outside the range; “the 
user must decide whether the CER is still applicable”. [SSCM05 User’s Manual, p116]  
Table 6-1 shows that most TacSat input parameters were within the range of the model’s 
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requirement.  These inputs were based on a satellite bus that could sufficiently support 
any of the possible payloads.  The areas that did not fall within the range of values were:  
power subsystem mass, propulsion subsystem dry mass, and transmit power.  The reason 
for this is due to the uniqueness of the TacSat common BUS approach.  The common 
BUS is a work horse that must support a variety of payloads.  Subsystems such as power 
and propulsion are oversized to provide flexibility rather than being carefully tailored to a 
specific payload as is usually done.  Conversely the telemetry link for the BUS is 
undersized due to a very low data rate.  This resulted from the assumption that payload 
data would be down linked using a CDL data link built into the payload section of the 
spacecraft.  The overall mass of the spacecraft is kept low by eliminating complexity and 
minimizing redundancy wherever possible. 
Due to export laws by the U.S. Government, the CERs are not able to be 
published in this study.  For details regarding the CERs used, please contact the 
Aerospace Corporation. 
Table 6-1.  Range of Values for SSCM Inputs 
Range 
Technical Parameter 
Low Minimum Value Maximum High 
Design Life   6 12 96   
Satellite Wet Mass   113 545.1984 877   
Bus Dry Mass   45 415.8675 674   
Power Subsystem Mass   19.3 109.9971 96 14.6% 
BOL Power   56.5 240.7144 2500   
Solar Array Area   0.71 8.769399 14.6   
Structure Subsystem Mass   6.7 64.61276 182.9   
ADCS Subsystem Mass   5.8 29.93785 58.5   
Pointing Knowledge   0.01 0.1 1.5   
Propulsion Subsystem Dry Mass   9 153.7972 118.2 30.1% 
C&DH Subsystem Dry Mass   3.25 5.5 31   
Transmit Power 97.5% 1.5 0.037594 5.5   
Thermal Subsystem Mass   0.5 8.180031 21.3   
 
The Spacecraft/Vehicle Level Cost Model (SVLCM) “is a top-level model 
derived from the NASA/Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM) 
database”.[http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/SVLCM.html] It provides an estimate of a 
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scientific instrument’s development and production costs based its dry mass.  Other 
CERs exist to reflect payload costs based upon aperture diameter (for optical payloads) or 
the mass of the subsystem for communications payloads. [Larson W, Wertz J 1999, p796] 
6.2.2  Analogous Cost Estimates 
Analogous estimation methods will be used for the launch vehicle.  The TacSat 
program intends to “break-the-mold”.  The use of low-cost launch vehicles is a part of the 
solution.  
6.2.3  Expert Opinion 
Expert opinion is used for estimation of the ground segment.  Timothy P. 
Anderson, Senior Engineering Specialist at the Aerospace Corporation provided 
information regarding the ground segment as well as general rules of thumb and 
overviews of the cost estimation process. 
6.2.4  Cost Drivers 
The primary cost driver for the spacecraft bus and communication subsystem is 
mass.  For the purposes of estimation, as the mass increases, the cost proportionally 
increases as well.  Mass is directly related to the cost of the bus subsystems.  For the 
imagery payload, the primary cost driver is aperture diameter.  As the diameter increases, 
the mass increases also, as does the cost.   
As the spacecraft bus and payload increase in mass, care must be taken to ensure 
that the total mass does not exceed the capacity of the launch vehicle.  In this case, 
Falcon 1 has a payload capacity of 570 kg.  As mass increases, many factors change, 
including launch vehicle options and the CERs themselves as the satellite changes from a 
small, low mass satellite to a medium or heavy mass satellite. 
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6.3  RESULTS OF COST ESTIMATION 
6.3.1  Space Segment 
6.3.1.1  Spacecraft Bus 
Table 6-2 shows the results generated by SSCM for the spacecraft bus 
subsystems.  It provides estimates, in FY06$, for recurring and non-recurring costs.  
“Non-recurring costs including all efforts involved with design, drafting, engineering unit 
IA&T, ground support equipment, and the portion of program management and system 
engineering costs that can be identified as non-recurring.  Recurring costs cover all 
efforts associated with flight hardware manufacture, IA&T and the portions of program 
management and system engineering costs that can be identified as recurring”. [SSCM05 
User’s Manual, p13-14] 
Table 6-2.  SSCM Cost Estimate 
 
  Estimate (FY06$K) % of % of 
  Non-rec Rec Total Std Error Sub-level Sys-level 
Spacecraft Bus Subsystems             
ADCS 2,133 1,544 3,677 1,199 17.4%   
Propulsion 2,782 2,782 5,565 1,786 26.3%   
Power 1,664 1,803 3,467 985 16.4%   
TT&C* 1 1 3 0 0.0%   
C&DH* 2 1 3   0.0%   
Structure 4,405 3,190 7,595 1 35.9%   
Thermal 455 373 828 3,653 3.9%   
Spacecraft Bus 11,443 9,695 21,138 4,352 100% 49.1% 
IA&T 1,658 3,691 5,349 362   12.4% 
PM/SE 5,893 5,020 10,913 3,994   25.3% 
LOOS 0 5,678 5,678 2,300   13.2% 
S/C Development & First Unit 18,994 24,083 43,077 6,349   100% 
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6.3.1.2  Payload Cost Estimates   
Key cost estimating relationships for payloads are driven by aperture diameter 
(m) and communications subsystem mass (kg).  Program level costs for RDT&E and 
Theoretical First Unit (TFU) were computed using Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) 
in SMAD, Chapter 20.  Table 6-3 shows the RDT&E cost and corresponding CER.  
Table 6-4 shows overall program level cost estimates for the Payload which were 
determined using CERs for Estimating Subsystem Theoretical First Unit (TFU) Cost.   
The validity of the CERs is limited to a range of values, because they were derived from 
historical data.  Using the equations beyond 25% the parameter ranges will compromise 
its validity [Larson W, Wertz J 1999, p795] 
The values for each cost component were derived from previous analysis in this 
study, and both are within the acceptable input data range of the CER 
 
Table 6-3.  Payload Cost Estimate for RDT&E. [Larson W, Wertz J 1999].   








Visible Light Sensor Aperture dia. (m) 0.2 – 1.2 356,851 X 0.562 
 
.4 m $213228 
Communications Comm. subsystem 
wt. (kg) 
65-395 353.3X 105.363kg $37224 
 
Table 6-4.  Payload Cost Estimate for Theoretical First Unit (TFU) [Larson W, 
Wertz J 1999]  








Visible Light Sensor Aperture dia. (m) 0.2 – 1.2 51,469 X 0.562 
 
.4 m 30754 
Communications Comm. subsystem 
wt. (kg) 
65-395 140X 105.363kg 14751 
 
The program level cost includes cost for program management, systems 
engineering, product assurance, and system evaluation.  The allocation of the program 
level cost to each component is shown on Table 6-5.  The cost allocation percentages 
were provided as part of the analysis in SMAD. [Larson W, Wertz J 1999, p798] 
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Table 6-5.  Allocation of Program Level Cost 















       
Program Management 20% 42645.6 744.8 30% 9226.2 4425.3 
Systems Engineering 40% 85291.2 14889.6 20% 6150.8 2950.2 
Product Assurance 20% 42645.6 7444.8 30% 9226.2 4425.3 
System Evaluation 20% 42645.6 7444.8 20% 6150.8 2950.2 
Program Level Costs 100% 213228 37224 100% 30754 14751 
 
The CERs used for these payloads are based upon large scale satellite systems.  
Thus the values may be slightly different that those for smaller satellite programs.  
Another model that estimates payload costs is the Spacecraft/Vehicle Level Cost Model 
by NASA. [http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/SVLCM.html]  The input parameters to the 
model are listed in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6.  SVLCM Inputs 
Quantity 10 
Mass 105 kg 
Learning Curve 90% 
 
 
The output of the model yields the results in Table 6-7. 
Table 6-7.  SVLCM Payload Summary (FY00 $M) 
Development Cost $21.13
Production Cost $53.45
Unit Cost $ 7.46
Total $ 74.58
 
With the SVLCM, the unit price per payload is significantly cheaper.  Again, this 
is an estimate based upon the projected mass of the payload. 
6.3.2  Launch Segment 
The launch segment includes the cost of the launch vehicle and the launch itself 
along with orbital operations support (LOOS, Table 6.2) before ownership is given to the 
operational user.  As seen in the launch vehicle table, options vary significantly.  The 
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payload capacity required is determined by the mission need.  Depending upon 
constellation size and the location of orbits, a single launch may be sufficient, or multiple 
launches may be necessary.  “The LOOS is composed of prelaunch planning, trajectory 
analysis, launch site support, launch-vehicle integration (spacecraft portion), and initial 
on-orbit operations”. [SSCM05 User’s Manual, p13]  This component was able to be 
estimated by SSCM05 (Table 6-2). 
6.3.3  Ground Segment 
Ground segment costs have been estimated by expert opinion to be approximately 
$1 million per person per year.  This individual would work for 8 hours/day.  Thus for 
constant 24 hour monitoring, three (3) individuals would be needed.  These figures do not 
include new facility construction, but rather would utilize existing space in facilities such 
as the Air Force Satellite Control Network of ground stations.  
6.3.4  Program Costs 
SSCM includes program costs (Table 6.2).  These costs include systems 
engineering (quality assurance, reliability, requirements activities), program 
management, data/report generation, and special studies not covered by or associated 
with specific satellite subsystems. 
6.4  COST SENSITIVITY AND RISK ANALYSIS  
Based on the report of the Comptroller General of the United States, there are 
three major causes of cost growth:  inflation; requirement changes, and estimating error.   
6.4.1  Inflation 
Cost estimating for future space vehicle systems often requires planning five to 
ten years ahead.  Estimating costs needs specific attention to the changes in the dollar’s 
purchasing power because future expenditures are sensitive to inflation.  Inflation is an 
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“increase in the overall level of prices over an extended period of time” and loss of 
purchasing power. [www.mcwdn.org/ECONOMICS/EcoGlossary.html]   
Cost projections are made from a particular time and the estimates are sensitive to 
historical information.  Historical cost data from satellites dating from 1970s are used to 
estimate costs for current programs.  Each spacecraft data point used are normalized to 
year dollars to FY00$ using the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) inflation indices.  
Thus, inflation plays a major role in cost sensitivity and risk analysis. 
6.4.2  Requirement Changes 
Requirement changes results from a myriad of factors such as program mission 
changes, technical alterations from design problems, and program redirection.  
Deviations from program baselines are caused by requirement changes.  In addition, such 
requirement changes tremendously affect program cost, resulting in cost overruns.   
Parametric cost modeling is “based on cost estimating relationships (CERs) that 
make use of product characteristics (such as hardware mass and complexity) to estimate 
costs and schedules”. [http://www1.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/PCEHHTML/pceh.htm]  Therefore, 
parametric cost modeling reflects historical cost experience and the cost changes within 
today’s program.  Thus, future program will benefit from today’s programs because of 
accurate historical data.  
The SSCM’s cost estimating relationships rely on technical parameters for space 
vehicles.  It is important to use realistic parameters for estimating costs based on 
historical parameters.  The SSCM program generates its cost estimates by using 
preliminary mass inputs to input into CERs using a database of historical information.  
One approach is to assume probability distributions based on the mean and range of the 
historical data.  Then one can apply a random selection technique such as the Monte 
Carlo that will generate a probability distribution for the cost estimate.  However, 
problems can occur when estimating is at the component or subsystem level because 
available parameter growth data pertains only to the particular component or subsystem.  
The mass growth data at the subsystem level in a Monte Carlo analysis is independent 
from mass growth amounts at each subsystem.   
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Another approach is to treat configuration uncertainty as discrete with each case 
having its own associated uncertainty. One can address the uncertainty by using worst 
and best case scenarios for component and subsystems.  This will allow for cost range 
estimating and can be used in the cost distribution.  There are a handful of risk analysis 
tools such the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) Risk Model or the risk model 
created by Tecolote Research to alleviate cost growth from requirement changes.  One 
must combine any risk such as schedule risk, technical risk, the risk associated with 
limitations of the estimating tools, and requirement changes risk to accurately provide 
risk dollar estimates and their associated confidence levels. 
This is in fact one of the key areas where a TacSat approach is expected to have 
benefits.  The goal is a satellite program with simple well known objectives that 
deliberately does not try to “push the envelope”.  It is hoped that this will lead to greater 
requirements stability and a resulting cost savings. 
6.4.3  Estimating Error 
There are a myriad of errors that occur in cost estimating a space vehicle program.  
Errors from technological influences, schedule conflicts, management, and other external 
factors cause cost deviations or overruns. 
Standard errors in cost estimating relationships result in an estimated range for 
each cost estimating relationship. This range can serve as a conservative assessment of 
the situation.  However, the cost range provided does not reflect the cost range for each 
component or subsystem.  Taking Monte Carlo samples from these subsystem 
distributions, one can derive a distribution for the total. Thus, a more appropriate range 
may then be inferred for this total distribution and the Monte Carlos sums for subsystem 
















Figure 6-2.  SSCM Cost Estimate Probability Distribution 
6.5  COST EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISONS 
An alternative to TacSat is the Global Hawk RQ-4 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV).  There are advantages and disadvantages associated with either option with 
regard to cost.  The Global Hawk ran approximately $123.2 million in 2004 including 
development costs and MILCONs (ground stations). [UAV GAO Report, November 
2004]   
For the purposes of comparison, the following assumptions were made: 
• Global Hawks 
o Four (4) Global Hawk RQ-4Bs would be needed as indicated from 
the gap analysis. 
o Two (2) ground stations would need to be established to support 
the Global Hawks. 
o Development costs would be amortized across all the fifty-one (51) 
Global Hawks to be procured (UAV GAO Report, November 
2004). 
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o Figures from the 2004 GAO report would be adjusted to FY$06 
dollars. 
o Four operators are estimated to be needed for operations, estimated 
cost $150K/yr/person. 
o Three maintenance personnel per ground site are estimated to be 
required at an estimated cost of $150K/yr/person. 
o A C-17 is able to launch three Global Hawks, thus two (2) C-17 
flights would be needed at an estimated cost of $300K per flight. 
• TacSat 
o Ten (10) satellites are produced in order to amortize the 
development costs. 
o Two, three, and four satellite constellations would be compared 
and learning curve is at 90% since a 10 satellite program is 
assumed. [Larson W, Wertz J 1999, p809] 
o One satellite per launch vehicle (assuming Falcon 1). 
o Ten payloads will be procured and the corresponding development 
costs will amortized.  The payload is a combination of the visible 
sensor and the CDL data downlink. 
o Ground operations are estimated to be $1M/yr/person for eight 
hours a day.  For 24-hour monitoring, three people will be required 
for a total cost of $3M/yr.  This cost will remain the same whether 
for two satellites or four satellites.  This involves the monitoring 
reception of data and the satellite after initial launch operations are 
completed. 
As shown in Table 6-8, the Global Hawk operational costs for the Philippine Sea 
Scenario are approximately $514 million dollars. 
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Table 6-8.  Global Hawk Summary (FY$00 M) 
Global Hawk Summary 
  Unit Cost Quantity Ext. Cost 
UAV  $ 20.37 4 $ 481.49 
Ground Stations  $ 14.00 2 $ 28.00 
Operator  $  0.15 20 $3.00 
Maintenance  $  0.15 6  $ 0.90 
C-17 Flight  $  0.30 2  $ 0.60 
Total    $ 513.99 
 
The TacSat costs are listed in Tables 6-9 through Table 6-12.  Table 6-9  indicates 
the cost per satellite (using SMAD payload estimates) with the exclusion of ground 
operations since the cost will be the same regardless of the constellation sizes being 
considered.  The bus, payload, and launch information were taken from above and 
standardized to FY$00. 
Table 6-9.  TacSat SMAD Spacecraft and Launch Cost (FY$00 M) 
  Unit Cost Quantity Ext. Cost 
Satellite Bus  $ 16.80 1  $ 16.80 
Satellite Payload  $ 50.86 1  $ 50.86 
Launch Vehicle  $ 6.70 1  $ 6.70 
Total Per Satellite    $ 74.36 
 
Using the SVLCM model, the satellite costs are significantly cheaper as shown in 
Table 6-10.  In this model, the payload portion decreases in expense substantially. 
Table 6-10.  TacSat SVCLM Spacecraft and Launch Cost (FY$00 M) 
  Unit Cost Quantity Ext. Cost 
Satellite Bus  $ 16.80 1  $ 16.80 
Satellite Payload  $ 7.46 1  $ 7.46 
Launch Vehicle  $ 6.70 1  $ 6.70 
Total Per Satellite    $ 30.96
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To evaluate the different constellation sizes, the total cost per satellite was 
multiplied by the size of the constellation and then added to the ground operations cost.  
The results for the SMAD version of the satellite are shown in Table 6-11. 
 
Table 6-11.  TacSat SMAD Summary (FY$00 M) 
  
Constellation 
Size Ext. Cost Ground Ops Total 
Constellation A 2  $ 148.72  $ 3.00   $ 151.72 
Constellation B 3  $ 223.08  $ 3.00   $ 226.08 
Constellation C 4  $ 297.44  $ 3.00   $ 300.44 
 
The results for the SVLCM model are shown in Table 6-12. 
Table 6-12.  TacSat SVLCM Summary (FY$00 M) 
  
Constellation 
Size Ext. Cost Ground Ops Total 
Constellation A 2  $ 61.92  $ 3.00   $   64.92 
Constellation B 3  $ 92.89  $ 3.00   $   95.89 
Constellation C 4  $123.85  $ 3.00   $ 126.85 
 
Using the SVLCM model as the principal payload model, the TacSat becomes a 
very attractive solution.  The cost is less than a quarter of a Global Hawk system 
performing the same mission with four satellites orbiting.  In the worst case, using 
SMAD models for the payload, the cost is still significantly less that the Global Hawk 
system. 
Program costs are often a significant portion of the decision making process.  The 
revised Global Hawk program costs are shown in Figure 6-3. 
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Figure 6-3.  Global Hawk’s Annual Funding requirements. [UAV GAO 
Report, 2004] 
 
Program costs were projected on a 20 year program life based upon a 7% discount 
rate.  Using the SVLCM model, the total present cost of a 10 satellite TacSat program 
would be approximately $217 million (FY$04).  The funding profile is shown in Figure 
6-4. 
153





















Figure 6-4.  SVLCM Funding Profile 
 
Using the SMAD model, the total present value of the 10 satellite TacSat program 
is approximately $588 million (FY04).  The funding profile is shown in Figure 6-5. 
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Figure 6-5.  SMAD Funding Profile. 
 
 
All R&D is assumed to be completed in the first year of the program.  This will be 
enabled by using mature technologies to mitigate cost risks and schedule slips.  The 
procurements occur at one per year for the following ten years and production cost 
decreases by a 90% learning curve.  Operation and Maintenance costs are assumed to be 
the same across the entire life of the program.  The very large R&D expenditure in the 
first year of the SMAD funding profile is due to the very high cost of developing the 
payloads based upon large-scale satellite CERs.  TacSat has a conservative approach of 
using simple tried and true spacecraft and payload technologies so the R&D expenditures 
would be lower in these areas and could be used to offset the TacSat unique challenges of 
a common BUS, responsive timelines, and tactical control of the payload. 
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6.6  COST CONCLUSIONS 
Comparatively, the TacSat program (either the SMAD or SVLCM based models) 
are significantly less expensive in terms of development and procurement costs per year 
(Figure 6-6). 



















Figure 6-6.  Funding Requirements per Year 
 
As a result of comparing the development and procurement costs along with the 
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7.0  CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this project was to examine the feasibility of developing and 
employing tactically controlled and operationally responsive satellite systems.  To ensure 
relevancy, it was bounded by the requirements and constraints of a realistic mission 
scenario.  The “Philippine Sea Scenario” was selected as the most appropriate for the 
purposes of this study.  Military requirements were obtained from this scenario that drove 
the requirements for the space mission.  These high level mission requirements were then 
devolved into space system requirements.  The “Gap Analysis” compared the mission 
requirements to current capabilities such as commercial systems, and Global Hawk. The 
shortfalls identified through the gap analysis were examined as potential capabilities a 
notional space system might provide.    
This high-level space system engineering exercise, based on the SMAD process, 
was not expected to generate “the” solution for a TacSat system.  Rather it was carried 
out to see if a notional space system could be developed that would meet the 
requirements and provide military utility.  In addition, once armed with such a notional 
system it was possible to develop some estimates of what it would cost.  This analysis 
does not address issues such as the necessity of TacSat due to vulnerabilities in the 
national constellation.  If such vulnerabilities exist, then a wide range of solutions must 
be examined and decision makers should not assume TacSat is the only answer.    
To meet the scenario requirements, the team analyzed payloads, orbits, and 
constellation size.  These elements drove the development of a common bus.  A TacSat 
system also would need to be supported by ground infrastructure and launch capabilities.  
In addition, once all subsystems of the TacSat system were analyzed, the Aerospace 
Corporation’s Small Satellite Cost Model (SSCM) was used to develop a cost estimate. 
Technology has advanced greatly since the 1960s, but space costs have not gone 
down for several reasons.  Decision makers continue to push state of the art satellite 
systems instead of producing more quantities of less capable, but more producible 
satellites.  In this project, the team examined the feasibility of a TacSat system based 
solely on tactical military utility provided by such a system. 
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The key results of this exercise are summarized below: 
• Requirements Generation. The TacSat system requirements were generated from 
the Philippines Sea mission scenario.   It included stress factors that pushed the 
limits of such a system including vast distances between ground targets and a 
requirement to revisit each target hourly.  Even with these stress factors, the study 
showed that a TacSat system could meet those requirements and provide 
militarily useful imagery, SIGINT, and communications capability.  This study 
also showed that TacSat incurs minimal in theater logistical demands when 
compared to UAVs. 
• UAV Comparison. The same stress factors that make the Philippine Sea scenario 
a challenge to TacSat also make the scenario a challenge to traditional tactical 
assets such as Global Hawk.  This study pointed out the significant problems the 
theater commander would have when using a UAV such as Global Hawk to meet 
scenario mission requirements.  Additionally, UAVs impose constraining 
logistical challenges such as in theater support, airlift, air bases, and staff.   
• Constellation Analysis.  Analysis indicates a constellation of between two and 
four satellites in a 400 km orbit with a twenty degree inclination would meet 
imagery surveillance requirements.  A constellation of two satellites provides 
revisit times of 40 minutes, while a constellation of four satellites provides a 
revisit time of about 20 minutes. 
• Imagery Analysis.  The optimal payload for TacSat includes a panchromatic 
imager with a 0.4 meter optic, and a CDL data link system with an ESA.   
• Communications Analysis.  The large constellation size required for continuous 
coverage makes TacSat a non-feasible alternative for general voice and data 
communications purposes.  It is feasible for a store and forward architecture that 
would support data exfiltration.  
• Ground Station Analysis. TacSat requires the VMOC concept for tactical control 
of the TacSat payload while spacecraft operations and mission control require a 
globally distributed ground infrastructure.  Additional TacSat infrastructure is also 
required for the launch facilities including pre-staged launch vehicles, payloads, 
and buses.  This TacSat infrastructure has associated costs above and beyond the 
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costs of the spacecraft and the VMOC infrastructure in theater.  These costs can 
be minimized, however, by using existing Air Force Ground stations and 
operations facilities.   
• Cost Considerations. It is difficult to directly compare satellite systems to UAVs 
but this study did draw significant conclusions.  The procurement costs for a 
constellation of two tactical satellites is approximately $63 million.  It would take 
four Global Hawks to accomplish the same mission with a price tag of 
approximately $514 million.  
The natural shelf life of spacecraft and launch vehicles as well as the need 
to train as we fight requires that there be regular launches of TacSats.  This will 
lead to regular yearly costs associated with the TacSat program but will drive 
down per unit costs as more spacecraft are produced.  This should also encourage 
more rapid development of and space qualification of new satellite technologies. 
 
Based on the results and observations summarized above this study concludes that 
it is feasible to develop a tactical satellite system with current technology.  Tactical 
satellites have capabilities, such as providing surveillance over restricted airspace, and 
covering targets over great geographic distances, that systems such as Global Hawk 
cannot efficiently provide.  Most importantly, the operational costs of these systems vary 
as a function of time.  For short missions, UAVs can provide effective surveillance, while 
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APPENDIX A.  MODELING AND SIMULATION APPROACH 
Effectiveness Methodology 
 
TacSat has unlimited orbit and payload design possibilities. To verify potential 
designs, several iterations of modeling and simulation were performed using Satellite 
Toolkit (STK) software developed by Analytical Graphics. Launch site, launch windows, 
and logistics were not determined.  The goal of using this software was to provide only 
orbits, payload, and satellite life cycle verification which align with coverage and access 
and control issues.  Each of these was determined by an STK module or tool. 
 
The effectiveness methodology is as follows.  
 
a) Area of interest (AOI) and timeline. Based on the Philippines Sea Scenario, a 
futuristic vignette set in the year 2015, several regions in the Philippines and 
surrounding Indonesia were determined and inserted into the scenario. Below in 




Figure 1- Area of Responsibility 
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b) Force structure. STK has the ability to input Navy assets or “objects” into a 
particular scenario. The figure below lists the facilities, ship assets containing 
CDL, and Army MIST station. The force structure for this scenario consists of the 
following:   
1. Satellites.  After the AOI was determined, two LEO satellite objects were 
inserted.  To do this, the altitude, inclination, and RAAN needed to be 
specified along with the proper perturbed.   
2. Common Data Link (CDL). The satellites need a ground system with 
which to communicate. Through the process of elimination and research 
CDL was chosen for the satellite downlink. To distribute CDL coverage 
thoroughly three ships were modeled with routes east of the Philippines.   
3. Modular Interoperable Surface Terminal (MIST): Based on research with 
earlier TacSat experiments and ACTDs, MIST is in this scenario as a CDL 
compatible Army system. This object is represented by a road vehicle and 
is placed in the Philippines between the two volcanoes. 
4. Potential launch and ground stations. Perth, Wallops, White Sands, 
Okinawa, Santiago are potential ground and launch stations. 
5. Control Stations. Although not in this scenario, control stations play an 
important role in keeping the satellite along its current path.   
 
 
Figure 2- STK Objects in Object Browser  
 
c) Payload parameters. Each TacSat is designed to contain an imagery payload, a 
SIGINT, and communications (transmit/receive antenna) to deliver the data. The 
capabilities utilized in STK assume that the SIGNIT and imagery are the same. 
Attached to each sensor are transmit/receive antennas that represent the 
communications link. The table of contents below shows what the STK object 





Figure 3- Attached Satellite Objects in STK Object Browser 
 
d) Force Structure communication. The objects in the scenario need to communicate 
with the right systems and be able to relay data to compatible mission critical 
systems in the field. 
 
1. Pointing/Targeting. This is how the sensor is steered to the target which 
can be any type of asset. Looking at the AOR in Figure 1, each TacSat 
will first pass over the Western Approach, then the Spratly area, then the 
volcanoes, transmit down to the MIST station as much information as 
possible and if it is not done transmitting, downlink to the CDL on the 
other ships in the Force Structure. Both targeted and fixed imagery are in 
the model.  Targeting creates better access to the AOR, but does not come 
without its cost. 
 
2. Chains.  The TacSat constellation will communicate with CDL/MIST 
stations which may potentially relay to the ground stations (mobile units in 
the field). MIST and CDL must also be compatible and “chained.” 
 
e) Input researched payload parameters. After the chains were specified, the 
properties for each of the payloads needed to be looked at closer. 
 
Sensors object properties. This includes ground coverage is a combination 
of factors which determine access/coverage are. These factors are slew/cone angle 
which help determine swath width.   
 
1. Communications object properties. Each sensor has a respective transmitter 
and receiver associated with it. Since the sensor itself was gimbaled or fixed 
the communications antennas will move along with that particular sensor to 
pass data back and forth. So for gimbaled each antenna type on the TacSat 
constellation and the MIST/CDL ground stations were specified. STK allows 
flexibility by providing options for transmitters and receivers in the form of 
Simple, Medium, Complex transmit receivers. Simple just specifies the 
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frequency and the temperature. Medium specifies more detailed parameters 
and Complex specifies most antenna properties by inserting the beamwidth, 




Table 1- STK Communications Properties 
 


































Transmitter 1.9 Parabolic 7.5 5 0 0.2 RHCP BPSK STK Calculate 
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f) Run simulation. Once all properties are verified, the scenario was simulated for a 
potential constellation of up to four satellites.  
 
g) Change parameters and repeat. STK allows the user to insert an object, but it does 
not allow the user to shut an object off, so several iterations of this same 
experiment were ran for constellations for up to 4 satellites. Results in the 
appended reports will only include two through four satellites, their limitations/ 
increased coverage reports. 
 
h) Report results. STK offers the user the ability to report on many aspects of the 
scenario.  Satellite lifetime, for instance, reports a text file that shows the orbit on 
per day, weekly, monthly basis until it enters the earth’s atmosphere. It also shows 
a lifetime graph of that data. Other reports generated include Access times from 
the sensors to the ground station and coverage reports for the uplink and downlink 
capabilities. Lifetime, access, and coverage reports will all be in the appended 
results. 
 




In addition to the several iterations of altitude, GEO, LEO, HEO trade studies, 
coverage plot reports were generated for the specific areas inside the AOR designated. 
With a camera targeted on the center of the AOR, for one day coverage time (24 hours) 
is: 
Table 2- Pointing towards the Center of AOR, STK Stats by Region Report. 
 
Region Name Num Accesses Minimum (min) Maximum (min) Average (min) 
Surabaya 0 0 0 0 
Jakarta 0 0 0 0 
EastApproach 4 0.76 2.984 1.862 
IndNavApproach 9 2.138 10.141 5.519 
WestApproach 8 2.036 9.946 4.717 
Insurrection 7 0.337 3.399 1.998 
DADS 15 8.366 15.285 12.021 
SpratleyIs 11 73.775 98.381 91.615 
Volcano2 11 11.888 14.903 13.128 
Volcano1 11 11.872 13.289 12.526 
 
If the imagery cameras are pointed towards the Volcano area, the coverage time 
for one day (24 hours) looks like this:  
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Surabaya 0 0 0 0 
Jakarta 0 0 0 0 
EastApproach 0 0 0 0 
IndNavApproach 2 0 2.89 0.511 
WestApproach 0 0 0 0 
Insurrection 2 0.505 2.407 1.273 
DADS 2 2.105 6.129 4.206 
SpratleyIs 4 3.587 6.529 4.959 
Volcano2 16 29.83 52.962 41.02 




Access to the ground stations for downlink is another important issue. For a 
downlink MIST station located near the volcanoes and imagery pointing at two different 
areas, the following table shows access times and quantity for a 17-day period.  
 
Table 4. 









in 17 days 
Volcano 1.82 9.77 246 




Imagery coverage areas for different pointings are shown above. If the satellite 
points to the north, the areas to the south will not be covered. The opposite is also true, if 
the satellite points to the south, the north will not be covered as well. 
 
From the access table for downlink access, a MIST station in the field located 
near the volcanoes would not have very good access to the imagery data and would only 
experience downlinks intermittently.  This analysis is for only one TacSat and not two. 
Two satellites would double the access. Detailed reports on access and pointing will be in 
the thesis final package.   
 
Placement of the ground station becomes very important with respect to pointing 
of the imagery camera. The satellite will need to have enough onboard processing and 
mechanical ability to quickly maneuver imaging cameras and downlink to the ground 
stations. Both coverage and downlink capability must be examined further to determine 
downlink placement. Coverage areas can be altered as well to optimize pointing. 
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Coverage of the full AOR is determined by the sensors’ pointing. If the imagery 
cameras point to the center of the AOR, the downlink MIST station could be located at 
some other point. This means the satellite will need to maneuver the payload to complete 
the mission and downlink or have an alternate downlink. This analysis only incorporates 
downlink and imagery sensors pointed in the same direction. Alternate downlink designs 
were not analyzed. The results show that the best way to downlink to an area that will 
allow the most access to downlink is to point the camera at it first. These results do not 
include environmental constraints of the Philippines Sea Scenario. Those constraints will 




APPENDIX B.  TACSAT SENARIO 
Coalition FORCEnet Study – Operation Philippine Comfort Scenario 
 
1. TTCP’s MAR group has set up Action Group 6 (AG-6) to study the coalition impact 
of participating in the USN FORCEnet programme.  The intention is to provide 
guidance to each Nation (AUSCANNZUK) in terms of identifying opportunities to 
participate in FORCEnet, and the operational benefits that might result.  The aim is to 
assist each Nations decision making process, by supporting their criteria for evidence 
to approve such an investment. 
 
2. AG-6 have outlined a programme of work to identify technical opportunities, and 
both high and low level operational analysis, that will leverage individual Nations 
capabilities, previous MAR AG-1 collaborative work, and also utilize MSc studies by 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) systems engineering students.  Discussion 
has identified the requirement for a feasible Coalition scenario, to act as the 
framework for the various modeling efforts and that the Operation Philippine 
Comfort – CJTF scenario, already used for U.S. demonstrations of FORCEnet 
components, might be appropriate.  The scenario can be set in any timeframe through 




3. Historical Setting: Oil has been confirmed in the Spratly Islands Region in 2008.  
This has led to greater territorial dispute and re-interpretation of the Economic 
Exclusion Zone by the five nations laying claim to the Spratly’s and their potential 
mineral wealth.  International arbitration has resulted in the Philippines being 
awarded major holding in the disputed area in 2010; Indonesia has routinely stated 
that the U.S. public support of the Philippines’ claims was capricious, and in 
retribution has done little to quell the indigenous anti-U.S. fomentation by its Islamic 
fundamentalists.  While Indonesia is not likely to embark on overt unilateral military 
action against the Philippines, they are likely to attempt to capitalize on opportunistic 
regional instability.   
 
4. The scenario opens with an internationally compelling natural humanitarian disaster -
public sentiment requires relief action an the part of each nation.  Each nation has in 
the vicinity assets with some dual use capability (naval/humanitarian relief) so their 
initial response can be measured in days not weeks.  The trade space for modeling the 
force is that some portion of the U.S. ESG will not be available.  The injection of the 
Indonesian Naval threat will be evolutionary and will begin after the Nations have 
already very publicly committed to the humanitarian mission, thus removing the 
opportunity to just not participate. 
 
1. From the Indonesian perspective opportunity knocks in 2015: the Philippines are 
affected by two large volcanic eruptions affecting the centre of the country 
(Luzon), and the overall disruption leads to a political crisis and change of 
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government.  Other nations provide support with humanitarian and disaster relief, 
but whilst this effort gathers pace, Muslim factions in the southern province of 
Mindanao use the opportunity to forment trouble and achieve their own goal of a 
separate secular state.  The coalition support then widens to include peace 
making/peace enforcement, and the U.S. dispatch an Expeditionary Strike Group 
(ESG) with an amphibious component to ensure that disaster relief is not 
impeded, and to provide additional land support to Philippine ground forces 
facing the insurgents.  In turn this triggers increased Indonesian support 
(previously covert) to the separatists, and their naval units (SAG and SSK) 
attempt to oppose access by the ESG. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Natural Disaster Triggers Scenario 
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Chronology.  The following is the outline timeline: 
 
Table 1 - Timeline 
 
Day Event: 
D0 Volcanic eruptions, Philippines asks for international assistance with disaster and 
humanitarian relief 
 Tensions over crisis response cause fall of Philippine Government 
D+1 Insurrection starts. CNN reports rebel forces have taken government hostages and 
are threatening NGO entry/aid efforts. 
D+1 Commitment of ESG 
D+4 Indonesian declaration of support to insurgents.  SAG and SSK deployments 
 Stabilisation forces delivered ashore 
 
FORCEnet Capability Assumptions   
2. The nature of the ESG lends itself to accommodating coalition enhancements to 
give a scalable and compassable force.  The intent of the study is to quantify the 
degree to which FORCEnet improves its changes of success.  Table 2 lists the 
broad benefits that would expect to be enjoyed by an ESG/CSG with a coalition 
element at various levels of FORCEnet capability.  Benefits accumulate with 
increasing FORCEnet level. 
 




0 No FORCEnet.  Vessels use voice radio and Link 11 or 16 to share 
situational awareness and C2 data.  Platform-centric in character. 
1 Filtered, delayed, low bandwidth (dialup) FORCEnet (like ‘no FORCEnet’, 
but higher fidelity/faster updates).  ESG/CSG has access to reach back and 
has the ability to distribute intelligence information gained from that to all 
ESG/CSG members.  Information from organic sensor and intelligence data 
is available with some time delay throughout ESG/CSG.  Recognized 
maritime picture (RMP) which fuses organic and other ESG/CSG data is 
distributed with minor time delays. 
2 Real-time targeting information gained from any U.S. or coalition 
asset/source (when latter is technically capable) is available to all ESG/CSG 
vessels as required.  Access to targeting information is assured within 
understood limitations. Information accuracy, timeliness and coverage 
continuity are assured up to predefined levels.   
Rapidly updated RMP is available to all ESG/CSG vessels. 
3 Weapons systems are networked but are only able to be controlled by 
national authority. 
4 Vessels of all coalition nations are technically and politically/militarily able 
to offer weapons systems as a network service for command by approved 
authorities from any of the nations within the ESG/CSG. 
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Specific ESC/CSG +/- coalition capability options to explore in the modeling are 
shown in Table 3. These options are mapped to the benefits listed in Table 2 
 
Table 3 – FORCEnet Options 
 
Option Description Map to Benefits in Table 2 
I (do nothing)  
 
Small size (all U.S.) ESG force, 
fully FORCEnet capable U.S. part (level 3) 
No Coalition 
II (do 
minimum)    
Added Coalition ships, but not 
FORCEnet capable (i.e., larger 
overall force) 
U.S. part (level 3) 
Coalition part (level 0) 
III  Intermediate FORCEnet capability 
to the additional Coalition ships 
U.S. part (level 3) 
Coalition part (levels 1 or 2) 
IV Full FORCEnet capability to entire 
force 




7. Volcanic eruptions on Luzon have caused widespread civilian distress, and Naval and 
Marine forces from the Essex ESG (originally transiting South East Asia en-route to 
the Arabian Gulf) are diverted.  The U.S. commit the force to Humanitarian Aid and 
Disaster Relief (HA-DR) tasking, involving airlift, medical and material 
requirements.   The ESG is 72 hours from Republic of Philippines (RP), when it is 
ordered to divert to provide humanitarian assistance/relief and to be prepared to 
assume the role of Maritime Component Commander (MCC).  Other nations also 
promise relief assets, to be identified over the next 48 hours.  
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Figure 2 – Maritime Storyboard – Assembly of ESG 
 
8. Fundamentalist rebels (ASG) remain active on southern Philippine islands, and 
increased force protection measures are applied to all units transiting within the 
vicinity.  The ESG is briefed to anticipate the possibility of providing assistance to 
U.S. and RP ground forces, and at T+36, the MCC re-roles assets to provide for 
enhanced Force Protection of MCC forces and NGOs.  
 
9. At T+48  (1500Z07NovXX) Indonesia announces support for ASG.  The statement: 
• praises the gallant fight of the Muslim freedom fighters and their valiant struggle 
to achieve independence on for the Muslim Republic of Mindanao. 
• criticizes the Philippine Government not recognizing this new republic. 
• criticizes the U.S. Government for its support of the Philippine Government and its 
suppression of liberty. 
To show its support of Mindanao, Indonesia announces that it will send a naval force 
northward up the Sulu Archipelago on a Freedom of Navigation (FON) transit to Mindanao. 
They do not announce what that force will do once it arrives in the area, but it is 
likely to be based on their recent major sea exercise off the south-eastern point of Borneo.  
This featured:   
• 2 cruisers, 5 frigates and 1 amphibious ship have been operating as a single force, 
conducting anti-submarine operations against the 2 Kilo submarines for about five days   
• The exercise was observed by a nearby Australian frigate that also monitored the 
communications traffic  
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• The Kilo’s appear to be fairly proficient.  National sensor support confirms that the 
submarines have not returned to port near Jakarta, there is no SIGINT information to 
confirm their whereabouts, and the Kilo positions have been unknown for about 50 
hours 
10. The ASW vignette then runs for 6 days, and covers the approach of the ESG to the 
operating area near Mindanao, the monitoring and shadowing of Indonesian naval 
units in the Sulu sea as the scenario unfolds, forming the first, and then a second 
SAG.  The ESG then has to localise two Kilo class SSK using a mixture of assets: 
MPA, SSN, LFAS and deployable barrier sensors laid by Littoral Combat Ships 
(LCS),  which is supported by an operational deception (Opdec) plan covering the 
major surface units of the ESG.  Timeline considerations include: 
• Virginia-class SSN based at Apra Harbor (Guam) could be off Mindanao in about 41 
hours, plus whatever time is required to make ready for sea.  
• Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) operate out of NAS Agana.  There could be one aircraft 
continually on-station for up to two-weeks. 
• A five-ship squadron of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in Apra Harbor, with sufficient 
undersea surveillance modules to equip two of these ships with deployable surveillance.  
With a 40-kt SOA, LCS can be on-station off Mindanao in about 26 hours, plus 
whatever time is required to make ready for sea 
• A TAGOS ship (Cory Chquest) equipped with Low-Frequency-Active Sonar (LFAS) 




11. Scenario Order of Battle 
 
ESG ORBAT prior to Coalition enhancement:  
Essex  LHD2 Winston Churchill  DDG81  
Curtis Wilbur  DDG54 City of Corpus Christi  SSN705  
Juneau  LPD10 Niagara Falls  LCS1  
Ft McHenry  LSD43 Cumberland Falls  LCS2  






A. High-intensity operations (combat expected) 
On warning + 10 days, a high readiness Cont TG and sustain the TG for 60 days, 
including transit time.  
MARPAC (Esquimalt) would provide  
• 1x FFH,  
• 1x DDG or AOR, and organic air.  
MARLANT (Halifax) would provide  
• 1xFFH,  
• either the DDG or AOR that MARPAC did not provide, and organic air.  
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Also: 
• 1 x SSK could also deploy with the TG from either the East or West 
Coast.  
 
B. Medium-intensity operations (significant threat to deployed forces expected),  
Same configuration as in(A). but for a period of 12 months (over 2 ROTOs), 
including transit time.  
 
C. International contingency operations  
1 x FFH from MARPAC sustained for 60 days or 12 months (over 2 ROTOS), 
including transit time. 
 
 
New Zealand  
 
Suitable subsets chosen from: 
• 2 x ANZAC Class FFG (HMNZS Te Mana and Te Kaha) 
– Speed: 27+ kts, Range 6,000 nmi @ 18 kts 
– Weaponry: 5” gun, CIWS, Seasparrow Mk 41 air defence missile system, 
2 x MK 32 Mod 5 Surface Vessel Torpedo Tubes , 50 cal guns 
– Comms: Link-11, 64 kbs INMARSAT, VHF/UHF voice, HF Signals 
System, HF/UHF subnet relay 
– GCCS-M 
– CENTRIXS (single COI at a time) 
– Carries 1 KAMAN Super Seasprite helo 
• 1 x Multi role vessel (due 2006) 
– Capable of embussing up to 250 troops, and a range of equipment 
including: 2*NH90 or SeaSprite helos and LAVs 
– Able to land troops and supplies without established port. 
• 1 x Replenishment at sea vessel (HMNZS Endeavour) 
– Speed: 14 kts, Range 10,000 nmi 
• 1 x Hydrographic research vessel (HMNZS Resolution) 
– Speed: 11 kts, Range 21,500 nmi. 
• 1 x Diving support vessel (HMNZS Manawanui) 
– Speed: 11 kts, Range 5,000nmi 
• 6 x RNZAF P3-K Orion 
– Currently undergoing an upgrade of communications, navigation and 
sensing capabilities  
– Wide range of sensing systems 
– Comms: Link-11, HF/UHF Voice 
• 5 x KAMAN SH-2G Super Seasprite 
– Capable of carrying torpedoes, depth charges and maverick missiles. M60 
machine guns 











2 x ANZAC FFH 
2 x FFG 
1 x Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) 
 
 
Indonesian Naval ORBAT: 
 





8 Strela-3 (SA-N-8 Gremlin) 
18 VA-111 Torpedoes 






2 quadruple SA-N-5 (24 
missiles) 
2 twin 16-in torp tubes (400-
mm) 
4 KH-35 
8 6 At Sea 






2 twin 16-in torp tubes (400-
mm) 
6 2 At Sea 





1 76mm gun 
8 SS-N-14 ASCM 
3 2 At Sea 








1 76 mm gun 
 








12 At sea 




3 1 At Sea  
2 In Surabuya 
 
Concept of Analysis for AG-6 Modeling 
 
12. The Concept of Analysis (CoA) for AG-6 modeling includes both high and low level 
operational Analysis (OA).  The high level work is essentially at the campaign 
outcome level, whilst the lower level work is at the vignette or encounter level.  The 
overall hypothesis is: 
    H1.  FORCEnet gives the ability to compose a well trained, coalition agile 
mission group, which will achieve military aims quicker, with less resources, and 
at lower risk. 
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The planning workshop also identified the following top-level Measures of Effectiveness 
(MoE), and lower level benefits or ‘qualities’ of the FORCEnet enabled taskgroup:  
Top level MOEs: Qualities: 
Campaign Success (Effectiveness) Agile/Flexible/Adaptive 
Economy of Effort (Efficiency) Plan/Train/Rehearse/Execute/Regenerate 
Time to Capability (Timeliness) Collaborative Working 
Minimise Attrition (Risk) Quality of Information 
 Shared Awareness 
 Self Synchronising 
 Distributed Combat Elements 
Table 4 – MoE and Qualities 
 
13. Integration of vignettes into High Level Campaign analysis.  There are two discrete levels 
of OA work: high-level campaign modeling (using NSS, DARNOS or MANA), and lower-
level vignette or encounter modeling, exploiting national work, the previous MAR AG-1 
study, and the team projects of system engineering MSc students from NPS.  It is the 
intention that all use a common representation of the scenario, and of the options outlined in 
para 4 above, and that the more detailed lower level work is used to ‘underpin’ or calibrate 
the relevant aspects of the high level models. 
 
14. The output of the lower-level modeling can be characterised either as a Measure of 
Performance (MoP), or as the MoE for that element in isolation (which are then 
capable of being used as building blocks for the higher level analysis work).  In the 
event that there are problems with the high level models, the following picture shows 
how the ‘slices’ of lower level work may be aggregated upwards to produce the same 
outcome.  The eight slices cover the sequential phases of the operation, followed by 
recovery & regeneration: 
• Training & Planning as the Coalition ESG force ‘gels’ together during the transit 
and assembly phase (NPS work plus DARNOS). 
• A littoral transit phase against a FIAC threat (MAR AG-1 work with MANA). 
• ASW against the Kilo threat (MAR AG-1 work with Queue Theory) 
• ASuW against the SAG threat 
• AAW and/or ASMD should the Indonesian forces achieve launch position 
against ESG (NPS work using Extend model) 
• Amphibious offload, to put the forces ashore to back up the RP troops against 
the insurgents 
• Naval Fires support, if appropriate to land campaign (DARNOS, and potentially, 
NPS) 
• MIO, to stop Indonesia reinforcing the insurgent ashore, by sea (MAR AG-1 














      Metrics are
             MoE1-4
Total of 8 vignette ‘slices’, plus recovery & 
regeneration
Each ‘slice’ is freestanding, and when modelled 
as low level OA, will have MoP/MoE.  These 
calibrate or benchmark          respective parts of 
higher level campaign model, or metrics can be aggregated sideways  


























Figure 3 – Overall Study Structure 
 
15. The only issue with this simplified picture, is that it presents an almost ‘linear’, 
attrition based view of the operation, whereas Network Centric Warfare is intended to 
capture the parallel application of effort to many aspects simultaneously, and by using 
adaptive behaviour, to achieve Effects Based Operations.  These aspects may be 
captured by the high-level campaign model, and the use of ‘sideways’ aggregation of 
the lower level slices represents a fallback, in the event that the campaign work is not 
completely successful.   The high level metrics (MoE1-4), and the contribution made 
by the lower level measures are shown below:       
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High Level MoE:                       Contributing Elements and Notes:
MoE1
Time to Capability
Number of MEU major Amphib units delivered
time to achieve
Gives credit for safe delivery ashore, and factors 
in transit speed, i.e. Fn will reduce timeline, by
incorporating planning and rehearsal into transit 
MoE2
Economy of Effort
Cost, for fuel and munitions used in Campaign
MoE3
Risk
Minimise blue attrition - sum total of unit losses for 
all eight slices (assemble, Littoral transit, ASW, 
ASuW, AAW/ASMD, Offload, NFS and MIO)
MoE4
Campaign Success
Probability of success for each warfighting slice
(Littoral transit, ASW, ASuW, AAW/ASMD, NFS)
multiplied by Time to Capability (MoE1) minus
MoP for MIO phase
Safe delivery of Campaign effectors (landing force
ashore), minus red’s ability to interfere with/
degrade our operations by reinforcing insurgents
 
 
Figure 4 – Model and Metric Integration 
 
16. It is likely that this view will be refined as the study progresses, and in particular that 
the lower level slices can also be aligned with the ‘FORCEnet Qualities’, identified in 




TTCP MAR AG-6 FORCEnet Systems Engineering Study Philippines Scenario: 
Vignette Breakdown and Measures of Effectiveness 
 
The TTCP MAR AG-6 scenario plan lays out a timeline of events, which is broadly as 
described in Figure 1 below. Here a U.S.-led Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) or 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is joined by elements from Australia, New Zealand, Canada 
and the United Kingdom, who then assist in humanitarian relief and insurgency 
suppression in the Philippines. 
 
 
Figure 1 Graphical overview of scenario. 
 
In order to break the scenario down into specific tactical situations a second map, shown in 
Figure 2, has been developed. Amphibious offload, maritime interdiction operations and 
naval gunfire support are not shown as they are all likely to occur close to the landing 






Figure 2.  Tactical situation plan for TTCP MAR AG-6. 
 
Orbats are provided here on the basis that often only a selection of the assets listed would 
be used in specific studies. 
 
Phase 1 - Training & Planning as the Coalition ESG/CSG force ‘gels’ together 
during the transit and assembly phase  
 
Description.  FORCEnet enables connected platforms and organizations to plan and train 
together while assembling the force.  The assembly phase is notionally shown in Figure 
1. 
 
MOP.  Potential high-level MOP are presented here.  Performance in each of vignettes 
explored here will contribute to these overall measures. 
  
1.1 Disposition of COP prior to arrival in theatre as compared with that after arrival. 
1.2 Timeline to geolocate, identify and act on targets of interest. 
1.3 Level of understanding of commander’s intent. 
 
Potential Executor/Models. (NPS work plus DARNOS). 
 
 
Phase 2 - A littoral transit phase against a FIAC threat 
 
Description.  ESG/CSG transiting Sarangani Strait is attacked by FIAC manned by 
insurgents. FFG/LCS defend the high value units (HVU: LSD (1), LPD (1), LHD/CVN 
(1), NGO Vessels) from the attackers.  Figure 3 shows the course taken by the ESG/CSG. 
The littoral environment offers the opportunity for FIAC to attack from close to 
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Mindanao where they can be initially concealed in coastal traffic; or for them to attack 








Blue Force.  Combat: LCS (3), 2 DDG, 2 Coalition FFG/DDG (2), MPA/AWACS/ 
UAV/helos.  HVU: LHD/CVN(1), LPD(1), NGO vessels 
 
Red Force.   5 - 20 type 1 (armed with RPG/large blast bomb - range 500m) or 2 - 5 type 
2 FIAC (armed with multiple launch rockets – range 8 km) 
 
Force Objectives 
Blue.  Defend HVU and continue on course. 
Red.  To destroy the HVU.  Suicidal psychology. 
 
Relevant FORCEnet levels.  Levels 0 – 4. 
 
MOP.  Potential high-level MOP are presented here.  Performance in each of vignettes 
explored here will contribute to these overall measures. 
 
2.1 Average detect to kill time. 
2.2 Probability/Number of leakers. 
2.3 Probability of achieving raid annihilation 
2.4 Number of HVU soft-killed 
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2.5 Number of Blue combatant craft soft-killed 
2.6 Time for contacts to propagate to all vessels in fleet. (Time to propagate COP) 
 
Potential Executor/Models.   Extension of TTCP MAR AG-1 work with MANA. 
 
 
Phase 3 - ASuW against the SAG threat 
 
Description: Red force forms surface action group (SAG) during approach to Sulu Archipelago. 
Blue force monitors and shadows SAG as it passes through the archipelago. Red force forms a 
second SAG once it arrives in the Sulu Sea and Blue force continues its monitoring/shadowing 
role. See Figure 2 for a map plan. 
 
Blue Force ORBAT 
Combat: 3 LCS, 1 SSN, 2 DDG, 2 Coalition FFG/DDG, MPA/AWACS/UAV/helos 
HVU: LHD/CVN(1), LPD(1), NGO vessels 
 
Red Force ORBAT 
2 Parchim Covette, 3 Van Spijk FFG 
 
Blue force objectives 
Monitor and shadow Red force SAG 
 
Relevant FORCEnet levels.  Levels 0 – 2. 
 
MOP.  Potential high-level MOP are presented here.  Performance in each of vignettes 
explored here will contribute to these overall measures. 
 
3.1 Amount of time SAG within sensing range. 
3.2 Efficiency of asset allocation for monitoring duty. 
3.3 Ability to maintain RMP (accuracy, timeliness etc.). 
 
Potential Executor/Models.  Unassigned 
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Phase 4 - ASW against the Kilo threat 
 
Vignette Description.  As shown in  
Figure 2, once the ESG/CSG has passed through the Sulu Archipelago into the Sulu Sea 
it must localise two red force submarines. It will use a range of assets and sensors to do 
this.  
Figure 4 shows the concept of benefit that TTCP MAR AG-1 saw from network enabling 
the fleet in such a tactical situation 
False Target Reduction Concept
• Use sensor correlation across all appropriate platform s in a task group to 
reduce the num ber of non-target contacts presented to sensor operators.
• Reduce non-object false contacts, such as reverberation spikes and 
w recks, by using acoustic m odels, in situ data, and local data bases.
 Congestion of sonar, high w orkload
 Tim e to investigate false contacts
 Reduction of effective search rate
 Missed detections of targets
 Inform ation is essential
 System  to rem ove specified sensor contacts
 Can possibly low er detection threshold













Submarine’s search track plan is interrupted 
due to false contact investigation
Submarine avoids unnecessary false contact 




Figure 4.  TTCP MAR AG-1 ASW NCW Concept. 
 
ORBATs 
Blue - A mixture of assets: MPA (1 continuous equivalent U.S. or coalition), SSN (1), 
LFAS and deployable barrier sensors laid by LCS, (3).  
Red - 2 Kilo submarines. 
 
Force Objectives 
Blue - ESG/CSG aims to localize the red force submarines. 
Red - Unknown. 
 
Relevant FORCEnet levels.  Levels 0 – 2. 
 
MOP.  Potential high-level MOP are presented here.  Performance in each of vignettes 
explored here will contribute to these overall measures. 
4.1 Probability of locating and classifying enemy submarines 
4.2 Time taken to locate and classify enemy submarines 
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Potential Executor/Models.  Extension of TTCP MAR AG-1 work with Queue Theory. 
Phase 5 - AAW and/or ASMD should the Indonesian forces achieve launch position 
against ESG/CSG  
 
Vignette Description.  During or after the hunt for the SSK Red force may launch an air 
or missile attack.  
Figure shows this occurring somewhere in the Sulu Sea. 
 
ORBATS 
Blue force - Combat: LCS (3), DDG (2), U.S. E-2C (1), Coalition FFG/DDG (2). 
HVU: LHD/CVN(1), LPD(1) 
 





Blue - To defend ESG/CSG against air/missile attack. 
Red - To attack ESG/CSG from the air/with missiles. 
 
Relevant FORCEnet levels.  Levels 0 – 4. 
 
MOP. Potential high-level MOP are presented here.  Performance in each of vignettes 
explored here will contribute to these overall measures. 
 
5.1 Average detect to kill time. 
5.2 Size of supportable engagement envelope. 
5.3 Probability/Number of leakers. 
5.4 Probability of achieving raid annihilation 
5.5 Number of HVU soft-killed 
5.6 Number of Blue combatant craft soft-killed 
5.7 Time for contacts to propagate to all vessels in fleet. (Time to propagate COP) 
   
Potential Executor/Models.  NPS work using Extend model.  MANA is a possibility as an 
alternative. 
 
Phase 6 - Amphibious offload, to put the forces ashore to back up the RP troops 
against the insurgents 
 
Vignette Description.  Once seaborne threats have been removed or subdued preparation is made 
for amphibious offload of troops and equipment to assist RP troops against the insurgents. ISR 
requirements must be met for a beachhead landing including littoral reconnaissance prior to 





Blue - Combat: LCS (3), Coalition FFG/DDG(2), DDG (2), MPA/UAV/helos 
Amphibious offload: LPD (1), LHD/CVN(1), NGO Vessels, Coalition amphibious 
offload ships (e.g. UK LSD(A) or NZ MRV). 
Red - Land insurgent elements. 
 
Force Objectives 
Blue - Support safe landing of troops and equipment. 
Red - Disrupt Blue force landing at all costs. 
 
Relevant FORCEnet levels.  Levels 0 – 2. 
 
MOP.  Potential high-level MOP are presented here.  Performance in each of vignettes explored 
here will contribute to these overall measures. 
 
6.1 Time to complete amphibious offload. 
6.2 Ability to co-ordinate ISR assets before and during offload to monitor sea and 
land threats. 
 
Potential Executor/Models.  MANA is a possibility here. 
 
Phase 7 - Naval Fires support 
 
Vignette Description.  During HA phase of amphibious offload, truck-loaded rocket 
launchers attack coalition amphibious forces.  Trucks are either well-camouflaged or 
disguised as ambulances mixing with other HA assets.  Trucks commence firing 
unguided rockets at landing marines and landing craft.  The trucks are located on cliff-
tops or other inaccessible locations which prevent direct marine counter-attack, therefore 
marines request fire support from coalition ships. 
 
SACC determines fastest available asset is NSFS, therefore AWD and 1xANZAC are 
ordered to conduct NSFS ops to suppress trucks. 
 
MOPs. Potential high-level MOP are presented here.  Performance in each of vignettes explored 
here will contribute to these overall measures. 
 
7.1 Time and number of rounds taken to suppress truck attack. 
7.2 Number of trucks destroyed vs. number of trucks escaped. 
7.3 Accuracy of first round falls of shot. 
7.4 Time taken from call to fire, to first round impact. 
7.5 Time taken from first anti-coalition attack to first round impact. 
7.6 Time taken from first anti-coalition attack to BDA confirming target neutralized. 
 
ORBATs 
Blue  - 1 x ANZAC  
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1 x AWD 
1 x UAV (RAN owned or U.S. owned) 
Marine spotter(s) 
Red - 4xtrucks with rocket launchers hidden or disguised, possibly mobile. 
Neutral - Refugee camp 500 yards form trucks 
 
Relevant FORCEnet levels: 
 
FORCEnet level 0.  Marines spotters provide target info (MGRS coordinates) by voice over 
radio only to NFSF ships. 
 
FORCEnet level 1 
• Targeting from marines only (no UAV) via GPS/laser spotting device 
• Delayed UAV info 
FORCEnet level 2 
Targeting high-resolution video feed from UAV/marine spotters freely available. 
 
Example Storyboard 
• During HA phase of amphibious offload, truck-loaded rocket launchers 
attack coalition amphibious forces.   
• Trucks were either well-camouflaged or disguised as ambulances mixing 
with other HA assets.   
• Trucks commence firing unguided rockets at landing marines and landing 
craft.  Trucks located on cliff-tops or other inaccessible locations, prevent direct 
marine counter-attack, therefore marines request fire support from coalition ships. 
• SACC (embarked on amphibious ship) determines fastest available asset is 
NSFS 
• AWD and 1xANZAC are ordered to conduct NSFS ops to suppress trucks. 
• SACC coordinates NSFS ships to spotter(s) 
• Senior NSFS ship contacts spotter 
o No FORCEnet: trucks visible to spotters (but out of range)  
o Intermediate/Full FORCEnet: trucks not visible: UAV deployed 
(from owner) to verify targeting 
o (Assume this is a daylight operation) 
• Spotter commences fire missions on truck (Assume a truck is visible) 
• At some point, all visible trucks are destroyed or have left the area.  Red 
fire ceases.   
• Commence BDA ops: 
o Using air assets (UAV, helicopters, CAP a/c) 
o Option to prosecute escaping trucks using air assets or NFSN 
ships, or ARH helicopters from RAN amphibious ship 
 





Phase 8 - MIO, to stop Indonesia reinforcing the insurgent ashore, by sea 
 
Description.  Indonesian forces have sent troops and supplies to assist the insurgents 
ashore. Method of entry is by unmarked civilian vessels. Blue force attempts to prevent 
this entry by forming a MIO barrier. All vessels passing through this barrier are queried 
and as many as possible are searched. Figure 5 shows a representation of the adaptive 
redeployment concept modelled by TTCP MAR AG-1 for MIO. 
 
Figure 5. Concept of adaptive redeployment within maritime interdiction operations as 




Blue - DDG (2), LCS (3), Coalition FFG/DDG (2). 2 RHIBs and boarding parties 
available per vessel. MPA/AWACS/UAV/helos. 
 
Red - Insurgents potentially utilizing: 
• Up to 50 fishing boats 
• 10 small craft/coastal traders 
• 4 large merchants 
Neutral  - Up to 50 fishing boats, 10 small craft/coastal traders, 4 large merchants 




Red - To evade the MIO barrier and to reach land. 
Blue - To prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching land. 
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Relevant FORCEnet levels.  Levels 0 – 2. 
 
MOP. Potential MOP are presented here.  Performance in each of vignettes explored here will 
contribute to these overall measures. 
 
8.1 Number of Critical Contacts of Interest (CCOI) successfully inspected vs. total 
number of craft in the AO 
8.2 Percentage of correctly identified CCOI in the Recognized Maritime Picture 
(RMP) 
8.3 Percentage of CCOI missed by the MIO 
8.4 Number of incorrectly identified craft boarded 
8.5 Average time taken to inspect each vessel 
8.6 Quality and timeliness of intelligence information gathered 
 
Potential  Executor/Models.  TTCP MAR AG-1 work with Queue Theory. 
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APPENDIX B.1: Vignettes/Vignette Variations of Specific National Interest 
 
Vignettes or vignette variations of specific national interest are presented here for the 
reference of the group. In addition to informing specific national studies, it may be that 
these vignettes are more useful to the group than the generalized ones shown in the main 
body of the text. 
 
Australian Phase 5 – AAW/ASMD Vignette  
 
Issues of Australian interest: 
• Performance of ASMD (PAR + IRST) ANZAC in point defense role in a 
FORCEnet/non-FORCEnet environment? (Needs heads-up on what the leakers 
are, FORCEnet vs. link) 
• High-jamming environment? – if FORCEnet isn’t being jammed  ANZAC IRST 
picture being passed to coalition via FORCEnet, link 16 
• ASMD project might want to be very FORCEnet compliant if IRST provides 
significant benefit to Force level ASMD 
• AWD contribution to FORCEnet? Local Air Warfare Commander to protect 
NSFS ships (While CG is protecting ESG) 
 
Vignette Description 
During the AW phase there are two task groups.  The first being the main task group lead 
by the U.S. Navy which includes a LHD/CVF and the second task group lead by RAN 
Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD), who is the Local Air Warfare Commander, with 2 x FFH 
are preparing for NSFS and Land Attack operations approximately 30 nm from the main 
task group. The main task group is under attack from multiple air threats consisting of 
sub-sonic and super-sonic ASMs launched from a hostile task group consisting of a 
number of SU-27s. Elements of this hostile task group split off  and attack the Australian 
task group. Subsequently, the Australian task group is under attack from 8 sub-sonic and 
4 super-sonic ASMs. 
 
MOE/MOPs 
• Probability of achieving raid annihilation 
• Quality of Recognized Air Picture (RAP) between Local Air Warfare Commander 
(LAAWC) and Air Warfare Commander (AAWC)  
• Handover of threats from AAWC to LAAWC 
• AWD conduct as LAAWC 
• FFH ASMD capabilities 
• AWD ASMD/AAW capabilities 
 
ORBAT 
Blue Force ORBAT 
U.S. led task group: 
1 x U.S. CVN 
2 x U.S. CG 
1 x UK DDG 
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2 x CAN FFH 
1 x U.S. E-2C  
 
RAN task group: 
1 x AS AWD 
2 x AS ANZAC FFH 
 
Red Force ORBAT 
8 x SU-27 
 
Information Requirements 
(References to Table 3’s force capability options are shown in brackets after each 
heading in the following.) 
 
No FORCEnet (option I) 
Link only (can’t fire on someone else’s track, FCR/IRST cueing or decoy employment 
only) 
 
Intermediate FORCEnet (option II) 
filtered, delayed, low BW (dialup) FORCEnet (like “no FORCEnet”, but higher 
fidelity/faster updates) 
 
Full FORCEnet (option III) 
U.S. equivalent (CEC everywhere) 
 
Example Storyboard 
TBD by U.S., based on vignette description.  (See also, NPS Study “FORCEnet for 
Coalition Joint Task Force, June 2005, TACSIT 2 
 
Study Output Opportunity 
SEA 4000, SEA 1448, JP 2048  
 
Australian Phase 8 - Maritime Interception Operations 
 
Vignette Description 
Within Operation Philippine Comfort, separatist insurgents are using small boats, fishing 
vessels, etc. to transport personnel, weapons, drugs (for revenue-raising), and other 
suspicious materiel between the islands to disrupt coalition operations.  With U.S. Navy 
assets occupied elsewhere, RAN/coalition units are tasked with intercepting insurgent 
vessels.  The aim of the mission is to prevent transport of personnel, weapons, drugs, and 
to gather intelligence on insurgent operations.  
 
MOE/MOPs 
• Number of Critical Contacts of Interest (CCOI) successfully inspected vs. total 
number of craft in the AO 
• Percentage of correctly identified CCOI in the Recognized Maritime Picture 
(RMP) 
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• Percentage of CCOI missed by the MIO 
• Number of incorrectly identified craft boarded 
• Average time taken to inspect each vessel 
• Quality and timeliness of intelligence information gathered 
 
ORBAT 
Blue Force ORBAT 
2 x AS ANZAC FFHs, with 2 x RHIBS and boarding teams 
2 x FFs, with 2 x RHIBS and boarding teams 
 
Red Force ORBAT 
Insurgents potentially utilising: 
Up to 50 fishing boats 
10 small craft/coastal traders 
4 large merchants 
 
Neutral Force ORBAT 
Up to 50 fishing boats 
10 small craft/coastal traders 
4 large merchants 




• Intel reports, and Situation Awareness (RMP) from U.S. sensors 
• Considerations of timing of information  
• with/without link 16 
• Fusion of organic and coalition information (handover of CCOI tracks from 
aircraft/satellite)  
 
(References to Table 3’s force capability options are shown in brackets after each 
heading in the following.) 
 
No FORCEnet (option I) 
2 x AS ANZACs (get filtered RMP via GCCSM/Centrixs) 
2 x FFs (get filtered RMP via GCCS-M/Centrixs) 
 
Intermediate FORCEnet (FFs option I, ANZACs option II) 
2 x AS ANZACs (Fully FORCEnet capable: they get the U.S. COP (RMP) 
2 x FFs (non-fully FORCEnet-capable coalition units: they get an RMP transfer from the 
AUS units 
 
“Full FORCEnet (option III) 
2 x AS ANZACs (Fully FORCEnet capable: they get the U.S. COP (RMP) 





1.  Land-based assets track suspected insurgent leader/arm shipment to local port 
2.  Ascertain three small boats being used for island transfer 
3.  Potential track will take them through the MIO AO 
4.  Air asset assigned to conduct surveillance.   
5.  Tracks the three boats departing port  
6.  Air asset hands over tracking of contacts to MIO units upon entering MIO AO 
7.  MIO units track and conduct boarding of the three vessels 
8.  Contraband and leader discovered during search 
9.  All SITREPS passed via FORCEnet 
10. FORCEnet used to disseminate info to Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) 
(probably U.S.) for determination of outcome 
 
5,6,7,9, and 10 would be affected by different levels of FORCEnet compliance. 
 
“Routine Boarding” 
Same as 1.5.1 but without air asset, i.e.: 
 
5.  MIO force is conducting routine MIO in the AO 
5.5. Land assets transfer all available info on CCOIs to MIO forces (via FORCEnet) 
6.  MIO detects CCOIs 
7.  MIO units track and conduct boarding of the three vessels 
8. Contraband and leader discovered during search 
9.  All SITREPS passed via FORCEnet 
10. FORCEnet used to disseminate info to OTC (U.S.) for determination of outcome 
 
Study Output Requirements 
Bandwidth requirements 
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